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CHAPTER - I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The distinctive feature of Contract Law, as 
compared to other branches of law, is that in the 
former the parties make law for themselves within 
the broad framework of the Contract Law, The fact 
that the State is willing to deploy its coercive 
apparatus to protect the reasonable expectations of 
promises means that the contracting parties are ena-
bled to acquire a kind of "limited sovereignty" by 
virtue of which they can engage in "private legisla-
tion" . The importance of contract in regulating busi-
ness and other social and economic relations is so 
great that Dot only private enterprise, but public 
enterprise units and the Government have resorted to 
contract as an instrument of participating in their 
country's market economy. Contract is,in effect, the 
instrument by which the conflicting interests of the 
participants in the econranic process can be reconciled 
and brought to a common goal, 
"Pacta Sunt Servanda" (agreements are Intended 
to be performed) once the pivotal of contractual juris-
prudence has now fallen into notoriety due to breaches 
of holy pacts, search for elusive defences by interested 
parties, hedges in performance evolved by law. The 
shrine having dwindled in course of centuries among 
other things due to people's low morale, culture, 
habit and discipline, the contracting parties now 
salvage or strengthen their legal position by a third 
party, called the surety. 
When the Indian Contract Act, 1872 was brought on 
the anvil, it was thought and rightly so, to include a 
chapter on indemnity and guarantee. In course of over 
a century the concept has found multiple uses in myriad 
factual situations. These situations are not necessa-
rily of a commercial nature. They encampass within 
their orbit situations as to repayment of loans and 
Bank overdrafts, repayment of the price of goods, sold 
to the principal debtor, guarantee to and by the banks, 
guarantees as to the regular payment of rent and fide-
lity bond of an employee relating to the honest discharge 
of his duties and partnership venturesHetc, 
The guarantee agreement has earned its rightful 
place as an important canponent of the commercial loan 
transactions. The immediate access to guarantors makes 
credit available in cases where it might otherwise 
be denied, 
A guarantee is the simplest form of security 
as banker may take and is for that reason the most 
common. Except where it is desirable for the banker 
to invite the guarantor to take independent advice, 
no formalities are required apart frcsm obtaining the 
guarantor's signature on the bank's standard form of 
guarantee, A guarantee is not a particularly safe 
form of security-depending as it does on the guaran-
tor's willingness and ability to pay when called upon 
to do so, A guarantee often demanded by a banker as 
an additional secxirity to reinforce a clean advance 
or buttress a tangible security. 
With respect to the undertaking by the surety, 
the types of guarantees are those guaranteeing the 
honesty of and faithful performance of duty, by, the 
principals, such as public officials and court fidu-
ciaries; those guaranteeing the credit of the princi-
pals; such as agents, consignees or licenses receiving 
money or property for which they are required to 
account; those guaranteeing the immediate payment of 
money or delivery of goods upon the happening of a 
specified contingency, such as the result of an 
appeal; and those guaranteeing the performance of 
contracts, such as for construction work and the 
supply of materials. 
First, there are public official bonds also 
called official undertakings. These are written 
by a surety to guarantee in effect that a named 
public official will faithfully discharge the duties 
of his office and promptly account for and pay over 
all money or properties received by him as such officer. 
Treasurers, customs and revenue officers, tax collectors 
and many executive and administrative officers fall in 
this category, 
A second Important class consists of fiduciary 
probate bonds. These are given to assure that the 
principals will faithfully administer and account for 
the assets ar estate. With which they are entrusted. 
In this group are executors, administrators, trustees, 
guardians, committees, assignees and receivers. They 
hold office by court appointment. 
The next class of bonds and that constitutes the 
most considerable portion of the business of suretyship 
is cc»nposed of those guarantees such as constructions 
contract bonds, these cover public works, high ways 
and tunnels, docks and drainage, public building 
and private construction of an almost unlimited 
nature. The surety undertakes in general, to indem-
nify the creditor by assuring the ccMnpletion of the 
work, payment for labour and materials and indemnity 
for loss through injury to workmen or defective cons-
truction. 
The concept has found an in let into the educa-
tional environment also. Some universities while 
granting study leave to their teachers require them 
to fill a bond to serve the university for a stated 
period on their return from the leave. This is required 
to be backed by a local guarantor so that in case the 
teachers ( principal debtors) fail to return to their 
or fail to fulfill the terras of the contract, the 
surety could be made liable by the educational insti-
tution to perform his part of the contract. Again, 
students, many of them minors, are admitted to the 
Engineering and Medical Courses under a guarantee by 
their guardians that on passing the prescribed exami-
nations the words shall serve at the place/places 
concerned for a stated period, otherwise the surety 
shall be liable. The credit houses which deliver 
goods on credit or on instalment to customers not 
unoften make use of the instrumentality of the 
guarantee, especially when the customer is non-
government servant. 
Banking system occupies a very important place 
in the economy of the modern world. The banking 
industry in India at present is passing through a 
period of rapid development and radical changes. It 
can hardly be gainsaid that banks have a pivotal 
role in financing the economic development of the 
country, their object inter alia being to promote 
production eradicate poverty and unemployir.ent, and to 
encourage the full development of the productive re-
sources of the country. In conformity with these 
objectives, the banks have been called upon these 
days to extend direct and indirect industrial and 
agricultural credit, besides giving direct financial 
assistance to carry out the developmental activities 
of the State, The development of banking has reached 
a stage where the banks are required to identify 
their business with national policies and programmes. 
In India, until recently, business on a 
large scale was confined to a few large cities. 
With an accelerated process of development, the 
variety and magnitude of corwnercial activities have 
expanded. Large scale construction and collaboration 
contracts involving huge financial outlays have natu-
rally increased the need of taking guarantees from 
banks, mostly for tenders and performance. 
The purposes of guarantees by banks are many. 
These include performance of a contract, repayment 
of a loan, repayment of an advance paiTTient made in 
respect of a contract involving the sale of goods 
and so on. The undoubted value of a guarantee on 
behalf of a customer is becoming an increasing prac-
tical advantage to commerce. In practice the banker 
v;ho gives the guarantee takes from the customer what 
in fact, is a counter indemnity, usually indicating 
that he is to pay on first demand. 
At the present time perhaps the most important 
ancillary service rendered by a banker to his com-
mercial customer is the facility of credit which 
enable the customer to discheurge his obligations. 
The main feature of this, however, is that the 
banker through his business connections is able 
to place the machinery of international commercial 
banking at his customer's disposal. Bank guarantees 
in internal and international trade are common 
features of ccstunercial practice. Transactions in-
volving financial liabilities of some magnitude are 
now almost InvariaQ^ly accompanied by bank guarantees. 
Since the advent of freedcxn in India an adop-
tion of industrial resolution and plan projects by 
it^ the system of guarantee ship has taken a new t\irn, 
the export and import of trade^ spreading of business 
within the country and punctilious performance of 
contract have, really speaking, necessiated the use 
of the instrument, foreign businessmen and country 
which enter into trade pacts with Indian commercial 
concerns require the guarantee by the State Trading 
Corporation of India or some allied agency to avoid 
a situation of dispair and dispute. Banks equally 
play an important role in furthering the cause of the 
trade through their guarantees, it has rightly been 
observed: 
The bank guarantee is an important 
instrument in Internal trade of a 
country, sometimes It also plays a 
useful role in international trade. 
a letter of credit is important in 
international trade. Obligations 
in bank guarantee is not an unquali-
fied obligation. By an irrevocable 
letter of credit, on the other hand, 
the issuing bank gives an undertaking 
to the beneficiary that all bills 
drawn in terms of letter of credit 
will be honoured without qualification. 
It would also be useful to refer to the Agricultural 
Credit Society Act, 1968, where loans are given for 
Agricultural purposes, the security for recovering 
the loan would obviously arise and the guarantee by 
a third person would secure the loan advanced to a 
farmer under this Act» i960. Interestingly Chapter 10 
which deals with Land Development Bcinks makes use of 
guarantee by the Government under sections 74 and 75 
of the Act, Sections 29 and 30 respectively of the 
Indian Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, also deal 
with loan by or to a registered society. But unlike 
the Jammu & Kashmir Act, there is no mention of gua-
rantee either in these or other sections of the Indian 
Act. However, recourse to the guarantee is not elimi-
nated and the general principles of law will apply. 
Deposits collected from lakhs of people were 
distributed among privileged few. The social wealth 
of the nation became the closed-door strong room of the 
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rich. The common man, the farmer, the small Indus-
trialist or the small businessman the type of people 
who make up the vast majority of India -were more 
or less denied an entry into this exclusive club of 
the elite - a faction that appropriated a lion's 
share of the national wealth and bank credit. There-
fore, the financially uncared for people had to throw 
themselves into the arms of the traditional money-
lender to whose clutuches once most of the Indian rural 
masses were bound, on the other hand, institutional 
finance continued to be at the back and call of the 
industrialists, big land-lords and speculators. If 
anything, this pattern of finance served to defeat 
an impbrtant socialistic objective of the Five Year 
Plans,i.e. reducing the economic disparity among the 
Indian people and in different areas. 
The neglect by the financial institutions was 
not limited to the weaker sections to whom money at 
reasonable rate of interest and in the simplest form 
of security was almost like Life saving drugs. Some 
changes in this one sided finance lending story was 
interjected in 1967 when the social control scheme was 
introduced. 
It is worthwhile to mention here that since 
the Nationalisation of the banks it has become easier 
for the government to implement its social welfare 
programmes by directing the banks to grant easy loans 
to small scale industrialists and others. To provide 
adequate safeguards to such lending banks, the govern-
ment has constituted a deposit insurance and credit 
guarantee corporation of India, 
In every developing country credit system, 
backed by guarantees and securities plays an important 
part. This helps the individuals in the raising of 
their living standard and capabilities for advancement. 
Firms and Ccxnpanies also are benefited in the expansion 
of their activities concerning trade and commerce. 
The tv/o main agencies for showering financial benefits 
for advancement and developnent are state financial 
corporations throughout the country and the banks. An 
inquiry into the office of Jammu and Kashmir State 
Financial Corporation reveals that loans against gua-
rantees, mortgage/ hypothecation are granted by it 
for the following purposesi 
i) weaving on Handlooms 
ii) weaving on power looms 
iii) stone crushing 
iv) Drug Manufacturing 
v) Cold storage 
vi) printing press 
vii) Husking of paddy 
viii) Band Saw Units/Saw Mills 
ix ) Flour and Rice Mills 
X ) Milk products 
xi ) Poultry and cattle feed 
2 
xii ) James,Jellies, pickles etc. 
All this is possible both through the system of 
guarantee and securities which borrower gives to the 
Corporation as per details prescribed by the Corporation, 
The banks also have come forward particularly 
since the time of Nationalisation in fulfilling the 
objects of the Five Year Plans to expand Commercial 
activities and provide relief to unemployed, A look 
at the report of the banks that a huge amount is 
advanced to the needy persons. What is intended to 
be emphasised here is the increasing imi>ortance of the 
instixunentality of guarantee ship and other forms of 
securities which has kept the "credit Ball in Motion", 
All this has been highlighted at appropriate places 
during the course of the reseaich work. 
IJ 
It will thus be seen that both In internal 
and international trade and man»y other matters the 
modality of a guarantee has become indispensable. 
Purpose and Scope 
During the course of more than a century of the 
Indian Contract Act, many legal problems have arisen 
which find no clear answer within the provisions of 
the Act, The courts have, therefore, grappled with 
these new situations, sanetimes on the basis of the 
provisions, sanetimes on English Common Law and some-
times on their judicial wisdom and experience. And 
yet, all this is not over | 
The glimpses of some of these problems which 
will be high lighted in this thesis in different 
chapters are as followsi 
a) The question whether or not a memorandum between 
parties is a contract of guarantee has arisen in many 
cases. A mere introduction or recommendation by the 
landlord of his new tenant to the Shopkeeper in the 
locality is not a guarantee that the former stands a 
surety to the latter for the payment of goods sold on 
credit to the tenant. On the otherhand, a positive 
assertion In writing as followsi 
"There will be no trouble In the 
payment of your money. Be 
assured If thereby any trouble, 
I hold myself responsible, •* -
has been held a surety contract* 
Again the question has been mooted w&ether a 
contract of guarantee Is a Contract Uberrlmae Fidel, 
4 
according to Trletle, Contracts of sioretyshlp or 
guarantees are scxnetlmes said to be Uberrlmae Fidel, 
but the later view Is that they do not fall Into this 
category. According to Tennan also whether or not a 
contract of guarantee Is one known to lawyers as 
uberrlmae Fidel, that Is one In the carrying out of 
which utmost goodfalth must prevail has been stumbling 
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blow even to classical legal authorities. 
The Indian Courts, not often, were called upon 
to examine this problem. In one case, however the 
Indian Court repudiated any similarity on this point 
between a contract of Insurance and a contract of gua-
rantee « The former belonging to the class of uberrlmae 
Fidel and the later not. The later class of contract 
were called "Strictassclna Juris", 
The legal distinction which emanates from this 
aforesaid classification is vital* In insurance cases 
there is a heavy duty to disclose and non-disclosure 
may be so sensitive that, it might not only render the 
policy void but also debar the representatives of 
the policy-holder frc»n claiming even the refund of 
the premiums paid by the deceased on such a defective 
life policy". In the suretyship contracts not classi-
fied as Contracts Uberrimae Fidei there is no such 
heavy duty of disclosure on the part of the creditor. 
Due to the importance of this legal position the thesis 
will undertake an in-depth study of the whole matter, 
b) Again a surety has been called a favoured debtor. 
Why? firstly, his liability is secondary and not pri-
mary, because it arises in the case of principal debtors 
default under section 126, Second, if the acts of the 
compauiy for which the debts have been guaranteed are 
ultra-vires the memorandxim of association, the surety 
g 
obviously, will not be liable for these illegal debts. 
Thirdly, his principal debtor under section 128, 
Fourthly, he is entitled to reimbursement from the 
debtor upon payment and also entitled to securities 
in the hands of the creditor. In State of Maharashtra 
9 
v» M,N, Kaul, Hadayatullah, C,J,, pointed out that the 
]j 
dictiim that a surety is a favoured debtor has been 
accepted both by the Privy Council and the Supreme 
Court but what is vital for the purpose of the thesis 
is the observation of the learned Chief Justice in 
that case that the coxirse of legal events have evolved 
several exceptions to this rule or status of the 
surety as a "favoured debtor". The thesis has ex-
plored this vital aspect of law. 
c) Section 129 of the Indian Contract Act defines 
as to what is "continuing guarantee". The actual defi-
nition is beset with legal difficulties. Questions 
have arisen whether the guarantee of a fidelity bond, 
due and regular payment of instalments of licence money 
are in the nature of a continuing guarantee. Further, 
10 
a Rangoon case has held that the illustration"a" to 
section 129 does not lay down a correct statement of 
law. Is it so? if so, why? The whole distinction 
between an ordinary and fixed guarantee is meaningful. 
If the former, the revocation of the guarantee is a 
breach of coi^tract. If the latter, the guarantee can 
be revoked under sections 130 and 131 of the Contract 
Act and thus, the suirety is further favoured at law. 
The thesis has examined this problem and attempted to 
i ; 
determine whether the definition of the continuing 
guarantee is satisfactory or needa change. 
d) The minor's agreements have been held to be 
void by the privy Council in Mohri Bibi v, Dhurmodaa 
11 
Ghose, The chapter on gueurantees, however, is abso-
lutely silent as to and whether a guaremtee as to the 
payment of debts incurred for necessary or non-
necessary purposes by the minor is valid or not. 
Section 128 of the Contract Act only speaks of the 
co-extenslveness of the guarantors liability. The 
Indian Courts have been divided over this question and 
both opinions/ affirmative and negative have been 
expressed. The thesis has further, considered this 
problem, in the light of English Common law in practice, 
e) In quite recent years- the performance guarantees 
have raised a new dimensional problem, the problem has 
arisen out of standard form contracts where one party 
binds the bank to pay the money to the creditor within 
a specified period demanded by him irrespective of the 
existence or non-existence of a dispute. The Judicial 
attitude of the Supreme Court in M,S.E,B. Bombay v, 
12 
Official Liquidator, H.C, Ernakulam, and of the Delhi 
IJ 
High COTirt in cases held earlier to this case 
( pesticides India v, S.C, and P, Corporation of 
J3 — ' 
India, and M/s B»L«R. v, Pos Cooperative Society 
• • ' 1 4 
and M, Federation Limited, and other have been 
favouraBle to the creditor and unless it is a case 
of fraud it appears, the bank will not be stayed 
to deliver the money or perform its guarantee to the 
creditor. In England, where the same result prevails 
Lord Deunlng has liked the performance guarantee by 
banks with irrevocable letter of credit". 
This problem, however, is not easy under the 
guise of development of trade and commerce courts 
have become champions of one-sided clauses, which is 
another grab of the condemned exemption clause in the 
field of the law of contracts. The matter is serious 
and the researcher has attempted a thorough prob*. 
fi) Yet another area, significantly Important, is 
the questionable power of the parties to make the 
provisions of the Contract Act ( Chapter on guarantee ) 
subject to the will of the contract. Can the parties 
abrogate the legislative will and substitute it with 
their own? If the answer is in the affirmative, 
careful draftsmanship of a party will, doubtless make 
him victorious in Courts and will restrict the task 
19 
of the courts to a mere construction of the deed. 
The thesis has examined this problem. 
These are only some of the problems which 
will be dealt with In the thesis. Other important 
matters on the subject will also be discussed. It 
needs to be clearly spelt out that the thesis will 
not be COTnplete without the delebratlon of the topic 
of "Bank Guarantees" including performance guaran-
tees by banks) through questionnaire and interviews, 
Thus the methodology of research will not be res-
tricted to study and dissection of the judicial 
decisions alone. It emperical knowledge gained 
through issue of Bank questionnaire and Interviews, 
Research cards system has been followed. The recan-
mendations of the Law Commission in their 13th report 
have been discussed where-ever found. 
The thesis most primarily deals with the 
Indian situations, the Indian provisions and the 
Indian Judicial decisions. It shall in no sense be 
comparative with English law, although Sir F, Pollock 
in his preface to the Indian work on Contract Act 
pointed out in the opening sentence that this Act is 
a code of English Law, nevertheless, as the majority 
16 
Of the Supreme Court In Gii?flhar Lai v« Bhagwan Daas^ 
pointed out that the Indian Contract Act is exhaustive 
and in such cases principles of justice, equity and 
food conscience will be applied which means English 
law, except where indian considerations and circum-
stances are different* But the Indian Contract Act 
is eachaustive so far as it goes and it is not permissible 
for the Indian Courts t6 apply the principles of 
English Law de-hors the Indian Act, as was pointed out 
17 by Justice Mukerjee in Satysbrata Ghose v, Mugneeram, 
the reference to the English decisions will, therefore, 
be not frequent but only occasional i.e. when in the 
fitness of a thorough research or a new situation 
reference becomes desirable. 
Nor shall this thesis make a detailed study 
of the bond given by a person to the Court strictly 
speaking, such a bond falls outside the scope a bond 
falls outside the scope of Contract of guarantee under 
section 126 of the Contract Act, But the Court may 
apply the spirit of these rules whenever a question 
18 
relating to the discharge of a surety is involved. 
The reasons for picking up of the topic for 
academic explusion are now, indeed obvious. These 
reasons are mani-fold. Firstly the concept of 
the suretyship is age-old, however, no scholarly 
significant contribution has been done in this 
area. In otherwords the topic is like the trusty 
version land in the desert and any probe in its 
disection will, undoubtedly convert the desert in 
an oasis* 
(i) The concept of suretyship is developing 
concept in the Industrialised india of today. New 
situations are coming up before the courts and the 
courts are combating with these problems. Sometimes 
on the basis of interpretions of the relevant pro-
visions of the Act, sometimes on guidance from the 
English Common Law System and sanetimes as a result 
of their Judicial wisdom, experience and insight. 
However* all the problems which have arisen before 
the courts have not yet found satisfactory solution. 
The foregoing pages demonstrate that in some situa-
tions there are differences between the courts. 
Neither the matter has reached to the open court of 
the land, nor has the legislature given it a magic 
touch with the result that the problem continue to lie 
where it was. It is significant, therefore, that an 
2J 
earnest effort must be made to find out satisfactory 
solution so that the law has a smooth functioning 
and it achieves* what jurisprudents say that cer-
tainty is one of the hall-marks of a good law. 
iii) The concept of the suretyship has broken 
national barriers. It has also become the forecry 
of international trade, international communities 
are coming up closer and India like some other 
countries thought of to reverse its advance balance 
of trade with the countries concerned. Naturally, 
therefore, the countries intending to enlarge their 
trade with India will be happy if the punctilious 
performance of the contracts in the quality of the 
goods are assured by the Government of India or by 
any of its allied agencies when the private sector 
contracts to supply the goods to the foreign trading 
community. Fundamentally for this reason alone the 
National and Internatio.ial sphere cannot be ignored 
and the law relating to the guarantee must find any 
adequate place in any research programme in this 
country, 
iv) The Indian Contract Act was brought on the 
Statute Book in the Year 1872, in the year 1955, 
however, a law commission was set up to suggest 
23 
suitable changes In this Act, The commission in 
their 13th report have not suggested significant 
changes In the concept of Guaranteeship, nevertheless 
the Law commission made recommendations in the defi-
nition of indemnity. The thesis, therefore, makes 
some suggestions for changes in the provisions on the 
chapter of guarantee. These changes for law reform 
may be kept in view in any future revision of the Act, 
Lastly the concept of the suretyship is a simple 
instrument as against a variety of concepts like 
mortgage, pledge, hypothecation which also secure in 
advance the future performance of the contract by 
the promisor. However, these concepts do not involve 
third parties and are necessarily complicated. In 
case of a contract of guarantee, here the principal-
debtor does not part with anything of value nor does 
the surety immediately handover the money, although he 
puts himself under a bond of obligation to the creditor 
in case of the default of the principal debtor, A 
creditor may involve, jyarticularly where the financial 
risks are high, both a guarantee by one or more persons 
and pledge also by the principal debtor dbf possible. 
2. 
Under the system o£ suretyiihip the creditoi Is 
safe even if the principal debtor becomes insolvent 
and various complications of law and procedure are 
abated when the principal debtor dies. The thesis 
brings out the value of the growing number of 
contract of guarantees in a developing society 
like India, 
The study does not go into the question of 
procedure# proof and evidence, stamp duty and suit 
valuation as these are more Important for practising 
lawyers, 
2J 
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CHAPTER - II 
NATURE AND ESSENTIALS OF THE CONTRACT OF GU'^ i\NTEE 
History of Guarantee 
A contract of suretyship is one whereby one party, 
the surety, guarantees that the other party, the principal 
debtor, will perform or carryout a contract or obligation 
with a third party, the creditor or obligee. 
The contract of guarantee is of very ancient date, 
perhaps to be "Coeval with the first contracts recorded in 
history". It seems that the words warranty and guaranty 
were the same, the letter "g* of the Norman French being 
convertible with 'w' of the German and English, as in the 
2 
names William or Guillaume. They are sometimes used indis-
criminately, but in general, warranty is applied to a con-
3 
tract as to title, quality or guantity of a thing sold and 
guarantee is held to be the contract by which one person 
is bound to other for the due fulfilment of a promise or 
engagement of a third party. 
Guarantee is the Low Latin guarantia or garantia, 
which is merely a variant spelling of warrantia. Ultimately 
the word is Teutonic, and means "protect", "defend" and 
the like ( Germwehren) a meaning which remained its ex-
4 
elusive sense for a long while. The legal use, however, 
is Later. The Statute of Frauds, which describes, what 
we call a guaranty, calls it, " a special promise to answer 
for the debt, etc. of another". 
2 ; 
The word "surety" has an unbroken lineage which is 
far older. It is the Latin securitas, perfectly classical 
in its obvious sense of freedom from anxiety or fear. 
This literary sense is also the legal sense. The more 
special sense of discharge from an obligation is at least 
as old as Gauis ( Circ, 160 A.D. ) 
Then in Medieval Latin we find it employed of the 
person who signs the bond as additional obligor and not 
of the bond itself. This shift must have taken place 
early enough since in Medieval French, seurte is used 
both for a person and for the contract. So, far example, 
in 1273-1280, in Register des Faides de waurnai, we read, 
"raporta as proves et as Juses Le seurlet firne et estnle', 
which seems to be the document itself, while in a book 
of the 18th Century, the Coutume des francs hommes de 
cambrai, it is the obligation. In many of the instances 
it is difficult to tell whether it is the person or the 
contract which is called by that name, but it is evident 
that the shift must have been an easy one and that it 
became established very early. When the word was taken 
into early English, a new word, suretiship, was coined 
by those who had forgotten that securitos was itself an 
abstract. 
The concept of suretyship has existed from the 
earliest days of mankind. It originated in the man or 
2. 
tribe or nation to whom an obligation was promised or due 
holding a certain man as 'hostage' for the performance 
of that obligation. To secure performance of the promise 
or obligation, a hostage was given. Originally the 
surety relation was actually one of personal security, 
the surety being little more than a hostage subject to 
imprisonment and sometimes death upon the default of his 
6 
principal. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
the surety no longer paid with his body, but his liability 
was translated into money and enforced in an action of 
7 
debt. 
At common Law it is not likely that we should find 
any differences in the relations expressed at the present 
day by suretyship and guaranty. When guarantee and guarantor 
do appear, no attempt whatever is made to differentiate 
them from the already existing expressions, English cyclo-
pedias do not recognize any distinction, Halsbury's Law 
8 
of England, treats of the subject only under the term 
guarantee and identifies the surety and guarantor. In a 
broad sense a contract of guarabtee ^.orresponds with that 
of suretyship, the distinction between them being merely 
technical, and a transaction which is called in some cases 
an absolute guarantee is de^ioninated by other courts a 
contract of suretyship. A guarantee is like a suretyship 
2J 
in the sense that it is an engagement to answer for the 
debt, default or miscarriage of another and for this 
reason the term 'surety* and • guarantor or guarantee' 
are often confounded and used interchangeably. 
As far as the cases are concerned, there is equally 
no sign that the courts in England during the nineteenth 
century were aware of any attempt in practice or in law 
to distinguish between an agreement to be a surety and 
to be a guarantee. 
When and how did the notion originate that a 
guarantee was in some way different from a contract of 
suretyship. We have seen that the common law knew nothing 
of it and that the English Courts continue to know nothing 
of it. It is evidently in American courts somewhere that 
it arose, since it is found only there. 
9 
In Oxford Bank v, Haynes, it is said: 
" A guarantee differs in character from a 
surety, cannot be questioned, for he 
cannot be sued as a promisor, as the 
surety may, his contract must be speci-
fically set-forth. That he differs 
from an indorser is equally clear and 
for the same and also because he warrants 
the solvency of the promisor which the 
indorser does not". 
u 
It is conceded that the guarantor ought to pay 
only if payment cannot be made out of the principal 
debtor. The surety is to pay whether the principal 
can or cannot. In other words, we have in germ the 
phrase which was later to have such success in discri-
minating the two contracts; the phrase that the surety 
promises to pay if the principal does not, the guarantor, 
10 
if he cannot. To this we must add the case in which 
the court sets forth the true distinction, which is that 
the surety is liable for the debt and the guarantor only 
where default is made by the principal debtor, and that 
the surety is bound by a speciality, the guarantor by a 
simple contract. A surety promises to do the something 
which the principal undertakes; the guarantor promises 
that the principal will perform his agreement and if he 
does not, he, the guarantor will do it for him. The 
liability of the surety is immediate and direct. He 
agrees that he will perform the principal contract,fixing 
upon himself the responsibility from the beginning. 
Both the surety and guarantor agree to pay the debt of 
another, but the liability to pay in the case of the surety 
starts with the agreement, whereas, the liability of the 
guarantor does not start with the agreement and is esta-
blished for the first time by the default. 
3. 
The contract of surety is made at the sometime 
and usually Jointly with that of his principal, while 
that of the guarantor is a contract separate and 
distinct from that of his principal. It may be made 
11 
at the same time and upon the consideration. The 
contract of surety is a direct original contract with 
the obligee, that the very thing contracted should be 
done. Whereas a guarantor enters into a cumulative 
collateral engagement by which he agrees that his 
principal is liable to and will perform a contract 
which he has made or is about to make and that if he 
defaults the guarantor will upon being notified by the 
resulting damages. 
What is more original about the surety's contract 
than about the guarantor's - or more direct ? In either 
case he either did or did not make the promise and we 
must took his words and conduct to determine whether he 
did obligate himself and to what extent. Just as we 
must in the case of principal debtor. In one sense both 
promises are absolute. Both promises undertake that the 
creditor shall receive the performance to which his 
claim entitles him. 
32 
We may illustrate by the two persons who are 
concededly most alike, and yet are declared to be in 
some mystical way wholly different, the absolute 
guarantor for payment and the surety. It is said 
that the surety owes the amount of the bond just as 
well, as the principal. The principals default is his 
default. The guarantor's obligation on the contrary 
is not fixed until and unless the principal defaults. 
The guarantor's default does not begin until after the 
principal has defaulted. But will this stand examina-
tion? Default creats a cause of action. It is obvious 
that the creditor cannot sue the surety intil the day 
after performance is due and on the same day and not 
before, he can sue the guarantor. If the principal 
12 performs neither surety nor guarantor is liable. 
The difference consequently is neither substantial 
nor even formal but merely verbal. Shall we leave it 
there and assert with solemnity that we should hold 
men to their words and that they are guarantors when 
they say they due and sureties when they call themselves 
so? It may be said that no test has been more uniformly 
rejected than this one. We should be indulging in the 
absurd fiction that the businessmen knew the full legal 
implications of words which lawyers and courts have 
not succeeded in defining, and we should be introducing 
regidity of interpretation in contracts which more than 
others, call for freedom and flexibility. 
The distinction so widely insisted upon and 
from which serious consequences are drawn, is no better 
grounded. It has no roots in the past. It has no sense 
in the present. If it is disregarded it will clear the 
subject of a portentous amount of confused phrases and 
economise effort in investigating, besides avoiding the 
obvious injustice of refusing or granting relief on so 
insubstantial a basis. 
Definition of Guarantee 
A guarantee often demanded by a banker as an 
additional security to reinforce a clean advance, or 
buttress a tangible security, which for one reason or 
the other is not considered adequate. 
The term guarantee or guaranty as it is called 
by some authorities is a collateral promise or under-
taking by one pierson to another to answer for the payment 
of some debt or the performance of some contract or duty 
3-r 
in case of the default of another person, who in the 
13 
first instance is liable for such payment or performance. 
Halstaury defines guarantee as an accessory 
contract, whereby the promisor undertakes to be answerable 
to the promisee for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another person, whose primary liability to the promisee 
14 
must exist or be contemplated. 
Some of the common law rules with respect to 
suretyship were, for the first time given statutory basis 
througn the English statute of Frauds, 1677. The pre-
statute law did not require any written evidenc^ of a 
suretyship which could thus be proved in the same manner 
as any ordinary contract. The main purpose of the 
statute of frauds was to prevent the danger of surety-
ship being established through false evidence, or by 
evidence of loose talk, when it was never meant really 
15 to make such a contract. 
Under Statute of Frauds a guarantee is a special 
promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage 
of another person. These three words point to three 
16 
distinct kinds of guarantee, namely, (1) guarantees 
for the payment of a debt already contracted by another 
person. (2) Guarantees against the default of another 
. I J 
person, i.e. for the payment of debts to be contracted 
by another person, or against loss that may occur 
from another's future breaches of duty and (3) guarantees 
against loss that may arise out of another's post or 
future beeaches of duty. 
An obvious difficulty is the significance of 
the three terms, debt, default, miscarriage, unless 
they are synonymous. The question was raised in 1819 
17 in Kirkhan v. Martee, 
The defendants son had without the 
plaintiffs permission, ridden the 
plaintiff's horse and killed him, and 
he was therefore guilty of a tort 
against the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
threatened to sue him, and in conse-
quences of the threat, the defendant 
orally promised the plaintiff to pay 
to him the agreed value of the horse 
of the plaintiff would forbear his 
suit. 
The defendants when sued on this promise pleaded 
the statute of frauds and the plaintiff argued that 
the Statute applied only when the liability guaranteed 
arose out of a pre-existent debt. The argument was 
rejected chief Justice Abbott said; 
"The word miscarriage has not the 
same meaning as the words default 
or 'debt*. It seems to me to com-
prehend that species of wrongful 
act for the consequences of which 
the law would make the party 
civilly responsible".18 
3.^  
The words of the statute were not confined to the 
cases of the contract, and, as the son has been 
guilty of the tort for which he might be sued, the 
father's undertaking was a promise to answer for the 
miscarriage of another person. It would seen, therefore, 
that the guarantee in the case of a contractual lia-
bility is covered by the word debt and, perhaps, by 
that of default and the guarantee of a tortious 11a-
19 bility by the miscarriage. 
The conclusion may be accepted as a reasonable 
interpretation of the terms which had no precise legal 
meaning. 
It is not necessary here to attempt an exact 
definition of the word 'debt', in as much as the three 
terms debt, default or miscarriage have been held to 
include all legal obligations under which a person can 
come, contractual or non-contractual, requiring a money 
payment or any kind of performance. A person may be 
indebted without being in default or having committed 
a miscarriage of duty. These two terms were added to 
the statute so as to make perfectly clear that it includes 
promises to answer for another persons breaches of duty 
20 
of all kinds as well as for his unmatured debts. 
The restatement of security uses the words 
"surety" and "guaranty" interchangeably as synonymus 
even though the word surety was designed to charac-
terize a primary obligation while the word guaranty 
21 
was designed to characterize a secondary obligation. 
22 
The restatement attempts to define the suretyship as: 
"Suretyship is the relation which 
exists when one person has under-
taken an obligation and another 
person is also under an obligation 
or other duty to the obligee. Who 
is entitled to one performance of 
the obligation of another and as 
between the two are bound. One 
rather than the other should perform". 
The suretyship relation exists where one under-
takes an obligation and another is under obligation 
or duty to the obligee, who is entitled to one perfor-
mance, but as between the two who are bound, one 
should bear the burden of performing. Whether one 
is a surety, therefore, depends not upon his relation 
to the obligee, the creditor, but upon his relation to 
23 
the principal obligor, the debtor. 
Indian Position 
The Indian Contract Act, 187 2 appears to follow 
the general Anglo-Saxon pattern in respect of the rules 
3-^  
governing the contractual relationship arising out 
of a contract of guarantee. However, it is important 
to bear in mind that although the relevant provisions 
of the Indian Contract Act partake of English Law in 
many material particulars, yet there are some signi-
ficant differences between the two. 
The definitions, of the 'surety', the 'principal 
debtor', and the 'creditor', rightly find place in 
section 126 of the Indian Contract Act . The section 
as a whole convey the general idea of what a contract 
of guarantee is, and who are the actors in the tran-
saction. 
The contract of guarantee is a credit device 
that make its appearance with earliest development of 
business obligations. Under the terms of guarantee 
agreement, one party becomes answerable to a third party 
for the acts or neglect of a second party. The surety 
is a person who gives the guarantee. The person in 
respect of whose default the guarantee is given is 
principal debtor. The creditor is the person to whom 
guarantee is given. A contract of guarantee pre-suppose; 
three parties. First of all there is a contract between 
the principal debtor and the creditor. It may be said 
to be the base of the entire transaction. Then there 
'1 
must be a contract between the surety and the creditor 
by which the former guarantees the debt to the latter. 
This, however, is not enough to constitute a contract 
of guarantee, because so far, one essential element is 
still missing, and that further element is that there 
must be a contract by which the principal debtor asks 
the surety to act as such though such a request need 
24 
not always be express and may be implied, Untill this 
whole chain is complete, a concract of guarantee as 
contemplated in the Indian law of contracts does not 
come into play. The reason is that until there is 
privity of contract between the three respective parties, 
it will not be possible, to '.wo*k o^^ the rights and 
liabilities of the surety and the principal debtor. In 
other words, if a person undertakes to reimburse another 
for some loss which may be caused to him, say by a third 
party or by himself without the express or implied 
request of a third party. The person having undertaken 
the liability and having been called upon to make good 
the loss would not be able to recover the loss so caused 
to him from the principal debtor the latter being not 
a privy but virtually a stranger to the undertaking 
given to the promisee. In Periyamlanna Masakkayar and 
25 
Son V, Banlars & Co,, it was observed by Krishna J, 
•i^ 
"though section 126 of the Act does not expressly 
say that the debtor should be a party to the contract. 
It Is clearly implied, taken with other provisions of 
the Act as Section 145 that in every such contract, 
the debtor must be a party". 
This however does not mean that such triportlte 
transaction should be embodied in a single document 
and it is quite possible, as is often the case, that 
the transaction between creditor and the debtor and 
that between creditor and the surety are embodied into 
two separate documents. In Prasanlit Mahtha v. United 
26 
Commercial Bank Ltd., the suretyship agreement was 
executed between the creditor and the surety and prin-
cipal debtor was not made a party to it. It was, there-
fore, contended that it was not a valid contract of 
guarantee. The court rejected the contention as mis-
conceived, for her the cash credit facility was 
extended by the creditor bank to the debtor private Co. 
upon the directors and principal officer guaranteeing 
repayment and it is not necessary that this triportlte 
transaction should be embodied in one composite document 
making the creditor, debtor and surety parties to it. 
There can be no contract of guarantee if the 
liability does not exist. The liaoillty of the guarantor 
presupposes the existence of a separate liability of 
1 JL 
the principal debtor and his liability is thus secondary, 
which comes into existence only in default by the 
27 
principal debtor. To the same e££ect is the decision 
28 
of Calcutta High Court, The issue in this case was 
whether a guarantee amounts to a promissory note or 
not. The words ' promise to pay' may mean a promissory 
note under the negotiable Instruments Act. A promissory 
Note means an unconditional undertaking signed by the 
maker to pay a certain sum of money. But in this case, 
the guarantee agreement is alleged to be conditional on 
fulfilment of certain conditions precedent. A guarantee 
is a collateral engagement to answer for the debt, 
default or miscarriage of another person. The liability 
of the guarantor is conditional upon the default 
committed by the principal debtor. The conditional lia-
bility does not come under the expression promise to pay, 
A guarantee in its technical and legal sense^ 
has relation to some other contract or obligation with 
reference to which it is a collateral undertaking. It 
is a secondary and not a primary obligation. If there 
is no debt etc, present or future, there is nothing to 
guarantee and, therefore, there can be no contract at all, 
In a guarantee, the obligation of the guarantor,is, that 
the principal debtor is able and will . perform his 
42 
undertaking, and if he fails, the guarantor will 
pay the resulting damages. Where, however, the 
person sought to be held primarily liable prior to 
the breach of contract or duty of some one else, the 
contract in question is an original promise and is 
not a contract of guarantee. 
It is the nature of the obligation and not 
its designation as guarantee, which determines whether 
or not the contract is one of guarantee or a contract 
of some other nature, is to be determined from the 
language used, in the light of the subject matter and 
the circximstances involved. A careful reading of 
section 126 would clearly indicate that the primary 
idea of suretyship is an undertaking to indemnify the 
debtor in case be does not fulfil his promise, the 
contract of guarantee being thus a contract to indemnify. 
The central point in such a case is to determine what 
was the contingency which the parties had in their 
mind when contract of guarantee was entered into. In 
order to decide that question it must be remembered 
that the law does not require a contract of guarantee 
to be necessarily in writing. It may be express or it 
may even be implied. It might even be inferred from 
29 
the course of conduct of the parties concerned. 
43 
Sometimes the problem may arise that the tran> 
saction between the parties is in more than one document. 
The question is whether the transaction amounts to a 
30 
guarantee or not has been decided by the Supreme Court, 
saying that it is well established that if the transac-
tion is contained in more thanone document between the 
same parties they must be read and interpreted together 
and they have the same legal effect for all purposes as 
if they are one document. To the same effect is the 
31 
observation of Moultan, L.J.: 
"Where several deeds form part of 
one transaction and are contempo-
raneously executed they have the 
same effect for all purposes if they 
were one deed. Each is executed on 
the faith of all the others being 
executed also and is intended to 
speak only as part of the same transac-
tion, and if one is seeking to make 
equities a^ -ply to the parties they 
must be equities arising out of the 
transaction as a whole". 
The Essentials of a Guarantee 
Principal debt 
The general rule is that a cause of action cannot 
exist against a surety, unless a cause of action exists 
against the principal debtorj This rule necessarily 
results from the very nature of guarantee as being an 
obligation accessary to that of the principal. There is 
-i t 
one notable exception to this rule. Where the principal 
is excused from liability for reasons personal to 
himself, which do not affect the validity of the con-
tract or debt Itself, the surety is still liable. 
Likewise when the primary obligation is invalid 
or between the parties for lack of consideration or 
failure of consideration or because of illegality, it 
will not bind the surety. This was held by the House 
32 
of Lords in LaXeman v. Mount Stephen. Lord Selbourne 
said: 
"That there can be no suretyship 
unless there can be a principal debtor -
nor can a man guarantee anybody elses 
debt unless there is a debt of some 
other person to be guaranteed". 
The other decision of the House of Lords is that 
33 
in Sawan v. Bank of Scotland, in which the subject of 
guarantee was prohibited by and clearly void under a 
revenue statute. It is clear that the purpose of 
invalidating the principal contract was to protect the 
revenue and it was held that any contract dependent on 
or collateral with a contract void for Illegality was 
tainted with the illegality also. The quotation from 
34 
Pothier also buttress the same view: 
"iJ 
" As the obligation of sureties 
Is according to our definition 
an obligation accessory to that 
of a principal debtor it follows 
that it is the essence of the 
obligation that there should be 
valid obligation of a principal 
debtor, consequently , if the 
principal is not obliged, neither is 
the surety,as there can be no 
accessory without a principal 
obligation. However, where directors 
guarantee the performance of a 
contract by their company which does 
not bind the latter, or being ultra 
vires, the directors suretyship 
liability is enforceable". 
It is also no defence to the surety that the 
principal debtor was an infant, with the right of dis-
affirmance or who has exercises that right. This 
likewise is a personal defence for the benefit of the 
infant himself. Indeed, one of the purposes the cre-
ditor has in seeking a surety for performance of the 
minors obligation is to prevent loss for minors dis-
affirmance. Also it is no defence to the surety that 
the principal debtor, a corporation had no legal capacity 
under its charter to enter into the primary debt so 
that its doing so was an ultra vires act. The incapacity 
of the principal is one of the contingencies against 
whicn the surety assures the creditor. When the principal 
is discharged because of incapacity, the debt itself 
remains, and its burden is assumed by the surety. In 
such a case the principal is not discharged because of 
"t. 
any defect Inherent In the contract Itself, that is 
to say, the contract Is not Immoral or Illegal, but 
at most one which the corporation was without autho-
rity to make. 
In view of the fact that any overdraft or loan 
to a minor Is Irrevoverable by legal proceedings, much 
thought has naturally been given to the question of 
obtaining from the minor some kind of security which 
will enable the lender to recover his money by Indirect 
means. In the present 8oclo<^conomlc conditions it is 
scarely remarkable that minor should take advantage of 
the hire - purchase agreement which has provided him 
with the means of acquiring with irelatlve case articles 
which used to be regarded as l\ixurles, but are now 
regarded by many Infants , though not by the law, as 
necessities» Venders who wish to do business with 
Infants have, therefore, had to avoid the legal diffi-
culties sxirrounding such transactions as best they can, 
normally by insisting that some responsible person of 
full age join In the transaction as the minor's guarantor 
or surety* Secondly It is a fact that the guarantees 
for the debts of minors perform a useful function. They 
enable minors to obtain credits which they may require and 
4 ; 
which they may not be able to obtain without such 
guarantees. The other area of concern Is that a minor 
admitted to some professional Institution has to provide 
some security that after the completion of the caurse 
he has to serve the same Institution for some period. 
It Is needless to say that a minor's agreement 
In India is void, vide the ruling of their Lordships 
36 
of the privy Council. The Chapter an "Guarantee", 
however, is absolutely silent whether a guarantee as 
to the payment of debts incurred for necessary or non -
necessary purposes by the minor is valid or not. 
An important issue relates to the question 
whether the guarantor is precluded from pleading the 
incapacity of the principal debtor in those cases only 
which he knew of it, when contract of guarantee was 
entered into or whether he is precluded even though he 
did not know of It. 
The decision of the Bombay High Court in KASHIBA 
37 
V* SHRIPAT, is still considered the leading and unimpea-
chable authority on the point. The facts of this case arei 
The plaintiff sued to recover Rs. 1,194 and 
Interest on a bond. The bond was executed on 29th, 
Nov. 1887 by the first defendant, who was a minor. The 
second and the third defendants were sureties. The 
43 
Bombay High Court observed as under: 
"Section 128 nas no reference to 
nature of the obligation but only 
explains the quantum of the surety's 
obligation . There is nothing un-
lawful « immoral or even improper in 
lending money to a minor, and we can 
see no reason in the absence of enactment 
to the contrary wny a person cannot 
contract to guarantee the performance by 
a person of a duty of imperfect obliga-
tion* The case is perhaps still more 
clear if the promise of the infant to 
repay the money is void. In that case 
the contract of the so called surety 
is not a collateral but a principal 
contract",38 
It is submitted that this decision incorporates a sound 
ethical principle in that no body but the principal 
debtor himself can benefit by the fact that the principal 
debtor suffers from a personal disability. This view 
is also supported by E,J. Cohan . 
A question is raised as to what is meant by the 
word •liability*? Obviously it means the liability 
enforceable, at law. A void contract rather than an 
agreement is an agreement which the law is not going to 
recoynlse. In other words which can be safely ignored 
by the person making the contract, because in the eyes 
of law such contract has no existence. From the careful 
reading of section 128, it clearly follows, that the 
surety is not liable for it says that the liability of 
a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor. 
^3 
It is beyond doubt that the liability of a minor is 
Zero, The liability of the surety must be co-extensive 
neither more nor less. The suret's obligation must 
40 
substantially depend on third party's default. 
The same view has been expressed by Madras 
41 
High Court. The question before the court was whether 
the obligation of a surety becomes primary one when 
no liability has ever been fastened on the principal 
debtor by reason of his minority at the time of the 
contract. It has been held that under the English Law 
the basis is that credit is given to the major guarantor 
and not to the infant and there is no authority for the 
proposition that where credit is given to the infant on 
the footing that he will be liable - a guarantor assumes 
an obligation as a principal debtor. 
The English courts have, however, refused to 
allow the Infants Relief Act to be circums-vented and 
have refused to enforce security provided by a minor in 
support of a loan. But it was cor^ m^only held until the 
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Coutts & Co, V, Srowne Lecky case, that if the security 
was furnished by an adult in the form of a guarantee 
it would be effective. In the light of the decision in 
the above case that opinion can no longer be held. 
The facta In the case were that the secoW and the third 
defendants had guaranteed the amount of a over draft by 
the plaintiff Bank's to the first defendant, an infant. 
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Obliver J. examined the Judgments in Wauthir v. Willson, 
and distinguished it from the facts before him on the 
grounds that Willson's liability was one of indemnity 
rather than of guarantee and observed: 
" As the obligation of the surety is ^  
an obligation necessary to that of 
a principal debtor, it follows that 
it Is of essence of the obligation 
that there should be a valid obliga-
tion of a principal debtor, conse-
quently, if principal is not obliged 
neither is the surety as there can be 
no a<?cessory without a principal 
obligation". 
The other side of the same coin is where the 
surety is not knowing the infancy of a principal debtor. 
In other words surety believes himself to be guaranteeing 
a perfectly valid obligation can the surety plead the 
infancy of a principal debtor. Thereis no'case directly 
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on the point. But in Newzealand this new principle, 
that the guarantee is ineffective, has been extended to 
the lack of knowledge by the parties of the infancy of 
the j^ rincipal debtor. So even if the parties are not 
knowing the infancy of the principal debtor the surety 
continues to be liable. This view is supported by E.J. 
51 
Choni! 
" On principle it appears strange 
that a guarantor should be liable 
although he believed himself to be 
guaranteeing a non-existence debt, 
while another who believed that he 
guaranteed a perfectly valid obli-
gation should be free from all liability, 
merely on the ground that the principal .^ 
debtor was under some personal disability". 
It is submitted that the above view is inconfir-
mity with the spirit of law and takes into account the 
practical problems which a minor has to face if the 
surety is allowed to plead the infancy of a principal 
debtor. 
The best course open to the Courts is that 
whether all concerned parties know or not that the 
first promisor is an infant, so that, as against him, 
the promise can not be enforced, the Courts should 
incline to construe the document signed by the adult 
( the second promiser/surety ) as an independent contract. 
It is submitted that the Indian Contract Act is 
amended and expressly it is laid down, as has been done 
by the American Restatement, that the incapacity defence 
is personal to the principal debtor and should not be 
pleaded by the surety. If the surety did not know of 
the incapacity and the creditor knew of the fact and did 
b -
not disclose it to the surety this may well be a 
defence based on the non-disclosure of a material 
fact. 
Another valid defence available to the surety 
is that the statute of limitation has run in favour of 
the principal against the creditor, on the ground 
that it would be in-equitable to require the surety 
to piy because the surety's right of reimbursement 
against the principal debtor has likewise been barred. 
Another reason sometimes advanced for discharging the 
surety when the Statute of limitation has nan on the 
principal debt is that there has been an extinguishment 
of the debt by the B)ar of limitation and therefore the 
surety is released. 
The above view is not a very persuasive argxament, 
since before the claim was barred, the surety could have 
paid the debt and sued for reimbursement, or it could 
have required the creditor to sue by giving it a notice 
to do so. Hence the surety is liable in the absence 
of a principal debt. 
Cons ideration 
Every contract not under seal must have a consi-
deration to support it. This consideration is either 
express Bd in words or implied from the very nature of 
the contract. It is implied in the case of bills or 
r o 
Notes. It being a presumption of law that every bill 
or Note, wnether expressed or not to be for a value 
received, was given for adequate consideration. The 
holder i;5|i ing on the instrument has not to prove or 
allege the consideration. Contracts under seal are 
not only valid without any expressed consideration but 
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are valid without any consideration. The reason why 
a contract under seal is valid without consideration 
is because an engagement of this description is of so 
solemn a character that persons entering into it must 
be presumed to have previously determined upon what 
47 
they are aboiit to do. 
Like any contract, a contract of guarantee must 
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be supported by consideration. No court of law has 
ever decided that there must be a consideration moving 
directly between the person giving and the person 
receiving the guarantee, it is enough if the person 
for whom the guarantee is given thereby receives a 
benefit or advantage, or if the party to whom it is 
given suffer a detriment or inconvenience to form an 
inducement to the surety to render himself liable for 
the debt of the principal. Under section 127 of the 
Indian Contract Act, anything done, or any promise made, 
for the benefit of the principal debtor, may be a 
b'^i 
sufficient consideration to the surety for giving 
the guarantee. It is not necessary that the consi-
deration should flow from the creditor andbe received 
49 
by the surety. Consideration between the principal 
debtor and the creditor is good consideration for 
50 
the guarantee given by the surety. In Ghulam Husain 
51 
^* Faiyaz All, it was argued on the basis of the defi-
nition of consideration in section 2(d) of the Indian 
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Contract Act, that In order to show that the bond in 
question was for consideration It must be proved that 
the lease was given to the principal debtor at the 
'desire of the suretyl The court held, however, that 
under section 127 of the ^ct it is not necessary that 
the th.ing done or the promise made for the benefit of 
the principal debtor should be at the desire of the 
surety and that section has implied in it some such 
expression as notwithstanding anything contained in 
section 2(d) of the Act", for, otherwise, there was 
no need to enact section 127 in as much as anything 
done or any promise made for the benefit of principal 
debtor, if done or made at the desire of the surety 
would clearly come under section 2(d). This inter-
pretation is correct keeping in view the object of the 
contract of guarantee. 
b J 
.\lso it is not necessary that surety should 
receive any advantage himself. The very nature of 
contract of guarantee does not stipulate for the surety, 
to receive or, for that matter, retain the money or 
advantage himself or the actual beneficiary is the 
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principal debtor. 
The consideration for guaranteeing an existing 
debt is commonly either a forbearance on the part of the 
creditor to press for the debt, or the allowance of a 
future credit or advance. Though credit has already 
been given to the principal debtor without any promise 
of surety, an agreement by the creditor definitely ex-
tending the time of payment or performance or otherwise 
definitely to forbear to exercise legal rights against 
the principal debtor, is a sufficient consideration for 
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the undertaking of surety. The reason being that the 
creditor has suffered a detriment at the request of the 
surety in relinguishing his legal right to proceed against 
the principal. An agreement to forbear for a reasonable 
time, and though there be no promise for a definite ex-
tension of time, to the principal, the creditor's actual 
forDearance for a reasonable time, at the express or 
implied request of the surety, to pursue his remedies 
against the principal debtor is a sufficient consideration 
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for the surety's undertaking. But mere voluntary 
bJ 
forbearance by the creditor without request on the 
part of one who subsequently signs as a surety is no 
consideration for the undertaking of the latter. It 
is no more than a voluntary courtesy to the principal 
debtor. 
\ mere recommendation must be distinguished 
from a contract of guarantee. So a recommendation by 
one party to another to do something, e.g. to lend 
money to a third party liable as a guarantor for the 
56 loan, I'f given. So also, a mere recommendation by C, 
that A should Jouy goods of B, will not entail on C the 
consequences that might flow from his guaranteeing that 
A will not suffer any loss, if he takes up B*s offer 
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of sale. The mere fact that a person tdlls that the 
creditor might safely do business with the principal 
58 debtor falls for short of a guarantee. 
There is considerable conflict of opinion as.- to 
whether the past benefit to principal debtor amounts to 
a good consideration. In other words whether past consi-
deration can be a good consideration for a contract of 
guarantee. One view is that the past consideration or 
the past benefit to t^"le principal debtor could be a 
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valid consideration for a bond of guarantee. 
5 7 
This view Is based on the ground that the word 'done' 
in Section 127 shows that the past benefit to the 
principal debtor can be a good consideration for a 
bond of guarantee. 
On the other hand some other High Courts take 
the view that the past consideration or past benefit 
to the principal debtor cannot be a good consideration 
for a contract of surety. This view is buttressed by 
a reference to illustration (C) of section 127 of the 
Indian Contract Act, made it clear. From this it is 
clear that anything done or any promise made for the 
benefit of the principal debtor must be contemporaneous 
to the surety's contract of guarantee in order to 
constitute consideration therefor* A contract of gua-
rantee executed afterwards without any consideration 
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is void. 
Though this conflict has not been finally 
resolved yet the view that past consideration or past 
benefit to the principal debtor cannot be a good con-
sideration for a contract of guarantee appears to be 
more in consonance with the letter and spirit of the 
law. 
^3 
Misrepresentation 
Mutual assent of the parties is an essential 
element of a contract of guarantee. It means that 
the minds of parties must qte^ t in the same sense on 
the same matter, A mistake may render an apparent 
contract of guarantee null and void, though there may 
have been no fraud or misrepresentation. A guarantee 
is apparently invalidated only where there has been a 
fraudulent concealment of material facts which should 
have been disclosed, though it is not necessary that 
such concealment should in order to have that effect, 
have been intended to benefit the person guilty of it. 
Where a surety is induced to enter into a contract 
of guarantee by fraud or misrepresentation on the part 
of the person to whom the guarantee is given, or to some 
fact or circumstances affecting the liability of the 
guarantor, such fraud or misrepresentation operates to 
discharge the guarantor from liability. The Indian 
Contract Act, provides for cases of mistake, coercion, 
undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation in sections 
13 to 22, The Chapter on guarantees, however, embodies 
only two specific sections, namely section 142 and 143,^ 
These sections cover the same ground as^  section 19 of 
the Act with the exception that the requirement of this 
b'3 
section is that the misrepresentation made by the 
creditor must concern a material part of the transaction 
does not expressly appear in section 19. This section 
only api^ lies in case of a misrepresentation concerning 
a material part of the transaction made by the creditor, 
or by some one else with his knowledge or assent. It 
can have no application to a misrepresentation made by 
the debtor without the knowledge and assent of the 
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creditor. 
Fraud vitiates all contracts, including of course 
the contract of guarantee. Fraud cuts down everything 
and the law sets itself against it to the extent of 
breaking through almost every rule, sacrificing every 
maxim , getting rid of every ground of opposition, 
technical or otherwise, so that justice and truth may 
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prevail. 
Fraudulent concealment may consist not merely of 
the omission to disclose such facts as need be mentioned 
only in answer to the surety's questions, but also the 
non-disclosure of facts which the creditor must spon-
taneously disclose to him, and the critdrian whether 
such disclosure should be made is whether there is any-
thing which might not naturally be expected to take 
place between the parties who are concerned in the 
bu 
transaction, that Is, whether there is a contract 
between the debtor and the creditor to the effect 
that his position shall be different from that v*ilch 
the surety might naturally expect. It depends on the 
nature of transactions In each case whether the fact 
not disclosed Is such that Is Impliedly represented 
not to exist. 
Where the surety Is Induced to sign by fraud of 
the creditor, or by fraud to which the creditor Is 
party, or of which he has knowledge, when he remains 
the surety, the surety is not bound. If there is a 
wilful false representation or the active concealment 
of a material fact, there Is little or nothing that is 
special to the subject In hand. The principal, question 
is as to the creditor* duty to make disclosure. The 
general rule on this subject where inquiry is made by 
the surety have been well stated as follows: 
" The law is that if a person who 
contemplates becoming surety to another 
for the payment of money or the per-
formance of any act by a third person 
applies to the creditor or to person 
to whom the security is to be given 
for information as to the nature, extent 
and risk of the .obligation, or the 
circumstances, condition or character 
of such third person, tne creditor, if 
he undertakes to give Information, is 
bound to disclose every material fact 
within his knowledge affecting the proposed 
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liability. This especially is so 
where the obligation of suretyship 
is entered into at the request of 
the person to whom the security is 
given. In such a case perfect good-
faith is required on the part of the 
creditor. The contract of guarantee, 
however, like the contracts of insu-
rance, is not in strictness uberrimae 
fidei, as one in which there is an 
obligation, irrespective of some fidu-
ciary relation between the parties, to 
make full and voluntary disclosure of all 
matters known to the creditor that would 
or might be material to the surety's risk, 
in the absence of inquiry by the surety." 64 
There is, however, no universal obligation on 
the part of the creditor to make disclosure of facts 
to the surety, and the duty to make disclosure, or any 
implied representation, depends on the particular cir-
cvimstances of the transaction, which may show that the 
creditor has guarded himself against liability for non-
disclosure or implied representation. If the intending 
surety is unacquainted with the risk he is undertaking, 
he should make inquiry on the subject, the creditor 
being under no obligation to inform him of matters 
affecting the debtor's credit, or if any circ\imstances 
unconnected with the transaction in whicn he is about 
to engage, rendering his position more hazardous. MBMCXBK 
If the creditor has made a statement which he believes 
to be true, but which in the course of the negotiations, 
he discovers to be false, he should correct it. 
6, 
of 
Although a contract/guarantee is not of utmost 
good-faith. Nevertheless* it may be so depending on 
the circumstances, for guarantees are closely construed 
in favour of the surety. For example, in a guarantee 
for the fidelity of a servant an innocent omission by 
the employer to inform the surety of the servants 
previous dishonesty whilst in his employment was held 
to bar the employer from enforcing any claim in respect 
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of the servant's subsequent dishonesty. 
In the case of a guarantee for a customer re-
quiring and applying to his bankers for cash credit, 
the omission to disclose spontaneously to the intending 
sureties the actual state of the customer's account or 
suspicious as to his honesty will not necessarily 
vitiate the guarantee. It has been held in Hamiltan 
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V. Walson, that the bank, if not asked for the infor-
mation as to how the debtor's account has been conducted, 
whether the debtor is already overdrawn or whether he 
has been punctual and honorable in his dealings. 
Although the bank is entitled to assume that the gua-
rantor has made himself acquainted with the debtors 
reputation and financial position, the bank must 
exercise care to avoid any possible charge of misrepre-
sentation. If any information is given it must be full 
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and fair, and if the guarantor asks question, the 
bank must make unequivocal replies. So far as dis-
closure is concerned, the bank may feel constrained 
by its duty of secrecy owned to its customer, and so 
it is probably better to arrange for a tripartite 
meeting of bank, customer and the proposed guarantor 
to discuss the matter, or else to get the customer's 
authority for disclosure of the information sought by 
the guarantor. 
A bank should not suggest the name of a possible 
guarantor to a customer, lest the guarantor should 
subsequently argue that the bank had made the customer 
as its agent, so that any misrepresentation by him 
might enable the guarantor to avoid liability. There 
is a duty not to mislead a prospective guarantor and 
"very little said which ought not to have been said, 
or very little omitted which ought to have been said", 
will avoid the contract. 
Misrepresentation, as distinguished from conceal-
ment, may be either written or oral and may consist if 
such a suppression of the truth by the partial, inaccu-
rate and decitful setting forth by the creditor of 
facts within his knowledge material for the proposed 
surety to be informed of ^s, along with the non-commu-
nication of the facts material for the latter to know. 
B 
amounts to misrepresentation. Misrepresentation 
usually consists of direct assertion of a fact which 
is not a fact and which is calculated to influence 
a person becoming a surety. If a contract of guarantee 
is induced by a material misrepresentation by the 
creditor, it may be set, aside, even if the misrepre-
sentation was made innocently. It is misrepresentation 
to frame a guarantee so as to mislead a surety as to 
its real effect and meaning. But if he could have 
procured inrormation on the subject, but did not ask 
for it the surety remains liable. 
Keeping silence, or concealment, which is not 
fraudulent in fact or in law, will not avoid a guarantee, 
and the creditor is not required to make any disclosure 
or explanation, the withholding of which would not 
amount to a fraud. 
Though the law requires the creditor to act in 
good faith, unless he has knowledge of or participates 
in the concealment, he is not responsible for any mis-
representation or concealment practised by the principal 
debtor, on the surety, in order to induce him to enter 
into the contract of guarantee. Yet, if the creditor 
participates in a false representation or frudulent 
concealment of facts which operate to induce the making 
1*^  r« 
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of the contract of guarantee, the surety may set up 
such misrepresentation or concealment as a defence 
in an action on the guarantee. So also, if the 
creditor knows that the surety is entering into the 
contract, because induced to do so by misrepresentation 
or concealment of facts by some third person, the 
contract of guarantee is not binding. 
The expression keeping silence implies inten-
tional concealment as distinguished from mere non-
disclosure, which no doubt is of itself a fatal objec-
tion in insurance contracts and virtually expresses 
what is laid down in North British Insurance Co. v. 
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Lloyd , that tne withholding must be fraudulent, which, 
necessarily must be the case when a material circum-
69 
stances is intentionally concealed. In order to 
avoid the guarantee it must not only be proved that 
there was a silence as to a material circumstance but 
also that tne guarantee was obtained by means of such 
silence. 
Where the relationship between the bank and the 
customer sucn that there is an element of trust and 
confidence between the two and tne customer of the bank 
is either old and ignorant, or weak, in sucn a case, the 
bank must exercise due diligence and allow the customer 
6? 
to get independent advice and not obtain documents 
trom the customer without his full knowledge and 
understanding the significance of his act. More 
often It happens in practice that printed form with 
the banks are filled in by the officers of the bank 
and the same are signed on the spot by guarantors who 
barely read through the forms and sign the same forth-
with. The party may do so for the purpose of obtaining 
immediate advance from the bank. However, subsequently, 
the person signing the forms at the request of the 
borrower may contend that he had either not completely 
read through the form, nor understood the significance 
of what he was doing and had no opportunity to obtain 
independent advice. The bankers should act more care-
fully and deligently whilst getting mortgages, guarantees 
and other similar forms signed by the guarantors at 
the request of the borrowers. 
The banker is not bound to volunteer to a pro-
posing guarantor information as to customer's financial 
position or business habits, however, material such 
information might be but if the banker is {questioned 
by the intending surety orv> point which might have a 
material bearing on the surety entering or not entering 
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into the gruarantee, in such a case the banker must 
give the requisite information honesty and the best 
of his ability, the occasion justifying the dis-
closure being Implied In the introduction of the 
surety. Any misrepresentation on the part of the 
bank as to the nature, contents or effect of the 
guarantee would entitle the surety to rescind or 
treat the instrument as rescinded. The custom of 
entrusting the guarantee to the principal debtor to 
get it executed by the surety should be avoided. 
The safest course, and the one normally adopted 
would seem to be to have the guarantee signed and 
witnessed by the surety bankers, so as to avoid any 
question of this sort. 
Fidelity Guarantee 
Since much of the business today is conducted 
by agents, it becomes necessary for the principal to 
exact the utmost honesty and goodfaith of his agent 
in the performance of his duties, Whenever the 
principal is unwilling to repose such confidence in 
the agent alone, he usually obtains what is known 
as a bond or faithful performance that is signed by 
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the agent and some third party, A contract of 
suretyship, therefore, appears to have for its 
objectives, security either for the payment of the 
money or the faithful performance of some other duty, 
in the latter case often being known as fidelity 
insurance. 
Before the writing of surety bonds became an 
established business, persons acting in a fiduciary 
capacity or occupying positions of trust, if sureties 
were required, were obliged to appeal to relatives or 
friends. While it was not unusual for the personal 
surety to require compensation for participating in 
the agreement, more often than not the surety signed 
his name to a bond without remuneration and purely as 
a favour. Corporate surety bonds were offered first 
in England during the early part of the Eighteenth 
century. In the period around 1720, when mony strange 
Insurance proposals made their appearance in England, 
a company offered to Insure masters against loss through 
71 the dishonesty of their servants. 
It was not until 1840 that the corporate fidelity 
business became established with the organization of 
an English Company to write the business. The first 
American Company was organized in New York in 1853, 
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following enactment by the Newyork Legislature of a 
law authorising the formation of corporations to 
insure the honesty of employees. 
Corporate suretyship was slow in developing. 
There was considerable resistance to the substitute 
of the impersonal corporation for the locally known 
personal surety. However, there was the growing reluc-
tance on the part of the individuals to assume gratui-
tously obligations in which they had no immediate 
interest. Corporate sureties were more and more accepted, 
and as the idea become increasingly reluctant to assume 
obligations without remuneration that corporations were 
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ready and willing to assume for a consideration, 
A second factors that tended to stimulate the 
development of corporate suretyship was the performance 
and stability of the corporations in the business. 
They are subject to the regulations provided by the 
Statutes, they have a lasting and permanent organization . 
It is their chief function to meet losses when they come, 
consequently, when losses develop, they are ready and 
willing to pay. 
The rule is generally well settled, that where 
the surety is liable upon the continuing undertaking 
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for the honesty of a servant, Ifthe servant has been 
guilty of acts of dishonesty in the course of the 
service to which the suretyship relates, it is the 
duty of the employer, upon discovering the fact, to 
discharge him or to disclose such dishonesty to the 
surety and secure his consent to the continuance of 
the services and if he fails to do this he cannot 
after-wards have recourse to the surety for any loss 
that may arise for the dishonesty of the employee 
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during the remaining period of the service. 
This rule is founded bot only upon obvious con-
siderations of justice and fairness to the surety but 
also the implied intention and expectations of the 
parties. The guarantor in such a case guarantees the 
fidelity of the servant. He guarantees the fidelity 
and ensures the loss against the risk of infidelity and 
not the fact of infidelity If the rule would have been 
otherwise it would be to permit the employer to encourage 
dishonesty at the cost of the surety which will not 
only be against all known notions of fairness but also 
be most repugnant to the elemantary considerations of 
public policy. 
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The continued employment of a seirvant without 
notice to the surety, in order to discharge the surety 
must be after the creditors or employer has proof of 
the servant's acts of dishonesty and not merely suspi-
cious or reports about it. The theory is a theory not 
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of suspicious but of satisfaction. 
It is submitted that the employer starts immediate 
investigation to find out what the actual fact is. 
Although a contract of insurance is not one of uberrimae 
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fidei, but a contract strictissina Juris. But at the 
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sametime a surety is considered as a favoured debtor. 
The suretyship contract, however, may impose 
special terms upon the employee regarding notice of 
irregularities or default of the principal, and the 
conditions imposing special duties upon the obligee so 
long as the employer observes goodfaith, the obligee is 
not bound to exercise supeevision of his employee or to 
adopt any particular means to prevent or ascertain his 
default. Most bonds of this kind, however, contain 
special provisions in this behalf. A common ©he being 
that the bond is made and accepted by the obligee upon 
the condition or upon the basis that there shall be a 
careful periodic examination of the accounts of the risk. 
72 
such provisions are in the nature of promissory 
warranties or conditions subsequent« and non-compliance, 
77 
there-with avoids the bond. In the case of Individual 
surety, when he affixes his name to the bond, his 
financial strength may be beyond question. If the 
bond runs for any considerable period of time, the 
financial status may change entirely, even to the 
extent that the surety may be without capacity to meet 
this obligations. It is easy to investigate the standing 
of a corporate surety. It is not so easy to know the 
status of an individual or to be assured that financial 
reverses may not have the effect of changing that status 
without the knowledge of other parties in whose interest 
a bond is written can exercise no supervisory control 
over individual sometimes and have no way of assuring 
themselves of continuing solvency. Individual sureties 
are unable to supply a bond with the same safety and 
stability as can a surety company. 
Difference between guarantee and insurance 
A contract under which an insurer undertakes 
to make good loss caused by the default of a debtor 
bears close resemblance to a contract of guarantee. There 
is, however, a broad distinction between an insurance 
and a guarantee. This distinction depends 
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upon the intention of the parties. In a contract 
of insurance pure and simple, insurer is not a surety. 
Insurer:does not undertake to pay the original debt, 
but undertakes to pay new debt, which arises out of 
the contract of indemnity. This debt may differ from 
the orivinal debt both in the amount and as regards 
other incidents. 
The subject-matter 6f a guarantee is always a 
debt either always incurred or intended to be incurred 
by the principal to the person taking the guarantee, 
or which though not already incurred or intended to be 
incurred, may result in the future from some default 
or miscarriage of the principal in a relation already 
existing or intended to be entered into between hdLmself 
and that person. The province of the guarantee is, 
therefore, narrower than that of the insurance. By 
insurance Indemnity may be secured against loss by the 
acts or omissions of strangers, A surety becomes bound, 
it may be unconditionally and without previous notice 
or demand, to pay the debt or make good the default 
which the principal is or shall be liable to pay or 
make good, A surety must see he does it. An insurer 
only engages to pay the loss, measured in a certain way, 
upon the happening of a defined contingency against the 
7 
happening of which he is not considered as capable 
of exercising any influence. 
An insurer is entitled to a disclosure of all facts 
material to the risk within the knowledge of the assured. 
But a surety can only complain of positive deception by 
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representations express or implied. 
It is co:r.mon knowledge that the contract of 
insurance is uberrima fide or in the utmost good-faith. 
Not only is such a contract liable to be set aside under 
the normal common law rules of mistake and misrepresen-
tation, but also as a special advantage of necessary 
disclosure. Uberrima fides is normally implied where 
one party has a considerable advantage over the other 
in terms of knowledge. 
If the principle contended for, that every thing 
should be disclosed by the creditor, that is material 
for the surety to know, is allowed, it would knock up 
transactions in giving security on a cash account because 
no banker would rest satisfied that they had a security 
for the advance. Jf such is the rule, it will be 
necessary for the canker to whom the security is given 
to state Blow the account has been kept of over drawing, 
whether he was punctual in his dealings, whether he 
1-1 '"• 
performed his promise honourably, for all these things 
are extremely material for a surety to know. Secondly, 
requirements of disclosure are not required because 
the guarantor is usually acquainted with the debtor 
anyway, and thus creditor cannot be called on to disclose 
to him facts of which through other sources he will 
probably have noticed, 
80 In Steatan v. Heath, Romer L.J. held: 
"The person desiring to be insured 
has means of knowledge as to the risk, 
and insurer has not the means or not the 
same means. The insured generally puts 
the risk before the insurer as a business 
transaction and the insurer on the risk 
stated fixes a proper price to remunerate 
him for the risk to be undertaken. On 
the other hand - thecreditor does not 
himself go to the surety, or represent 
or explain to the surety the risk to be 
run. The surety often take the position 
from motives of friendship and generally 
not as the result of any direct bargaining 
between him and the creditor, or in consi-
deration of any remuneration passing to him 
from the creditor". 
There are, however, situations where a person is 
persuaded to go to surety for another by payment of a 
money premium. This is a prima facie a case when the 
contract should be one of insurance. Secondly where 
an employer in taking a bond from a surety for the 
fidelity of a servant, did not disclose the fact, known 
to him but not to the surety, that the servant had 
7S 
previously been guilty of misappropriating money 
while in his service. In this situation the rule of 
81 
uberrima fidee applies even in case of guarantee. 
The difference between the two classes of 
contracts does not depend upon any difference between 
the word •insurance• and the word guarantee•, The 
distinction is based more upon the intention of the 
82 parties than upon the mere form of the contracts. 
There are four points upon which the relations arising 
between the two forms of contract can be distinguished: 
(i) Insurance is purely a business contract having 
for its consideration the payment of premium on the 
one hand and acceptance of the risk on the other. In 
the case of a guarantee liability is generally accepted 
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on personal grounds and without payment. 
(ii) Insurers do not usually have any personal know-
ledge of tne risk, and rely entirely upon what they are 
told. Thus they require the full disclosure of facts. 
In the case of guarantee the duty is less extensive and 
nothing short of actual misrepresentation can avoid the 
contract, 
(iii) Insurers are not sureties. They do not undertake 
to pay the original debt, but merely agree to indemnify 
the creditor to the extent of loss arising from non-
v ; 
payment of the debt. 
(iv) Insurers have no Independent rights against 
the debtor, but are merely subrogated to the rights 
of the assured. A surety on the other handjj__Jia5_a 
direct claim against the debtor. j^^>-^^'^^^-^^^ 
,/•/ Ace No. N^ 
Difference between Guarantee and Indfjmqlty^ i i n 9 o *^  
siisi I^L-x^^o^ ^^  
It is generally, recognized, ho^ J^'«>->that^ 5(^ ' 
guarantee is a contract secondary and collateral to 
the other promise, virnereas the indemnity is an original 
obligation independent of any other contract. In the 
former three party legal relationship is contemplated, 
that is, three sets of contractual relationship between 
the creditor and the principal debtor, the second 
between the creditor and the surety and the third, 
between the principal debtor and the surety. If the 
first two are the only contracts, the case is clearly 
one of •indemnity*. It is the third contract - the one 
where the principal debtor requests a third person 
expressly or by necessary implication to act as a 
surety - that constitutes a contract of guarantee. 
It is ofteff said that a contract of guarantee 
is one to the another for the debt, default or mis-
carriage of another, whereas a contract of Indemnity 
is one wherein the promisor j^ oE^ ^^ J^tra^ ^^ s^^ he promisee 
t( AecNo. \ \\ 
•S T'^(02,6.5|' 
73 
harmless from a loss, or it may be said that t^ he 
surety's promise is secondary and collateral to the 
other promise while the indemnity is oirlginal and 
independent of any other contract. A Uttarantee is 
sometimes said to be a promise to do an affirmative 
act, while the promise of indemnity is merely to 
repair a li&s^ , the liability of the indemnitor 
occuring only after the promisee has sustained actual 
loss. Still another definition says that a prcwnise 
of guarantee is one to protect the promisee against 
loss from the default of a third person, while a 
promise of indemnity is one to protect the promisee 
84 
from liability to a third person. 
A guarantee runs to the benefit of the creditor 
while an indemnity runs to the benefit of the debtor, 
gives a workable basis for distinguishing the two. 
The distinction is necessary when dealing with an 
absolute guarantee in order to determine whether the 
person secured must suffer loss to acquire a right of 
action or whether the debtor's mere fault is sufficient. 
That is, typically, guarantee is said to exist 
when the two persons are liable on the same debt, one 
as Principal, one contingently liable if the principal 
defaults and the normal expectation is that the debt 
79 
will be paid by the principal, or that he will 
reimburse the surety in the event of payment by the 
surety. On the other hand, a contract of indemnity 
is said to exist when, upon, the occurance of an agreed 
contingency, one person alone becomes liable to the 
obligee. 
The most important practical effect of the 
distinction, as is well known is that guarantee con-
tracts fall under the statute of Frauds 1677. Section 4 
requires evidence in writing and signed by the other 
party before they can be enforced in the courts. Indem-
nities on the other hand require no such evidence and 
can be enforced even when orally made. Although a 
contract of guarantee may be described as a contract of 
indemnity, points out Halsbury, yet contracts of gua-
rantee are distinguished from contracts of indemnity 
ordinarily so called by the faet that a guarantee is a 
collateral, that is, ancillary or subsidiary to another 
contract, where as an indemnity is a contract which is 
original and independent obligation. In certain cases, 
where there is a primary and secondary liaoility of the 
two persons for one and the same debt, they m^y. stand 
in relationship to one another of principal debtor and 
surety, even though no express contract of suretyship 
80 
exists. The existence o£ such a primary and secondary 
liability does not, however, in every case necessarily 
create the relation of principal debtor and surety. 
Thus despite the fact that there is primary and secondary 
liability, for instance between the transferee and the 
transfer of shares, the relation between them is not 
85 that of principal debtor and surety. 
The guarantee cannot, however, be collateral 
unless another is, or Is to be also liable. If two 
come to a shop and one buys, and the other says to the 
seller: 
"Let him have the goods, I will be 
your pay-master, or I will see you 
paid', This is an undertaking as 
far himself, and he shall be intended 
to be the very buyer and other to act 
but as his servant. 86 
Whatever the language used, the question must 
be whether they intended that the promisor should assume 
sole or subsidiary liability. Even the stark phrase, 
let him have the goods, I will see you paid, when thus 
read in the light of the contract, may mean not more 
than that of he does not pay, I will ^, 
The English Law applies various kinds of tests 
to distinguish between a contract of guarantee and a 
81 
contract of indemnity. The first test relates to the 
38 
shape of the contract and the second test relating 
89 
to the substantial nature of the contract. The tests 
are both objective and no weight is to be given to the 
90 intention of the parties. 
Whether a contract is one of guarantee oi* 
indemnity can thus be answered, scmietimes, only by 
referring to the circumstances which gave rise to 
the need for the use of that distinction and there 
certainly cannot be any basis for predicting, at the 
time a contract is made, into which category it may 
fall. 
The question whether the agreement amounts to 
a contract of guarantee or indemnity is of an academic 
nature involving technical hair-splettir^g and is not 
much productive. The remedy, if any, would seem to lie 
in ignoring entirely the supposed categories and actually 
deciding cases on the particular factual issues presented. 
But in the abaencB of such a remedy, it must be 
recognised that definitions of the guarantee or indemnity 
are cost in terms of the result rather than in terms 
that will lead to results. 
82 
impossible to worls out the rights and liabilities of 
the surety under the Contract Act. However, the same 
92 
High Court, H«« held that after It Is possible that 
the relationship of creditor and the surety be created 
without the principal debtor being a party to it. But 
in such a case,, the rights of the surety will be limited 
to those mentioned in sections 140 and 141 of the Act 
and does not extend to those mentioned in Section 145. 
In a contract of indemnity the indemnifer on 
paying off the claim can sue the third party, but the 
suit in the absence of any assignment can only be in 
the names of the promisee, i.e. indemnifier. There is 
no subrogation in the law in :case of contract of 
Indemnity, unlike that of a surety who undertakes the 
obligation at the request, express or implied of the 
principal debtor. In a contract of guarantee it is 
provided by section 140 of the Act that after payment 
or performance of the duty the surety is invested with 
all the rights which the creditor had against the 
principal debtor. In other-words, the surety steps 
into the shoes of the creditor to enforce any remedy 
against the principal debtor, and he can maintain an 
action against the principal debtor in his own name. 
To appreciate the distinction between a contract of 
8 0 
The distinction between the two types of con-
tracts is that in a contract of guarantee, the ^ _ 
surety assumes a secondary liability to answer for 
the debtor who remains primarily liable. Secondly 
a contract of guarantee is a tripartite agreement, 
which contemplates the principal debtor, the creditor 
and the surety, but on the other hand, in a contract 
of indemnity there are only two parties. In Periyanianna 
Masakayor v. Baniars & Co., Kumara Shastri^ J. of 
91 Madras High Court observed: 
" That the Contract Act, draws a 
distinction between a contract of 
indemnity and guarantee, and that 
contracts of suretyship, unlike 
contracts of indemnity, require 
the concurrance of three parties, 
namely, the principal debtor, the 
creditor and the surety. The 
surety undertakes his obligation at 
the request express or implied of 
the principal debtor. Reading section 
126 and 145 , it seems that there 
can be no contract of guarantee as 
distinguished from a contract of 
indemnity unless there is privity 
between principal debtor and the 
surety,as it is difficult to speak 
of an implied promise between persons whom 
there is no privity of contract. Section 
126 refers to contract of guarantee and 
speaks of three persons with reference 
to that contract". 
In strict sense all contracts of guarantee are contracts 
of indemnity, and unless there is privity among the 
principal debtor, the creditor and the surety, it is 
indemnity and guarantee, the case of Bank of India 
93 
Ltd, V. G. Govinda Prabha, is important. The 
facts were that A and B, agent and cleric of a bank/ 
when called upon to explain an irregularity in 
granting two loans to different persons, executed 
an agreement to see the repayment of the loan within 
a month, and also binding themselves personally to 
pay the amount if the debts were not discharged within 
the agreed time. After the expiry of one month, the 
bank filed a suit against the principal debtor and 
also against A and B. 'B* contended that the agreement 
in question was without consideration, and, therefore, 
void. The court rejected the plea and distinguished 
between contract of guarantee and a contract of 
indemnity as : 
" A contract of guarantee involves 
three parties the creditor, the 
surety and the principal debtor. 
There may be a contract, first of 
all between the principal and the 
creditor. That lays the foundation 
of the whole transaction. Then there 
may be a contract between the surety/ 
and the creditor by which the surety 
guaranties the debt and the considera-
tion for the same may move either from 
the creditor or from the principal debtor, 
or both. But if these are the only 
contracts, the case is one of indemnity. 
85 
In order to constitute a contract 
of guarantee, there must be a 
third contract, by which the 
principal debtor expressly or 
impliedly requests the surety, 
to act as surety, unless that 
element is present, it is 
impossible to work-out the 
rights and liabilities of the 
surety under the Contract Act". 
CJ n 
REPERENCSS ^ "^  
1. Now usually spelt guarantee. 
2. De Colyar, The Law of Guarantees« 3rd Ed. 
1897; Butterwlrth & Co, 7 Fleet Street 
Law Publishers. Black Law Dictionary, 4th 
Ed. 833. 
3. The Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 uses the 
word warranty with respect to the goods sold. 
4. Man Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 17 Cali-
fornia L.R.P. 605 
5. Ibid Note 2 
6. Maloney and MacNCice, cases and materials on 
security transactions, p. 1947. 
7. Frede Rick A. Whitney, The Law of Modern 
Commercial practices. Reprint 1961, P. 813, 
8. (1918) vol. 15 PP. 437-534 
9. (1825) 25 Mass ( 8 Pick ) 423, 428 
10. Courtis V. Dennis, (1844) 48 Mass ( 7 mtc)5lO 
11. BOUVIER's Law Dictionary , vol.1 
12. Man Radin, Guaranty and suretyship, 18 
California L.R.P. 28 
13. Ansons Law of Contract. The definition of 
Guarantee is always reduciable to ^his forrax 
"Deal with X, and if he does not pay you, I will. 
14. Simonds, ed., 18 Halsbury's Law of England 411 
3rd Ed. London 1957. 
15. Steel V, M. Kinlay, (1880) 5 AC 754 
16. Supra note 2 
17. (1819) 2 B & Aid. 613. 
18. Id. 
87 
19. Cheshire and Plfoot, Law of Contract, 
10th Ed. P, 179 
20. Corbin on contracts - A comprehensive Treatise 
on the Rules of Contract Law, vol. 2, p. 216 . 1950 
21. Restatement , 82 
22. Ibid. 
23. Samule Williston, A Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts, vol, 10 3rd Ed. P. 683. 
24. JanwatraJ v. Jcthmal, AIR 1958 Raj. 343; 
Ram Chandra B Loyalka v. Shapur^i N. Bhownagree, 
A. I.R, 1940 Bom., 315; Major General Mahabir 
Sheen Sher Jung Bahadur Rana v. Lloyds Bank 
Ltd. and another, A.I.R. 1968, Cal. 371. 
25. A.I.R. 1926 Mad, 544; Brahmayya & Co. v. K. 
Srinlvasan, A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 122. 
26. A.I.R. 1979 Pat. 151 
27. Brahmayya & Co, v. K. Srinlvasan Thangirayar 
and others, A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 122 
28. Satyanarayan v. Birendra, A.I.R. 1979 Cal. 197 
29. M.H.A. Khan v. Com. and Ind. Bank,,\.I.R, 1969 
A.P, 294 
30. Chattanatha v. Central Bank of India, A.I.R. 
1965 S.C. 1856. 
31. Marks v. Whitely (1912) 1 ch. 735 P. 754 
32. (1874) L.R. 7 H.L, 17 
33. (1835) 10 Blighns 
34. Potheir on Contracts, ( cited in De Calyor, 
Supra Note 2, at P. 364, 
35. Section 125 of the Restatement States that 
(1) The principal's lack of capacity is not 
a defence a valiable to the surety against 
the creditor (2) where a principal disaffirms a 
'1 O 
a promise because of lack of capacity and 
returns the consideration the criditor can 
held the surety to his obligation (a) subject 
to the creditor's duty to deliver the 
consideration to the surety upon the latter's 
performance or (b) reduced by the value of 
the consideration when returned to the creditor. 
36. MOHORI BIBI v. DHARMO DAS GHOSE, (1903) 
30 Cal, 539. 
37. (1895) 19 IL Bom. 697 
38. Ibid, p. 700 
39. Validity of Guarantees for debts of minors, 
10 M.L.R, P. 40 ( 1946). 
40. Varada Rajula v. Thavasi Nadar, A.I.R, 1963 
Mad. 413; PESTONJI Mody v. Mehubai, A.I.R. 1919 
Bom. 539; Tikkl Lai v. Kamal Chand, A.I.R. 1940 
Nag. 327. 
41. Kalappan Nanbear v. Kumhiraman, A.I.R. 1957 
Mad. 164. 
42. (1946) 2 All. E.R. 207. 
43. (1911) 27 T.L.R. 582. In this case, the minor 
to whcxn advance had been made was joined by 
his father in a joint and a Several promissory 
notes for the amount of advance. The father 
was held liable as a principal on the promissory 
Note. 
44. Robinson's Motor Vehicles Ltd. v. Grahan and 
other , (j.956) N.Z.L.R. 545. 
45. Supra, note 8 
46. Supra note 16 
47. Supra Note 16 
48. Ram Gopal v. Aga Sahabjan, 33 I.e. 732 
49. A.I.R. 1969 A»P. 294 
50. MIR Neyanath All v. The Commercial and indus-
trial Bank, A.I.R. 1969A.P, 294 
d 
51. A,I.R. 1940 Oudh, 346 
52. Which runs as follows: 
"When at the desire of the promisor, the 
promisee or any other person has done, 
or abstained from doing, or does or 
obstances from doing, something, such 
act or abstinance is called consideration 
for the promise", 
53. Parranjit Mahtha v. United Commercial 
Bank, A.I.R. 1979 Pat. 151 
54. Creass v. Hunter, (1887) 19 OBD.* 341 
55. Fullertion v. Provincial Bank of Ireland, 
(1903) AC 38 
56. Muthakasuppa v. Kauhapperdayan , A.I.R. 1915 
57. Mathukaru v. Krishnier, A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 62 
58. Muhammad Shamsuddin v. Shaw Wallace & Co., A.I.R. 
1939 Mad. 520 
59. Ghulam Hussain v. Paiyaz All, A.I.R. 1940 Oudh 
346; Chakhanlal v. Kanhaiya Lai, A,I.R. 1929 
All 72; Jagadindra Nath Ray v. Chandra Nath, 
(1904) 31 Cal. 242; Mathra Das v. Shambhoonath, 
A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 203. 
60. Nanak Ram v. Mehin Lai , ILR 1 All. 487; 
Varghese v. Abraham, A.I.R. 1952 Trav-co. 202; 
Ram Narain v, Hari Singh, A.I.R. 1964 Raj. 76; 
Pestanji Mankji Mody v. Meher bai, A.I.R.1928 
Bom. 539 
6^ 1. Appendix No. I 
62. Debendra Nath v. Administrator- General of 
Bengal, 10 C.W.N. 673 ( F.B. ) 
63. Per Pollock, C.B. in Rogers v. Hadly, 32 L.J.ex. 
64. Davis V. London Provincial Marine Insurant Co. 
(1878) 8 Ch. Div. 469 
9 J 
65. London General Omnicus Co, v, Halloway, 
(1912) 2 K.B, 72 
66. (1854) 12 CI. & Pin. 109 
67. Supra note 31 
68. (1854) 10 Ex. 523 
69. Bal Krishna v. Bank of Bengal, I.L.R. 15 Bom. 
70. Secretary of State for India v. Noilme I.L.R.6 
Mad. 406 
71. Johan H. MaGEE , General Insurance 6th, Ed.1961 
72. Ibid., P. 511 
73. Phillips V. Foxall, L.R.Q. 666; 
Radha Kanta v. United Bank of India,A.I.R. 
1955 Cal. 217; Co-operative Commission 
Shop Ltd. Chak^hunsa v. Udhan Singh, A.I.R. 
1944 Lah. 424; The decision of Harries C.J. 
and Mahajan tli J. laid down the well known 
principle that continued employment of a dis-
honest servant whose dishonesty has been proved 
or is clear, without notice to the guarantor 
will discharge the guarantor. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Chittaranjan Banerjee v. Commissioner of 
Lakhimpur, A.I.R. 1980 Gau. 62 
77. Hent v. Fidelity and casuality Co. 99 Fe'fi. 242 
78. Hukum Chand Insurance Co. v. Bank of Baroda, 
A.I.R. 1977 Kant. 204 
79. Rowlatt, Principal ans surety 2nd Ed. ,p,10 
It seems equally' settled that this rule uberrima 
fidi does not extend to contract of guarantee. 
It is clear, said, Sheuj in Lee v, Jones, (1864) 
17 C B.N.S. 482, that the rule which prevails In 
9 
assurance and life risks that all material 
circxxmstances known to the assured must be 
disclosed by him and that the non-disclosure 
of them, though innocent and not fraudulent, 
vitiates the contract does not apply to the 
contract of guarantee", 
80. (1899) 1 Q.B. 782 
81. Supra note 72; supra note 65 
82. C. KAMLSHWARA RAO, Treatise on the law of 
insurance, 1957, 
83. Lee v, Jones, supra note 79 
84. Somers v, U,S. Fidelity and guaranty Co.,191 
Cal, 542 ( cited in Yale Law j. Vol, 44 P,1054) 
85. 18 Halsbury's Laws of England, Supra note 12 
at kt6 416 
86. Birknyar v. Darmel, (1704) 1 Salke 27 
87. Supra note 19 P. 180 
88. The case of East wood v. Kenyar, (1840) 
11 Ad. and El. 438, is a good example of 
this comparatively simple test. In the words 
of Lord Dennar : 
" The plaintiff was liable to Mr, Blackburn 
on a promissory note, and the defendant, 
for consideration promised the plaintiff to 
pay and discharge the note to Blackburn . 
Doubtless the Statute would have applied, 
it would then have been strictly a promise 
to answer for the debt of another, we are 
of the opinion that the Statute applies to 
promise made to the person to whom another 
is answerable V 
89. Mount Stephen v. Lakeman« (1874) Q.B. 196; 
Yeaman credit v. Latter, (1916) 2 All. E.R. 
294. Thus if the purpose of the transaction 
is to replace the debtor entirely by placing 
the debt on anothers shoulders« the Statute 
will not apply. 
90. Michael C. Bahair, The Conversion of guarantee 
Contract, Mod. L.Review Vol , 29 P. 522 
91, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 544; Punjab National Bank v. 
D.C. Mills, ^.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1973; :.'^\\ 
Ram Chandra v. Shapurji, A.I.R. 1940 Bom.315; 
Janwattaj v, Jethmal, A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 343; 
Municipal Committee Baldana v. Vishnu Damodar 
Bhalrag, A.I.R. 1949 Nag. 48 
92. 
93. 
Muthuraman China v. Vellyan, I.L.R, 39 Mad,115 
A.I.R. 1964 Ker. 217; Radha Kumar v. Ram 
Narain, A.I.R. 1952 All. 587. 
93 
CHAPTER - III 
CONTINUINQ GUARANTEE — ITS NATURE ,REVOCATION ETC, 
The question whether a guarantee Is a 
continuing guarantee or not may be considered under 
1 
two heads. The first class o£ cases consists of 
ordinary mercantile guarantees for a current account; 
either for goods sold, or for money advanced or some 
consideration of the like nature. The second class 
of cases arises where guarantees have been given for 
the good behaviour of a person in some office or 
1 
employment. Sections 129 to 131, of the Indian Contract 
Act, deal with the nature and revocation of a continuing 
guarantee. 
All guarantees must be either specific or 
continuing. If restricted by their terms to a single 
transaction or within a fixed limit of time they are 
temporary. If not so restricted they continue in force 
until revoked. The latter class are called continuing 
guarantees, A continuing guarantee must refer to a 
series of transactions of which, when the guarantee 
is given, some are unknown, indefinite or uncertain. 
Where the guarantee is given in respect of a single 
existiny transaction, namely the payment of a specific 
9x 
2 
sum, the guarantee is a simple guarantee. To determine 
the difference bet.%feen a simple guarantee and a conti-
nuing guarantee one has to examine the nature of the 
consideration. If it is fragmentary and divisible, 
supporting for example a running or floating balance, 
the guarantee is continuing and revocable. If it is 
entire, supporting , say the grant of a lease or the 
3 
fidility of an employee, it is non-revofcable. 
The question often mooted is what is the 
effect of presence or absence of clauses expressly 
limiting liability on the nature of guarantee, /Mother 
moot question worth examining is whether a general 
authority, without any words of limitation as to time or 
amount, to make advances to another on the credit of 
the promisor, will bind the surety for any amount at 
any time until revoked, or whether he is bound merely 
for any amount the principal asks for and receives at 
the time he presents his letter of credit. 
To restrict such obligations to a single 
transaction and construe it as a limited guarantee is 
to adopt the view that instruments of guarantee should 
be construed most strangly in favour of the surety, 
and to construe the instrument as a continuing guarantee 
is to adopt the other extreme view that the construction 
95 
4 
Should be most strongly against the surety, 
Chitty while dealing with continuing guarantee 
5 
expressed the opinion* 
"It is often a difficult question 
whether a guarantee, for example, 
of the price of goods to be supplied, 
or may be lent up to a specified 
amount is tendered , to extent to a 
single or definite number of transac-
tions, or whether it is intended to 
be a continuing. In the former event, 
payment of the principal debtor for the 
goods sold, or repayment of money lent, 
brings the surety's liability to an end, 
in the latter event, the surety remains 
liable if further goods are supplied or 
money lent up to the limit of the 
guarantee". 
Whether the guarantee is continuing in any 
case is a question of construction, no hard and fast 
rule can be laid down, and the contents of one document 
affords little or no guidance to the constructions of 
an-other. Each case depends entirely on the language 
used and the document must be looked at with reference 
to the circiMnstances Kunder which it was given. The 
expression from time to time" or until further notice 
will usually, if not always be ^ ^^eclusive of an inten-
tion to make a continuing guarantee. 
9 
Continuing guarantee In accordance with 
section 129 of the Contract Act, would only mean a 
guarantee which extends to a aeries of transactions 
Therefore continuing guarantee speaks of continuing 
transactions, not the period of such transactions. 
Therefore, it is q[ulce possible that a guarantee can 
be confined to a series of transactions and can be 
restricted or limited to one year. Hence there can be 
7 
a continuing guarantee for a fixed period. The 
illustrations ai.pended to section 129 has created con-
fusion among various High Courts in order to determine 
the nature of the guarantee. It has been pointed out 
8 
by Rangoon High Court that the illustrantion to the 
Contract Act are to be used as guides only and not as 
authoritative and binding declarations of the law. It 
is to be noted firstly that illustration (a) is appa-
rantly not based upon any specific English case, such 
as the two subsequent illustrations are. Again in S.N. 
9 
Sen V. The Bank of Bengal, it has been observed that 
there is hardly any modern case in which guarantee has 
been held to be continuing one, which depends upon a 
main contract of employment between a master and a servant 
in the nature of a surety for the servant's fidelity. 
9? 
The only surviving cases of continuing guarantee 
are those In which a third party stands surety for 
the due discharge of a mercantile account or a floating 
balance between businessmen. The court held that 
Illustration - (a) of section 129 Is wrong as a state-
ment of law. 
Where a guarantee is meant to cover a series 
of transaction or no time limit has been fixed, but 
containing limitation as to the amount for which the su-
rety will be demanded, it will , in general, be construed 
to be a continuing guarantee. The time limit mentioned 
in such a guarantee ordinarily is deemed to have reference 
to the amount of the surety's liability, and not to 
the sunount of dealings between the principal debtor and 
the creditor, and the surety will be held liable to 
the extend of his guarantee. The principal debtor may 
have during the contract contracted debts to an amount 
equal to or greater than that agreed to. Thus I agree 
to be responsible for the price of goods purchased of 
you either by note or account, by H, at any time 
hereafter, to the amount of 0 1000 , was held conti-
nuing . So that though H. bought ^ iOOO/- worth of 
goods from the creditor and paid for them and then 
bought other goods of him in excess of that amount, the 
93 
guarantor was held liable for ^  1000 of the balance 
10 
due to the creditor. 
Where a guarantee contains no express limitation 
as to either time or amount, and there is nothing in 
the instrument itself to give rise to the conclusion 
that it was the intention of the sureties to leave it 
open as to both, the guarantee may generally be under-
stood as refering to a single transaction. Thus if you 
will let the bearer have what leather he wants and charge 
the same himself, I will see that y->u have your pay in 
a reasonable length of time. It was held to confine to 
a single transaction. The court said; "^ ,e think it Is 
limited to a single transaction or purchase. We must 
hold this or that it is unlimited both as to time and 
amount. Every man is supposed to have some regard for 
his own interest and it is not reasonable to presume any 
man of ordinary prudence would become surety for another 
without limitation as to time or amount unless he has 
11 
done so in express terms or by clear implication. 
The document should be interpreted as a whole 
and is not to be confined to the operative part. If 
there is any ambiguity or uncertainty it is pei^ rilssible 
to press into consideration the nature and character of 
93 
business« the relative position of the parties and 
12 
surrounding circumstances. In Sankaranaeayna v. 
13 
Paramasivan, it has been held that there is no analogy 
between a security executed by a surety under section 
55(4) C.P.C, and a continuing guarantee as defined in 
section 129 of the Contract Act, In the former case, 
there is no series of transactions giving rise to a 
distinct liability which the guarantee is intended to 
cover Dut tnere is only a single transaction under 
which the surety takes the responsibility for certain 
things to be done in future though on different occa-
sions. But where a person becomes a surety, and 
executes a security bond stipulating "I, the executant, 
agree to become a surety for the judgment-debtor and 
covenant that I shall produce the Judgment debtor in 
court on each and every occasion when his attendance is 
called for by the order of the court", the Contract is 
14 
of continuing guarantee. 
Where a bond or other guarantee has been given 
for the good behaviour ( fidelity ) of third persons 
in office or employment, very nice question often arise 
as to whether the liability of surety continues after 
some change has taken place as to the circumstances of 
the appointment. These situations may arise as: 
10. 
(1) The liability of the surety after the third 
party's appointment to the same office. 
(2) The surety's liability after the third 
party's appointment to another, though similar office 
ar employment. 
(3) The suretys liability after a change has 
taken place in the duties or the length of the term 
of the third person's office. 
In the celebrated case of Lora Arlingtan v, 
15 
MERRICK, the guarantee was conditioned for the per-
formance of the duties of deputy postmaster, by A.B, 
for and during all the time he shall continue deputy 
postmaster. It appeared, however, from the recital in 
the bond, that the plaintiff had appointed A.B. to act 
as Deputy Postmaster for the term of his six months. It 
was accordingly held, that the general words of the 
condition was restricted by the recital, and that the 
liability of the defendant under the bond or surety for 
A.B. ended only during the six months and did not extend 
to subsequent re-appointment to the same office. In 
16 
Peppin V. Cooper, a bond was given which after reciting 
the appointment of Henry Warren to be a Collector, under 
an Act of parliament which made the office an annual 
office. The due collection of rates and dues at all 
in; 
tiroes hereafter" was guaranteed, Abb6tt, C.J. said, 
" I am of the opinion that the condition of the bond 
is satisfied by the faithful collection of rates and 
dues for the period of one year. It is true, that 
the words at all tiroes hereafter, in the condition 
of the bond, would taken by theroselves, extend the 
liability of the surety beyond that period. But these 
words must be construed with reference to the recital, 
and to the nature of the appointment there mentioned. 
Now the nature and duration of that office must be 
learnt from the Act of Farliaroent itself, for if the 
Statute make it an annual office, it is unnecessary to 
state that fact either in the bond or in the pleading. 
Of course, by the use of the proper words, a surety may 
provide for a continuance of his liability on subsequent 
re-appointment to same office, of the person, whose 
17 
default or miscarriage is guaranteed against. 
Where a person is surety for another's good be-
haviour in a particular office, and subsequently such other 
person is appointed to a perfectly distinct office, 
which is incompatible and inconsistent with the first 
appointment the surety is discharged even though the 
duties under the two appointments be substantially inden-
tical. But where a person, for whose good behaviour an-
IOJ 
other is surety* Is subsequently , appointed to 
an additional office or employment^ the liability 
of the surety does not in consequence necessarily 
18 
cease. Of course, however, in such a case the 
liability of the surety would not extend to any-
thing done or omitted by the plaintiff in respect 
of such additional office or employment. 
Cases where, after the execution of the 
surety bond, a change has taken in the duties or 
length of the term of the third person's office 
or employment, or in the mode of remuneration 
of such third person for his services. It is 
well established that when the change made 
materially alters the duties of the office and 
this effects the peril of the sureties, they are 
released. 
HIS' 
The liability of the surety may also be destroyed 
by an alteration in the mode of payment, as well as by 
an alteration in the duties of an office. For where a 
bond given by a person as surety for the good behaviour 
of a third person in an office or employment states 
that such third person is to be renununerated for his 
services in a particular way, the surety is discharged 
from all liability if subsequently to the execution of 
the bond any change be effected in the made of remunera-
tion. Thus as decided in The London and North Western 
19 
Railway Co. v. Whimsay. In 1851 the defendant executed 
a bond in favour of a railway co.The company had agreed 
to appoint L. as their clerk or agent for the purpose 
of selling coal. The salary was £100 per year. A 
gurantee was given for the due accounting by L. Of all 
moneys received by him for the use of the company. 
Subsequently it was agreed between L and Company to 
substitute for salary. It was held that th?? surety was 
liable for the faithful conduct of L. Whilst ne conti-
nued clerk at such fixed salary, and consequently the 
defendant was not liable after the change in the mode 
of remuneration . 
Whether a guarantee is continuing or non-continuing 
cannot be determined by fixed rules of construction, nor 
by reference to decide cases. They simply illustrate 
H]-> 
what the courts have done under the peculiar facts 
and circumstances of particular cases. Disputes fre-
quently arise in England as to whether an instrument 
falls within the description of a continuing guarantee 
or not. There is considerable difficulty in reconciling 
all the cases on this suoject, and the difficulty 
arises chiefly from their being not at one as to the 
principle of decision, Scxne cases lay down that the 
guarantee sho\kld be construed liberally; in favour of 
the person giving it, and the others, that it ought 
to be construed^gtrictly. LorJ Ellenborough observed 
in Merle v. Well , "d)f a party means to confine his 
liability to a single dealing, he should take care to 
say so. Such a recital would restrain the generality 
of the engagement and explain whether it has reference 
to past or future transactions or continuing with 
reference to future transaction depends always on the 
circumstances under which it is given", 
"Revocation of a continuing guarantee" 
k continuing guarantee may either be revoked by 
notice as by death as to the future transactions under 
certain circumstances. If it 'appears that the guarantee 
was intended to be a continuir>g and the contract contains 
103 
no express limitation as to the duration of the 
guarantor's liability, liability thereunder will be 
deemed to have continued, in the absence of anything 
to indicate a different intention,ubtil notice of re-
vocation of the contract was given by the guarahtor. 
Speaking generally, a continuing guarantee may be 
revoked by the guarantor unless the terms of the con-
tract preclude revocation. More precisely, an offer to 
guarantee an obligation which is to be incurred at a 
future time may be revoked by the offree, with the 
result that he may not be held liable by the creditor 
oft account of the latcers extension of credit to the 
debtor subsequent to the receipt of notice of revoca-
tion. Of course, the guarantor cannot revoke the 
guarantee so as to escape liability for credit already 
extended. 
where the guarantee can be revoked, the revo-
cation cannot affect advances which have been made, or 
responsibilities wnich have been incurred on the strength 
of the guarantee before notice of the revocation is 
given. 
\ continuing guarantee for future advances as 
supplies, in consideration of granting of such advances or 
lOJ 
supplies does not become binding until the creditor 
has acted upon it. It may, therefore, be revoked^i, 
before it is acted upon, and as to future transactions, 
even if it has been acted upon, if there is no stipu-
20) 
lation between the parties. 
The reason is that each advance or supply, 
or each transaction is a separate transaction, and 
the guarantee is divisible as to each advance or 
supply. It ripens into a irrevocable promise or 
guarantee as to each advance, supply and transaction 
22 
only when the same is made. If the surety finds the 
principal debtor untrustworthy, he is entitled, on 
the payment of what has been advanced to the principal 
debtor upto date, to get the guarantee back. In 
23 
Lloyd's V. Harper, James L.J, said: 
"It may be considered equitable 
and right tnat where a man is 
not under any obligation to aska 
make further advances or to sell 
further goods, a person who has 
guaranteed repayment of such 
advances, or payment of the price 
of the giods, may say, I do not 
sell any further goods or make any 
further advances. I give you a 
warning that you are not to rely 
on my guarantee for any further 
advances which he make; or any other 
goods you sell'. That might be in 
many cases an equitable view, it 
might perhaps be hardly equitable 
for a banker or merchant to go on 
l u ; 
making advances after receiving 
notice from the guarantor that 
he would not be further liable*. 
Where the guarantee is a continuing one, the 
surety can at any time revoke the guarantee by notice 
to the creditor. So where a guarantee relates to a 
qmnnber of payments of rent, extending to a series of 
transactions, it is a continuing guarantee. The 
surety can revoke the guarantee after a notice to 
the creditor. The surety is not responsible for the 
payment of the rent which accu^ ted after the surety 
has revoked the contract and guarantee by notice. 
A distinction is to be made between entire and 
individual consideration on the one hand and fragmentary 
and divisible consideration on the other hand. In 
the former case, all guarantees which relate to the 
conduct of a person admitted to an office of trust; or 
to the possession of property. In such cases, the 
consideration is a single act done once for all and 
25 
is not divisiDle. In Abdul v. Belayat All. it has 
been held that under section 130 a continuing guarantee 
may be revoked at any time as regards future transac-
tions. It is a well known class of cases and there 
10. 
have been many cases in English courts in which a 
surity has been allowed to withdraw, where the 
guarantee has been found to be a continuing. But 
no case has ever established where a surety has 
given a guarantee to cover a definite case, he can 
simply by notice to the creditor withdraw the gua-
rantee to nullify altogether the effect of the 
security. The consideration is entire, supporting, 
as the grant of lease or the fidelity of an employee. 
But there is one authority to show, however, that in 
the case of a fidelity guarantee once exact information 
has reached the surety that the principal debtor has 
been guilty of misconduct or the position has com-
pletely changed, the surety is entitled to recall the 
guarantee as against the creditor. For example in the 
26 
case of PHILLIPS V. FOXALL, it has been observed: 
" But if there is misconduct on the 
part of the person whose fidelity 
is guaranteed, for instance, if a 
man guarantees that a collecting 
clerk shall only account for all 
money received by him and that collec-
ting clerk is found to have embezzled 
his employer's money, reason requires 
that the man who entered into the 
guarantee because he believes the 
person to be of good character, when 
he finds he is not so, and not to be 
trusted, should have the power of 
saying. I now withdraw the guarantee. 
I gave you. I give you full notice 
not to trust him any more. Notwith-
standing all that what has been said. 
10 
I am clearly of the opinion that a 
person who entered into such a gua-
rantee and is therefore responsible 
for the person whose fidelity he has 
guaranteed has a right to withdraw 
that guarantee when that person has 
been proved guilty of dishonesty". 
In the absence of agreement to the contrary, a 
continuing guarantee is revoked, as to future transac-
tions, thereunder, by any change in the constitution of 
27 
a firm to or far whom guarantee was given. 
There is, however, conflict of opinion between 
various High Courts aregarding the revocation of bonds 
given in court proceedings. The Madras High Court has 
28 
held in Sankaranarayan v, Paramasivan, that there is no 
anology between a security bond executed by a surety 
under section 55(4) C.P.C. and a continuing guarantee as 
defined in section 129 of the Contract Act. A surety in 
the former case cannot claim to be released from the 
obligation at his pleasure and the principle of section 
130, Contract Act, does not apply. On the other hand 
29 
Allahabad High Court, has held that where a person becomes 
a surety, and executes a surety bond stipulating, "I, 
the executant, agree to become a surety for the judgment 
debtor and covenant that I shall produce the judgment-
debtor in the court on each and every occasion when his 
11.J 
attendance is called for by the order of the Court", 
The contract being a continuing guarantee cannot be 
revoked by the guarantor as to future transactions, 
by the notice to the creditor. 
The Lahore High Court has taken a view that a 
security bond furnished under section 55 of C P . C , is 
in the nature of a continuing guarantee, and when the 
surety produces a judgmentdebtor before the court 
and requests to be absolved from further liability 
30 
under the bond, the court should not refuse the prayer. 
It is submitted that the view taken by Lahore High Court 
is reasonable that when a surety executes a sacarity 
bond he cannot put an end to his guarantee at his will. 
But the Court has a power to exonerate such surety from 
all future liability, that is liaoility arising from 
future transactions or future events, 
31 
The law commission | The Thirteenth Report(1958)| 
suggests: 
"To section 130 of the principal Act, the 
following exception be added namely; 
A continuing gurantee given to a court cannot be 
revoked by the surety as to future transactions without 
the permission of the Court", 
n 
In cases where the continuii^g guarantee 
relates* for instance, to a current account in a bank* 
or a current account relating to goods sold in a 
business, the guarantee may be withdrawn at any time , 
as to future transactions by notice to the creditor. 
The right of revocation may be limited by 
express stipulation. In case, it is intended that 
the surety should, in default of an agreed notice, 
continue liable indefinetely, the intention should be 
clearly expressed. The law is clear that a conti-
nuing guarantee may be revoked by the surety by notice 
to the creditor. But to have the effect of revoca-
tion , the notice must be such as can be regarded as 
a notice putting an end to the contract of guarantee 
under this section. The mere fact, that the surety 
denied his liability as surety in a previous suit cannot 
be regarded as a notice putting an end to the contract 
of guarantee when the denial was made for the purpose 
of pleading and could not have any other effect given 
to it than was given in the suit itself. A mere denial 
of liability by a party in a previous suit cannot operate 
as notice, nor can the denial of existence of a legal 
contract have that effect. Such denial cannot be given 
the effect of a notice to the creditor that surety is 
1] 
32 
putting an end to a legal contract of guarantee, 
33 
In Dhamoomal Farsasen v. Kuppuraj, it has been 
held that the Indian Contract Act has left it open 
to the parties to provide as to the manner in which 
notice to the creditor under section 130 has to be 
given, then such a contract is binding contract. 
When guarantee Is given by more than ane person, 
34 
notice must be given by or on behalf of them. \ 
notice revoking a continuing guarantee Just a day 
35 
before the performance of the contract is valid. But 
it is sutxnitted that the revocation should be within 
a reasonable time so that alternative arrangements 
could be made. So far as the revocation of security 
bonds required by the courts aire concerned, the revo-
cation should always came into effect only for subse-
quent appearances when the prit^ cipal debtor first has 
been produced before the court. 
Revocation of a Continuing Guarantee by surety's death 
Where the guarantee is one which can be ended 
at the will of the surety while living, it is terminated 
as to future transactions by his death. But such 
termination does not affect transactions which were 
executed prior to his death. Where the contract of the 
11 u 
surety is to be responsible for goods to be sold or 
money to be advanced in the future, it is held to be 
lnv>tih« nature of an offer or authority t<b sell goods 
or any other authority not coupled with an interest is 
revocable by notice by the surety to the creditor 
36 
during life and is ipso facto revoked by his death. 
But not all the cases held that death ipso facto 
revokes the guarantee of future advances even when it 
might have been revoked by notice during life and there 
is much authority and reason for the rule that notice 
or knowledge of guarantees' death must reach the creditor 
before the credit is given for which the guarantor's 
estate is sought to be held liable.To the same result 
37 
is Bradbury v, Margan, " if the guarantee has been in 
these words," i request you to deliver to A tomorrow 
morning goods to the value of £ 50, and in consideration 
of your doing so 1 will repay you", and before the 
morning the guarantor died, but the goods were duly 
delivered, I can see no reason, said Bramwell B, the 
personal representatice of the guarantor should be 
liable. In that case the guarantee had been acted upon 
and the question was only as to the effect of the death 
of the guarantor as to the future advances made subse-
quently. In such circumstances, at any rate, it is now 
1 ] •: 
settled that the death of the guarantor does not put 
an end to the continuance of the security, unless it 
38 
comes to the knowledge of the creditor. 
The guarantee is revoked by the guarantor's 
death if the guarantor might have revoked it during 
his life time. Guarantees have been divided into two 
classes, ojne., where it passes wholly in one time- the 
c'her, where it passes at different times, and is 
therefore, separable or divisible. The former are 
not revocable by the guarantor, and are not terminated 
by the death of the guarantor and notice of that fact. 
The latter, on the contrary, may be revoked as to the 
subsequent transactions by the guarantor, upon notice 
to that effect and are determined by his death and 
notice of that event. A leading case on the subject 
39 
is Lloyd's V. Harper, in this case the principal 
applied for an admission as an underwriting member of 
"Lloyd's and pursuant to a rule of that association 
regarding a guarantee on this behalf. The surety 
held himself responsible for all his engagements in 
that capacity. It was held that the guarantee was 
not terminated by the death of the surety and that 
the representative of the surety were bound for de-
faults occurlng after his death. Here the consideration 
n 
la given once for all, just as in the case of granting 
of a lease in which a third party guarantees the 
payment of the rent and performance of the conditions. 
If the surety was at liberty to say, " I withdraw 
the guarantee", than the guarantee would have been 
utterly futile and idle. 
A similar question was before privy council in 
40 
S,N. Sen V. Bank Qf Bengal, in this case the principal 
was appointed to a office of trust and a contract of 
guarantee was entered xnto for securing an appointment 
of principal in a bank. It was held that there being 
no series of transactions. It was one transaction, 
the appointment af the employee to a place of trust in 
the bank. So long as he continued in that place the 
guarantee remained and would not be revoked by the 
death of the guarantor. Any other view would have 
consequences very injurious to business. It would put 
the bank in the position of having either to get rid 
of an official forthwith upon death of his guarantor, 
which might be most inconvenient, or to keep him 
without security for his good behaviour. Even where 
the employee is entitled to three months notice the 
bank has to take a risk for three months of the gua-
ranty • -
Or'8 death. 
] 1 J 
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In Kaparthala Estate v, Sheo Shankar/ under 
a security bond, the surety made himself liable to 
thp extent of one year's rent on default by the 
principal debtor during the period of the lease. The 
principal died in the course of the lease. The surety 
did not give notice to the landlord revoking his 
guarantee. It was held that the sarety was liable on 
the bond for the whole period of the lease. 
The general rule is subject to a contrary con-
tract between the parties. The effect of a contract 
to the contrary is that the death of the surety does 
not operate as a revocation of a continuing guarantee 
so far as regards future transactions. In each case, 
the contract between the parties must be looked into in 
order to determine whether the contract of surety has 
been revoked by the death of the surety. If from the 
contract it can be gathered, either from the express 
provision or by necessary implication, that there was a 
contract that the death of the surety would not operate 
as a revocation, the contract af guarantee will be held 
to continue even after the death of the surety. In 
42 
Durga Priya v. Durgapada, towards the end of the bond, 
it was further stated: 
I'J? 
"Oyr heirs and legal represenatatlves 
shall be bound by the terms of this 
security bond in the same way may in 
which we are i>o\ma by them". 
From these terms it seems to be clear that the surety 
bound himself as well as his heirs and legal represen-
tatives by the terms oficthe contract entered into between 
him and the plaintiff for standing as a surety. There is 
in this contract as contemplates under section 131 the 
stipulation that the representatives of the surety would 
be bound for any act done by the principal debtor during 
the continuance of his service even after the death of 
the surety. 
There may be two cases where the surety has a 
contractual right to terminate the guarantee. One is 
where the contract of guarantee contains a provision 
enabling the surety to terminate the contract after a 
certain notice. The other where the surety binds himself 
and his representatives, after the death of the surety, 
and also contains a provision that the surety might ter-
minate his liability after giving a certain notice. 
In the first, the continuing guarantee is revoked 
by the death of the surety. In the second case, the death 
of the surety does not free his representatives from 
liability for default of the principal debtor subsequent 
n 
to the death of the surety. In this case the question 
for consideration is whether there is any contract to 
the contrary in the surety bond which takes it out of 
the provisions of this section. If the surety bond 
shows that it will continue to operate even after the 
death of the surety or that the operation of the surety 
bond will continue so long as the original contract 
between the creditor and the principal debtor continues, 
the case is taken out of this section and the clause 
in the surety bond that the surety in the surety bond 
that the surety can terminate his liability by giving 
previous notice does not show that the surety can ter-
minate at any time, and, therefore, would ipso facto 
43 terminate with the death of the surety. 
So far as banks are concerned, the question of 
notice of determination of the guarantee by the bank is 
simple no period is required, for the guarantor under-
takes to pay the amount due under the guarantee on demand 
in writing being made by the bank. In protection of 
its own interest, the creditor should not allow termi-
nation on the part of the guarantee, who will be required 
to give to the creditor a notice in writing of his 
intention to terminate the guarantee at the expiration 
11 
of the period stated in the guarantee« which may 
be, say, one month. This period allows the creditor, 
on the receipt of the notice, an opportunity of 
ascertaining the position vis-a-vis the principal 
debtor and for the guarantor before the expiry, date 
arrives. In acknowledging the receipt of the notice 
to the guarantor the creditor will state that the 
amount of his liability under the guarantee will be 
advised to him on the expiration of the notice. 
In practice, a tri-partite meeting may be 
sought by the creditor, so that the question of what 
arrangements the guarantor and/or customer intend to 
make or repayment or whether the customer can provide 
alternative security may be discussed among the three 
interested parties. 
L, J 
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CHAPTER - IV 12 
SURETY AS A FAVOURED DEBTOR — ITS ECONOMIC 
RATIONALE , EXPLANATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 
1 
Surety is a favoured debtor in Law. This 
observation contains the substance of the liability 
of the surety vis-a-vis the principal debtor in 
relation to the creditor. The law of the guarantee 
though fairly well settled in its main principles 
has many unusual features and special rules have been 
evolved with respect to the creation and discharge of 
a surety's liability. The very nature of the contract 
of guarantee and the fact it involves three parties, 
each of whom stands in a different, position vis-a-vis 
the others, necessarily give rise to diverse juristic 
interests which the law has endeavoured to adjust. The 
question arises what is the nature and measure of the 
liability of the surety. 
It has to be noted that the contract of 
2 
guarantee contains three contracts. One between the 
principal debtor and the creditor and the other between 
surety and the creditor and the third between the 
principal debtor and the surety. Thus what is known in 
52J 
contract as a composite contract of guarantee can 
be classified into three broad divisions as stated 
above. 
Under the principles of law of guarantee, 
the surety is liable to the creditor. Because the 
creditor has entered into the contract in considera-
tion of surety's assurance about the performance of 
the contract by the principal debtor. However, his 
liability is a qualified one which makes him a 
favoured debtor to the creditor. 
The following are the fundamental reasons 
which Justify the maxim that a surety is a favoured 
debtor in the jurisprudence of the law of guarantee: 
(1) Under section 126 of the Indiab Contract Act, 
a contract of guarantee is a contract wherein the 
liability of the surety arises in case of the principal 
debtor's default. This raises the nice legal question 
whether the creditor can file a suit directly and 
exclusively against the surety without having first 
made the demand or involving the principal debtor. 
Under section 128 the liability of the surety 
is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor and 
unless there is a contrary contract the suit 
123 
against the surety without first ekhausting the 
remedies against the principal debt6r could be main-
3 
tained. Thd creditor can bp^ ing a suit against the 
surety alone or can recover the decretal amount by 
proceeding agAinst the.surety alone in the first 
4 
instance in execution proceedings* The law has been 
5 
stated by the Supreme Court that in the absence of 
some special equity the surety does not have the 
right to restrain an action against him by the creditor 
on the ground that the principal is solvent or that 
the creditor may have relief against principal in 
some other proceedings. The liability of the surety 
arises immediately on the failure of the principal 
debtor to perform their obligation and that the liabi-
lity is not deferred until the creditor exhausts his 
remedies against the principal debtor. But the surety 
is a guarantor, and it is his business and not that 
of the creditor to see that the principal pays. Before 
payment, the surety has no right to dictate terms to 
the creditor and asK him to persue his remedies against 
6 
the principal in the first instance. 
Whether or not demand is necessary before a 
suit can be maintained against a surety depends upon 
the construction of the contract. Where the debt 
12 
guaranteed by the surety is under the teirms of the 
contract payable only after notice of demands, the 
7 
surety's liability arises only after such notice. 
The use of the words "unless it is otherwise provided 
by the contract" in the section is sufficient to 
warrant the proposition that where the terms of a 
bond require that the debtor should be proceeded 
against first, creditor must first take the steps 
against the principal debtor and if this has not been 
done no cause of action comes into existence against 
the surety. 
But the position would be different where the 
bond provides if the aforesaid person fails to pay 
the amount thereof I will pay it in accordance with 
9 
the bond". All could be made liable concurrently, 
10 
In Raqi Sagar Singh v, Yogendra Narain Prasad Singh, 
the surety objected to the principal claim in executiron 
by a creditor first instead of the debtor and where 
no steps were taken by the creditor to realise the 
claim from the principal debtor, it was held that the 
defence of the surety was not maintainable. It was 
observed by the High Court that it is open to the surety 
to proceed against any or both of them and as such the 
execution was maintainable. It would have been different 
12 
if there was a contract between the parties that in 
case of default, the creditor should proceed first 
against the principal debtor and if not satisfied 
then should have recourse against the surety. 
Thus the liability of surety is contingent 
and secondary. It is not independent and primary. 
The surety becomes liable only and to the extent of 
the default of the principal debtor and no more. 
This enables the surety to be called a favoured debtor 
in law. 
It has again to be noted that the liability 
of the surety is to the same extent as the liability 
of the principal debtor tie the creditor under the 
11 
terms of the contract of guarantee. This statement 
is, however, subject to the contract to the contrary. 
This gives the surety a power to limit his liability 
so that he may not be to the same extent to which the 
12 
principal is liable. This situation is clear if we 
refer to the illustration attached to section 128. 
The guarantee may be co-extensive with, or broader 
or narrower than, the contract between the creditor 
and the principal debtor. But as a general rule the 
liability of the principal debtor, unless a smaller 
or a greater liability is assumed by the surety. A 
]2J 
surety may limit his liability to a part of the debt 
ar obligation. This may happen by limiting the liabi-
lity of the surety in two ways. He might say " I will 
be liable for a portion of the amount which B shall 
owe you' or he may say, "I whall be liable for the 
amount B shall owe to you, subject to the limitation 
that I shall not be asked to pay more than a certain 
13 
limited sum . In Re Sass Vaughara Williams, J,,observes: 
" Where under the terms of guarantee 
the surety becomes a surety for the 
whole amount of the debt, although 
his liability is limited to a speci-
fied sum and has paid that sxim to the 
creditor, the creditor is nevertheless 
entitled to prove in the bankruptcy of 
the debt, without deducting thereform 
the amount received by him from the 
surety. It makes no difference whether 
the payment was made before or after 
the date of receiving order. But where 
the surety is surety for a part of the 
debt, as betvreen the principal creditor 
and the debtor, the right of the surety 
(to stand protanto in the shoes of the 
creditor) arises merely by payment of 
part, because that part, as between him 
and the creditor is the whole purpose 
of the guarantee". 
In all such cases, what each particular guarantee 
means is a question of construction. In guarantees for 
the payment of debts, there is nothing to prevent a surety 
from limiting his liability, or making it contingent 
upon some event other than the default of the principal 
v) J 
debtor in payment of the debt. Where a surety 
bond undertakes liability to the extent of a parti-
cular sum, but the creditor supplies goods exceeding 
that amount, the term in the bond does not impose 
a limit on the creditor advancing any sum but it only 
imposes a limit on the liability of a surety, and 
as such the surety is not discharged but is liable 
14 
to the extent mentioned in the bond. The surety 
like any other contracting party, Co-nnot be held 
bound to something for which he has not contracted. 
It has also been said surety is a favoured 
debtor. He is entitled to insist upon a rigid adhe-
rence to the terms of his ( surety's ) obligation 
by the creditor, and cannot be made liable for more 
than he has undertaken, for, though his contract is 
not unlike that of insurance, uberrimae fidei, it 
must be construed strictly, 
A surety being a "favoured debtor", is entitled 
to insist upon strict interpretation of the bond, 
15 
His liability is strictissimi juris. Lord Westbury 
16 
L,C. in Bleat v. Brown, stated this liability in 
the following words: 
13x 
"It must always be recollected in 
what manner a surety is bound. You 
bind him to the letter of his engage-
ment. Beyond the proper interpre-
tation of that engagement you have no 
hold upon him. He is bond, therefore, 
merely according to the proper meaning 
and effect of the written engagement 
that he has entered into ..." 
According to the rule of strictissime Juris as a 
general proposition a surety or guarantor is a favorite 
upon the strict terms of his undertaking. Once the 
scope and meaning of these terms are ascertained. To 
the extent, and in the manner, and under the circum-
stances pointed out in his obligation he is bound and 
no further. The reason of this rule is found in the 
fact that his undertaking is often entered into gratu-
tiously or for a mere nominal consideration and as an 
act of friendship or accommoiation, and is onerous an^ 
17 
burdensome. 
Under the law the guarantor or a surety cannot 
be held liable for more than he undertakes. However 
there are some exceptions to this rule. Therefore the 
cardinal rule remains unfettered that a guarantor or 
surety must not be made liable beyond the terms of his 
engagement, Tne exceptions are, (l) that when there is 
an ambiguity and all other rules of construction fail 
the courts should interpret contra proferenten (against 
1 3 : 
the guarantor ) or use the recital to control the 
meaning of the operative part where it is so possible; 
(2) that while construing a surety bond, the court 
must consider the object and purpose of its execution 
and the construction should not be unduly strained 
as to result in defeating the essential purpose of 
the bond. 
The better and practically universal modern 
opinion is that the words used in such contracts should 
be construed the sameway as the words used in other 
contracts, reasonably and with a view to ascertaining 
the true meaning and intention of the parties and 
that the same rules should be applied as in ascertaining 
the meaning of the language employed in other cases 
19 
of doubt and dispute. 
The surety is not liable upon any implied engage-
ment where a party contracting in his own interest 
might be and has the right to insist onthe strict per-
formance of any consideration for which he has stipu-
lated, whether the others would consider it material 
or pat and the contract is not to be extended to any 
other subject, to any other person, or to any other 
period of time there is expressed or necessarily 
20 included in it. 
I'd 
Under the law of contract of guarantee as 
a general rule, the liability of the surety arises 
from the liability of the principal debtor. If, 
therefore, the fountain head of the liability of the 
principal debtor is chocked and does not spring of 
at all so does the liability of the surety. In other 
words as the obligation of surety according to our 
law - an obligation accessary to that of a principal 
debtor, it follows that it is of the essence of the 
obligation that there should be a valid obligation 
of the principal debtor, consequently if the principal 
debtor is not obliged, neither is the surety, as there 
can be no accessary without a principal obligation. 
The principal traces its origin from Rcxnan law 
under which there was a relation of fide^ussio similar 
in substance to that of surety in our law. Fidejussio 
required that the liability of the surety and the 
principal debtor should be co-extensive and of the 
surety's liability were greater than that of the 
principal debtor the transaction was rendered void 
for all purposes on the ground, as Renter says, that 
the obligation is only accessory to the principal 
obligation and there cannot be more in the accessory 
21 
than is in the principal. 
]3i 
As a corollary to the above, the liability 
of the surety has been regarded as conditional upon 
the principle's liability. As De Colyar observes it 
"whatever extinguishes the principal obligation 
determines that of the surety, whose liabilities are 
in iaw dependent upon those of hisprincipal so that 
22 
when the latter cease the former do so likewise." 
This provision though does not provide any 
additional favour to the surety nevertheless absolves 
the surety from any liability. The cases have occured 
where an agreement was made by the minor to perform 
a contract, the surety had undertaken the responsibility 
of the performance of the contract by the minor. The 
question in such case is whether the surety of the 
23 
minor is responsible. The majority view thus is an 
exception to the rule that the surety is a favoured 
24 debtor in law. 
The surety enjoys a number of rights under 
25 
sections 134, 135, 139, 140, 141 and 143. Under these 
provisions the surety is discharged from his responsi-
bility either totally or to an extent permissible in 
law. The ways in which the surety is discharged from 
his suretyship are numerous, for a surety is a 'favoured 
debtor'. Speaking generally, holder, under the law 
of principal and surety, a creditor must not either 
13 
act in a manner inconsitent with the contract of 
guarantee itself, or do anything to pre-judice the 
right of contribution, for should he do so, the 
surety will be released either wholly or protanto. 
Thus if the creditor has released or destroyed the 
security which the principal debtor had given to him 
for the transaction, the surety is relieved of his 
liability to the seme extend. 
Under the chapter on guarantee there can be 
more than one surety for the transaction. Under the 
law the surety can have the benefit of the suretyship 
contract which the other sureties had entered into 
with the ( common creditor ), This will reduce the 
liability of each of the co-sureties whether or not 
he knew about the suretyship contract relating to the 
same transaction. 
Although the R^man Law rules to which reference 
has already been made are valuable basic principles in 
a jurisprudential sense, they nevertheless are misleading 
from the stand point of modern contract law because 
they fail in general application and are subject to both 
real and apparent exceptions. The main important excep-
to the rule that the sur^  txons. *-' 
debtor l^ay be stated as follows: 
^. urety is a favoured 
 .:.*..> 
13J 
Voldness 
Where the liability of the principal debtor 
is void abinitio. This situation arises where by-
reason of some incapacity or disability in the 
principal debtor, his contract with the creditor fails 
to be binding. Thus a surety who bound himself in 
respect of a contract made by a minor which was void 
under law, was held to remain liable on the instrument 
of guarantee, he being regarded in effect as a 
principal debtor and the contract as one of indemnity, 
"A difficulty arises where a person purports 
to become surety for one who is under a disability. 
That this circumstance, where there is no fraud or 
misrepresentation, does not prevent the so-called 
surety from t)eing liable to the creditor, seems clear. 
In nearly every instance it will be found that the 
proper inference, from the facts, is that the intention 
of the parties was that the socalled surety should be 
liable as a principal debtor, i,e, whether thiTi principal 
#»lititii'jic liable or not cases are, however, conceivable 
where the liability would be more properly explainable 
26 
as that of a surety by estoppel". 
This view leaves unresolved the question whether 
a guarantor is liable where the accessory contract is 
in truth a gurantee and there is no room for the 
137 
operation of an eatoppel. This is by no means an 
inconceivable situation. It wlll# for example, usually 
be the case if an undertaking to guarantee the debt 
of another is given by some one who was unacquainted 
with the debtor and unaware of the circumstances under 
27 
which the principal obligation was created. 
In the second lii^ of authority the court has 
to consider the enforceability of the guarantee given 
by disectors in respect of ultra-vires transactions of 
th*ir companies. In Chambers v. Manchester and Milford 
28 Rv,Co., Blackburin J. assented that directors who 
had guaranteed an ultra-vlriM loan by a bank to the 
company were liable to the bank. In Yorkshire Railway 
Waggon Co.V. Maclurc and Carnwall Minesals Ry. Co. Kay J. 
concluded his judgment by observing: 
"Probably the very reason in this case 
requiring the guarantee was the doubt 
that existed whether the company could 
be compelled to repay. I asked for 
authority on this point but none was 
cited. I must therefore decide that 
the guarantors are liable upon their 
guarantee," 
30 
In the Supreme Court of New South Wales Jordan, 
C.J., has suggested a distinction wnich may be sound. 
He pointed out that the language of the contracts and 
the surrounding circumstances may justify an inference 
13J 
of an implied representation by the promisor that 
the company has a power to borrow, which would stop 
him frc»n disputing the existence of a primary obliga-
tion. If the company had a limited borrowing power, 
the contract might be regarded as restricted to the 
basis made within the limits of the power. OR, the 
language might be such as to show an indication that 
the promisor should be liable whether the company 
incurred the liability or not, so that the contract 
was in strictness a principal contract of guarantee. 
Garrard James seems tcb be the case of this type. 
Another explanation is that the ultra-vires 
rule is a privilege, which is intended to protect, the 
32 
company, but not third parties. The difficulty with 
this interpretation is, however, that it appears to 
conflict with the rule laid-down in 1875 in Ashbury 
32 
Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche, that an ultra-
vires transaction is a naullity and incapable of rati-
fication even by unanimous consent of all the share-
holders. At the sametime there appears to l:s sound 
policy reasons for imposing more onerous obligations 
on directors who so aften are able to avoid debts by 
the device of incorporation. Moreover, it can justly 
be said that directors are more likely to be acquainted 
133 
with the powers of the company than third parties. 
So in the case of company's ultra-vires acts there 
is every justification, both morally and legally, for 
holding directors of a company liable on a guarantee 
given for a company's contract which is ultra-vires, 
because in actual practice they are more likely to be 
cognisant of the company's powers and the consequences 
of its acts than is a person who e'^ ters into a contract 
with the company without consulting its memorandum of 
association. The potential area of operation of this 
exception is, of course, severely curtailed by section 
9 of the European Communities Act, 1972 which provides 
that in favour of a person dealing with a company in 
goodfaith, any transaction decided on by the directors 
shall be deemed to be one which it is within the 
capacity of the company to enter into. No doubt each 
of tne decisions constitute an attempt by the respective 
courts to adjust th« conflicting interests of creditor, 
principal debtor and surety in a fashion which will 
a 
achieve/fair measure of justice in the particular cir-
cumstances and commandable as this may be from many 
view points, it has unfortunately infused a measure of 
uncertainty into an important branch of the law. 
l . J 
Leaving aside the possible future recognition 
of a rule holding a guarantee liable where he furnished 
a guarantee knowing or suspecting that the principal 
obligation was a nullity, it is suggested that the two 
lines of authority discussed above, and the resultant 
academic discussion, illustrate the relativeness of the 
liability of a guarantors and a debtor. It would seem 
that the policy considerations motivated the recognition 
of an exception in the case of directors guarantees 
and operated against the admission of a further excep-
tion in the case of guarantees given in respect of 
credit extended to minors. Generally it can be said 
that where a principal obligation is rendered void by 
the provisions of a statute, the gurantor will be dis-
charged unless the statute expressly or by implication 
provides that the sanction of nullity should operate 
only in favour of the debtor. Such an implication may 
arise from the language of the statutes or from a con-
sideration of the broad policy consideration underlying 
34 
it. 
Bankruptcy or Liquidation of debtor 
The bankruptcy of an Individual debtor results 
in a release of the debtor. But it is now provided by 
bankruptcy legislation that an order of discharge in 
14 
bankruptcy will not release any person who was surety 
35 
for the bankrupt. Prior to the statutory provisions 
being made to this effect it had been held that the 
bankruptcy of the principal debtor would not release 
36 
the surety. The basis for holding that the liability 
of the surety continues where the principal debtor 
becomes bankrupt is that bankruptcy merely releases 
the principal debtor personally and transforms the 
creditors rights against him into rights against his 
assets. In Insurance Office of Australia,Ltd. v. T.W, 
—TT ' — 
burKt^  Pvt. Ltd., Jordan, C.J,, gave the reasons as; 
"There is no reason to attribute 
to the legislature, when it 
releases or provides for the 
release of a bankrupt principal 
debtor, an intention to deprive 
a creditor, who will otherwise go 
unpaid to some extent or perhaps 
entirely, of course against the 
guarantor whose obligation he has 
been prudent enough to obtain". 
It is submitted that the rationale of the rule is 
more simple. The principal debtor's posslblf^  inability 
to re'-^ orm the principal obligation is the creditors 
motivation for asking for a guarantee and the guarantor's 
for giving it. The law couln, therefore, never counte-
nance that a creditor should "Lose the benefit of the 
38 guarantee at the very moment he most needs it". 
1 't:: 
Just as the bankruptcy of an individual does 
not discharge a surety from liability, so the liquida-
tion and dissolution of a company does not release a 
surety for that companys obligation. The only direct 
authority for this proposition is Re Fitz George, ex P. 
39 
Robson,the guarantee in this case was for regular payment 
of interest until the principal SUBM of a debenture was 
repaid; since there was not repayment, because of the 
liquidation and dissolution of the principal debtor 
( company ), the surety's liability became absolute and 
independent of the principal's obligation. 
Statute of Limitation 
Where the principal debtor's liability becomes 
barred by virtue of the Statute of Limitation there is 
no extinction or release of the principal obligation 
although the principal debtor is beyond reach of the law. 
It has accordingly been held that the surety remains 
liable on his contract of guarantee because the creditor 
has committed no positive act releaiing the principal 
debtor but has merely neglected to sue him within the 
period required by the statute, though irrecoverable, is 
40 
still due. 
U3 
The liability of the surety as laid down in 
section 128 is co-extensive with that of the principal 
debtor, unless otherwise provided by the contract 
between the parties. This section only explains the 
measure of surety's obligation where the terms of the 
contract do not specify otherwise and has nothing to 
do with extinction by the operation of the statute of 
limitation. It only means that surety is liable for 
whole of the amount for which the principal debtor is 
liable, tat not anything less or more than that unless 
otherwise provided in the contract. It does not, there-
fore, follow from the wording of the section that the 
surety gets discharged whenever an action does not lie 
against the principal debtor because the action against 
the principal debtor was barred by limitation. 
Under section 135, a promise not to sue the 
principal debtor discharges the surety, the underlying 
principle of suretyship being that the rights of the 
surety are not interfer^®^ with behind his back to his 
prejudice. However, mere forberance or delay in suing 
the principal debtor or pressing him for payment does 
not discharge the surety, as these words are expressly 
used in section 137, Section 137 read with section 134, 
therefore, will lead to a serious controversy. Again 
144 
according to section 134 if the creditor, is guilty 
of any act or omission the legal consequences of 
which is the discharge of principal debtor, the 
surety is also discharged. Thus if section 134 is 
alone taken into consideration, the surety will be 
treated as having been discharged. But mere for-
bearance to sue does not discharge the surety within 
the section 137. 
The above provisions have been interpreted 
41 
by the c»_urts differently. One view is that a failure 
to sue the principal debtor until the debt is barred 
by the limitation does not operate as a discharge of 
the surety. This view is supported by the Privy 
^2 43 
Council also. But there is also a contrary view. 
This controversy was however at lost resolved and 
finally set at rest by the Supreme Court in Bombay 
44 
Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. v. State of Bombay. Wherein 
it was held that a creditor is entitled to recover 
the debt from surety even though the suit against the 
principal debtor is barred by limitation. 
The liabilities of the principal debtor and 
the surety are distinct though their liabilities arise 
out of same transaction. An acknowledgement by principal 
145 
debtor does not save the limitation against the 
surety, unless it is shown that the latter allowed 
himself to be represented by the person who made the 
45 
payment. Likewise it was held that an acknowledgement 
by the surety does not save limitation as against the 
46 
principal debtor. 
In the result, it is clear from the above 
discussion that liability of the surety although is 
said to be co-extensive with that of the principal 
debtor or that the surety is favoured debtor, it has 
no relation in so far as its extinction under the 
limitation Act is concerned and as such he is liable 
to pay the debt, notwithstanding the fact that such 
debt is barred by limitation as against the principal 
debtor, provided it is otherwise enforceable against 
the surety. 
Contracting Out 
The creditors and especially the banks strengthen 
its own position by the insertion in the guarantees of 
various clauses whereby the guarantor renounces his 
47 legal rights, enshrined in the statutory provisions. 
As postponement of the surety's right of proof in the 
bankruptcy of the principal debtor and his right to 
l^t 
any security held by the bank until the bank has 
been paid in full, and his acceptance of the bank's 
statement of the extent of his liability as conclusive 
evidence thereof. The most important clause is one 
in which the bank takes the power to release or modify 
securities, renew bills* grant time, discharge or 
vary arrangement etc, with the principal debtor with-
out the consent of the guarantor and without in any 
way prejudicing or diminishing the validity of 
48 
guarantee. In Central Bank of India v, B.K. Nayar, 
it was contended that the guarantor agreed, that he 
shall not be entitled to any of the rights conferred 
on securities by sections 133, 135, 139 and 145 of 
the Indian Contract Act, The validity of the waiver 
was not decided by the Court, But very recently the 
49 
Karnataka High Court in R. Lilavate v. Bank of Baroda, 
was called upon to decide whether the parties can 
contract out the rights and liabilities laid-down in 
section 141 by virtue of a contrary contract. It was 
held that the Contract Act has created rights and 
liabilities. But the parties have got a right to con-
tract out of the rights and liabilities mentioned in 
the contract. Therefore, merely because we do not 
find words notwithstanding anything contained to the 
14? 
contrary etc. In section 141 of the Contract Act. 
In this case the surety has agreed that she will not 
claim the benefit given to her under section 141 
of the Contract Act. She herself is a party to 
that surety bond. Therefore it is not open to her 
now to contend that the said clause is either bad 
at law or is not enforceable. 
50 
Again in B.S. Patsa v. State Bank of India 
the guarantee bond read as underi 
We/I agree that no failure in requrlng 
or obtaining the said security or in 
the observance or performance of any of 
the stipulations or terms of the said 
agreement and no default of the said bank 
in requiring or enforcing the observence 
or performance of any of the said stipu-
latiogs or terms shall have the effect of 
releasing us/me from our/my liability or 
if prejudicing the said bank's right or 
remedies against us/me under the said 
promissory note. 
The bank sought recovery of the amount of 
to. 4,995.61 paise which included stipulated interest. 
The surety claimed that he had informed the bank 
urging it to take immediate steps for recovering its 
due because of the clandestine conduct of the principal 
debtor. He asserted that despite his second intima-
tion to the bank a few months thereafter, the bank 
has not taken the steps to protect the security, which 
14 J 
enabled the principal debtor to dispose of his stock. 
The Court held that the surety was not relieved 
of his liability under section 137, 139 and 141. 
It is submitted that the above view is not sound. 
Because how a party can surrender his legal rights 
provided in the statutory provisions, unless those 
are made subject to a contract to the contrary or in 
accordance with the policy of the Act. Secondly , 
section 128, only explains the quantum of a surety's 
obligation when the terms of the contract do not 
limit it, and that section has no reference to the 
51 
nature of the obligation of the principal debtor, so 
far as the question of the nature of the liability 
is concerned, other sections are to be taken into 
account. 
Bank Guarantee 
There have been a number of cases where the 
courts have said that the liability of the surety 
will arise as soon as 'demand' has been made by the 
creditor without determining the question of liability 
of principal debtibr . A large number of cases of 
High Courts and the Supreme Court have appeared on 
52 
the subject. 
14J 
The liability of the surety under a bank 
guarantee arises Irrespective o£ the considerations 
or failure of the original contract. Although the 
guarantee contract comes into being on account of a 
provision in the original contract. Such a bank 
guarantee is fused with autonomy of its own without 
recourse to the underlying original contract and the 
bank has to honour its obligations as per the bank 
guarantee. The obligation of the bank ( surety ) is 
absolute and irrevocable on demand for the payment 
of the guaranteed amount. 
It is, therefore, clear that the expression 
that surety is a favoured debtor has no application 
in case of a bank/ performance guarantee, 
A review of the some of the situations in which 
a guarantor's liability is not co-extensive with that 
of the principal debtor showed that the courts have 
treated such cases as exceptional, thereby emphasising 
the existence of the general principle. However, it 
also became apparant that the exceptions to the general 
rule are not insignificant in number and importance. 
It is not easy to find out a common thread in the 
exceptions. It would for example, be stretching these 
lb J 
concepts beyond breaking point to say that the 
voidness o£ a hire-purchase agreement, which is 
the subject matter of a guarantee, is a vitiating 
element attaching to the principal obligation, but, 
the ultra vires character of a transaction which 
is subject matter of the director's guarantee, is 
a defence personal to the debtor. The grounds upon 
which such exceptions have been admitted are based 
on polity, considerations, the realities of the 
situation and equitable consideration as between 
53 
creditor and guarantor. 
These exceptions on a logical analysis depend 
on fine distinctions such as the differences between 
void and illegal contracts, between extinction and 
unenforceability of an obligation. It should be 
understood, however, that judicial ap^ .roach to the 
problems posed by the cases has not been on this basis 
but rather on the basis that the general rule shvould 
release the surety unless there is some countervailing 
factor or interest which compfeis the court to hold the 
contrary. Thus where the bankruptcy or licjuidation 
of the principal debtor intervenes the law attempts 
to strike a balance between the security of the tran-
saction, the creditor's right to payment and the 
15. 
surety's right to release from liability; the counter-
vailing interests of the creditor and of the public 
in the security of the banfcract prevail - as the 
policy of the bankruptcy legislation requires. Over 
the interest of the surety. Where the Money Lenders 
Act invalidates or renders unenforceable a loan of 
money-the policy of the legislation which is designed 
to protect persons dealing with money lenders - whether 
principal debt)ors or sureties is given effect by holding 
that surety is under no liability. 
On the other hand where the principal is a company 
borrowing beyond its powers the directors who guarantee 
repayment cannot take advantage of their ultra vires 
act and are rightly held liable by anology to the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel. So, too, where a debt is 
statute barred this has not been allowed to prevent the 
complete performance of the transaction by obliging the 
surety to pay the creditor and then afflgE^  reimbursement 
from the principal; for in this way the contractual 
rights and obligations of all parties are satisfied and 
54 
honoured, 
152. 
It can fairly be said that there has been 
no rigid application of the general rule that the 
surety is a favoured debtor, modifications have 
been made and exceptions created by the courts, to 
adjust the conflicting interests of creditor, 
principal debtor, surety and also the public 
interest in favour of the enforcement of contractual 
obla^ations formally assumed. 
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CHAPTER - V 
DISCHARGE OP A SURETY 
The ways In which a surety is discharged 
from nis suretyship are exceedingly numerous/ for a 
surety is a favoured debtor. Speaking generally, 
however, under the law of principal and surety, a 
creditor must not either act in a manner inconsistent 
with the contract of guarantee itself, or do anything 
to prejudice the right of contribution between the co-
suret ••s for should he do so, the surety will be 
released, either wholly or protanto, 
A guarantor may be discharged or released from . 
his liability under the guarantee by a subsequent 
release or agreement, by operation of law, by payment 
or by performance of the principal debtor obligation or 
by a breach of the contract of guarantee and it may be 
stated as a general rule that any act or omission on the 
part of the creditor in breach of his duty under the 
guarantee, that increases the guarantor's risk or other-
wise injures his rights and remedies, discharges the 
guarantor from his liability under the guarantee, at 
least to the extent of the injury so occasioned. 
l b : 
Variance 
Indian law provides for the discharge of surety 
in different sets of circumstances. The surety is dis-
charged when any variance is effected to the main con-
tract between the principal debtor and the creditor. 
However the variance must be without the consent of the 
surety. When surety has undertaken liability on certain 
termS/ it is expected that they will remain unchanged 
during the whole period of guarantee. If there is any 
variance In the terms of the contract between the prin-
cipal debtor and the creditor, without the consent of 
the surety, the surety gets discharge as regards tran-
sactions subsequent to such a change. The reason for 
such a discharge is that the surety agreed to be liable 
for a contract which is no more there, and he is not 
liable on the altered contract because it is different 
from the contract made by him. This principle has been 
incorporated in section 133 of the Indian Contract \ct, 
Thi3 section refers to a contract which consists of 
series of transactions extended over a period of time. 
It does not purport to make any change in the law in the 
2 
case of a contract consisting of a single, transaction. 
l b . 
But what is variation in the contract of 
guarantee has been the subject matter of Judicial 
3 
interpretation. In N. Sulo Ghana v. State, the peti-
tioner's husband ( along with some other person ) was 
the highliest bidder for some shops. But no licence 
was granted by the government for these shops, unless 
a surety bond in respect of the previous year's arrears 
of !?s. 75,928/- was granted. The wife accordingly stood 
as a surety for the amount. The court held the surety 
bond , as regarding the arrears, it was not confined 
to the amount. Merely because the amount of the 
arrears was not determined and could be different from 
the above figure did not mean that there was a varia-
tion in the contract of guarantee, rne correct inter-
pretation, the court said ) was that the wife cannot 
be made liable for any amount over ^nd above 3s. 75,928 
but certainly she is liable for that amount, or for 
any lesser amount. This obviously is the correct 
exposition of law. 
The principle of law on the discharge of sure-
ties is that the surety, cannot be held bound to some 
thing for which he has not contracted. If the original 
parties have expressly agreed to vary the terms of the 
original contract no further question arises. The 
l b 
original contract nas gone, and unless the surety 
has assented to the new terms« there is nothing to 
which he can be bound, for the final obligation of the 
principal debtor will be something different from the 
4 
obligation which the surety guaranteed. 
If an alteration is made in a material part 
of a deed after its execution, by or with the consent 
of any party there to or person entitled thereunder, 
but without the consent of the party or parties liable 
there under, the deed is thereby made void. The 
avoidance, however, is not abinitio or so as to nullify 
any conveyancing effect which the deed has already had, 
but only operates as from the time of such alteration 
and so as to prevent thepperson who has made or autho-
rised the alteration and those claiming under him, 
from putting the deed in suit to enforce against any 
party bound thereby who did not consent to the altera-
tion, any obligation, covenant or promise thereby 
undertaken or made. 
In the field of law relating to the alteration 
of documents, the strict rule at one time was that the 
slightest alteration makes the document void. The 
5 
leading case for a long time was Pegot's case, where 
l b : 
Lord Coke stated the doctrine as follows: 
"These points were resolved, where 
any deed is raised, whereby it 
becomes void, the obligar may plead 
nonest factum , and give the matter 
in evidence, because at that time 
of the plea pleaded, it is not his 
deed". Secondly, it was resolved 
that when any deed is altered in a 
point material by the plaintiff him-
self, or by any stranger, without 
the privity of the obligee, be it by 
interlineation, addition, raising 
or by drawing of a pen through a 
line, or through the midest of any 
material word, that the deed thereby 
becomes void. So if the obligee 
himself alters the deed by any of the 
said ways, although it is in wards 
not material, yet the deed is void. 
But if a stranger, without his privity, 
alters the deed by any of the said 
ways in any point material, it shall 
not avoid the deed". 
The principle as to discharge of surety was 
6 
stated by Lord V/estbury L.C. in Blest v. Brown, in the 
followiny words: 
" It must always be recollected in 
what manner a surety is bounds Jfou 
bind him to the letter of his 
engagement. Beyond the proper inter-
pretation of that engagement you have 
no hold upon him. He receives no 
benefit, no consideration. He is 
bound, therefore, merely according 
to the proper meaning and effect of 
the written engagement that he has 
entered into. If that written 
Ib2 
engagement la altered In a 
single lin«, no matter whether 
the alterat^n be Innocently made, 
he has a right to say, the con-
tract Is no langer that for which 
I engaged to be surety, you have 
put an end to the contract that i 
guaranteed and my obligation, 
therefore, is at end." 
Material Alteration 
A material alteration is one which varies 
the rights, liabilities or legal position of the 
parties ascertained by the deed in its original state 
or otherwise varies the legal effect of the Instrument 
as originally expressed or reduced to certainty some 
provisions which were originally unascertained and as 
such void. The effect of making such an alteration 
without the consent of the surety is exactly the same 
as that of cancelling the deed. In Lakshman Mai v. 
7 
Narasinharaghava Iyengar, the Madras High Court held 
that " an alteration in a document which has the eff'=>ct 
of enabling the payee to sue on the document in a 
court where he could not have sued on it in its ori-
ginal form is a material alteration and as such des-
troy© the right of action on the document". 
Where a compromise decree was passed against 
the debtor providing for the payment of debt by instal-
ments and a certain person stood surety for the due 
payment of such Instalments on the strength of the 
l b . . 
property that was attached before judgment and 
subsequently permission to mortgage and sell the 
property privately was granted to the judgment 
debtor. It was held that under the circumstances 
the moment permission was granted to the judgment 
debtor to effect private mortgages or sales, the 
whole position was changed and the surety stands 
8 
discharged on the ground of material alteration. 
Likewise where a certain partnership, stipulating 
to be dissolved where losses occur. The firm carries 
on a business with a certain specified capital. The 
firm sustains losses and the partners instead of 
dissolving the partnership, further enlarge the capital 
and extended the business by amalgamating it with a 
rival concern. The firm also undertakes another 
business not originally contemplated. The new changes 
and liabilities in the business has thus totally changed 
the character of the business in the original contract 
of suretyship. This amounts to a material variation 
and, therefore, the surety cannot be made liable for 
9 
tne losses tnat may occur in the newly formed business 
where the variation of the contract has the result of 
laying an additional burden on the surety, the surety 
will be discharged. An unauthorised material altera-
tion by the promisee whether that is by adding anything 
l b 
to or by striking out any part of a written contract 
avoids the contract against the person otherwise 
liable upon it. In a printed foxnm of guarantee, if 
the signature of tne guarantor is obtained prior to 
the filling up of the blanks relating to the material 
particular of the contract, the filling up of the 
blank spaces in the form of the guarantee amounts to 
material alteration. In S, Perumal Reddiar v. Bank of 
10 
Baroda, the plaintiff, the Bank of Baroda was the 
creditor having advanced Rs. 15,000 as crop loan to the 
first defendant who was the principal debtor. The 
second and third defendants were the guarantors. In 
the printed foirm the introduction by way of filling up 
the blank spaces, relating to the date of execution, 
name of the principal debtor, names of the sureties, 
the description of the land for which the loan is 
advanced, as loan, and the rated of interest. It was 
held that these were material alterations made without 
the consent of the surety. The surety was, therefore, 
discharged from his contract of guarantee. The court 
did not expressly condemn tne practice of obtaining 
signature of a party on blank ( printed ) forms. But 
the legal effect of the decision would put the obtainers 
( of signatures) to serve test of consensus ad idem 
16 
( meeting of minda) of which the problem of variation 
11 
of the deed of guarantee is only an off-shoot. In 
12 
Rananund v. Choudhey Soonder^ where, under a consent 
decree, it was provided that in the default of one 
instalment, the properties in suit may be sold, and 
the surety proceeded against for any deficiency, the 
privy council held that the decree- holders' delay in 
actually bringing the properties to sale had the effect 
of discharging the surety protanto, as to Interest due 
from the date of the order for sale, because the act 
of the creditor in postponing the sale laid an addi-
tional burden on the surety by increasing the interest. 
Immaterial alteratiofa 
Unsubstantial alterations in an instrument of 
guarantee which are to the benefit of the surety do not 
discharge the surety from the liability. An alteration 
made in an instrument after its execution, in some 
particular which is not material, does not, in any way 
effect the validity of the instrument. An alteration 
is not material, if it carries out the intention of the 
parties already apparent on the face of the deed. 
13 Cotton L. J. stated the Law in Halme v. Brunskill, 
as follows: 
1 ^ ~ i 
" The true rule in my opinion is, 
that if there is any agreement 
between the principals with refe-
rence to the contract guaranteed, 
the surety aught to be consulted, 
and that if he nas not consented 
to the alterations although in 
cases where it is without inquiry 
evident that the alteration is 
unsubstantial, or $;hat it cannot 
be otherwise than beneficial to 
the surety, the surety may not be 
discharged. Yet that if it is not 
self-evident that the alteration 
is unsubstantial, or one which cannot 
be prejudicial to the surety, the 
Court will not in an action against 
the surety go into an inquiry as to 
the effect of the alteration." 
An instrument is not discharged by an immaterial 
alteration, that is to say, one which does not alter 
the legal effect of the instrument or increase a greater 
liability on the promisor. \n unauthorised material 
alteration by the promisee whether by adding anything 
to or by striking out any part of a written contract, 
avoids the contract against the person otherwise liable 
upon it. 
The strictness of the rule was that any alte-
ration without the surety's consent even for his benefit 
will discharge the surety, tempered in subsequent 
14 
cases and was departed from in Aldous v. Carnwill, 
where Lush J. after referring to numerous authorities, 
observed: 
lb? 
" This being the state of authorities, 
we think we are not bound by the 
doctrine in Piqots case ^or authority 
cited for it and not being bound, we 
are certainly not disposed to lay it 
down as a rule of law that the addi-
tion of the words which cannot possibly 
prejudice any one, destroys the vali-
dity of the note. It seems to us repug-
nant to justice and common sense to hold 
that the maker of the promissory note 
is discharged from his obligation to pay 
it because the holder has put in writing 
on the note what the law would have 
supplied if the words had not been 
written". 
The question whether a document jointly executed 
by the two persons creating a joint liability is to be 
regarded as materially altered ±f the liability is 
reduced equally for both but the alteration is made by 
only one of them. Such an alteration must be regarded 
as unsubtantial and not otherwise than beneficial to 
the surety and it cannot attract the strict rule. 
The rule was applied by the Supreme Court of 
16 
India in M.S. Anirudhan v. Thomco's Bank Ltd., the facts 
of the case were that the respondent bank allowed an 
overdraft of 8s, 20,000 to the pribcipal debtor on the 
guarantee of the appellant. Originally the guarantee 
paper showed the sum of '?s. 25,000 which the bank refused 
to accept. The principal debtor took it back and 
altered the sum to Ss, 20,000 and gave to the bank. Th e 
Ibj 
bank brought an action against the surety on the 
default of the principal debtor. The surety appellant 
contended that the sum w^a unauthorisedly altered and, 
therefore, he was not liable. The Bench consisted of 
J.L, Kapur, A.K. Sarkar and M. Hidayatullah , JJ. The 
Supreme Court was divided In this case. It was held 
by a majority that the surety was not discharged. 
As per Kapur J., (as he then was ): where a 
guarantor entrusts a letter of guarantee to the principal 
debtor and the principal debtor makes an alteration 
without the assent of the guarantor, then the guarantor 
Is liable because It Is due to the act of the guarantor 
that the letter of guarantee reinalns with the principal 
debtor and what the principal debtor did well estop the 
17 
guarantor from pleading the want of authority. In the 
same case, Hidayatullah J., (as he then was ) said that 
the particular document, could not be said to have been 
materially altered, because It had not been altered In 
such a manner as to change Its nature, the alteration 
does not save the sure.ty from liability arising under 
it, the alteration was made by co-executant who reduced 
not only his own liability but that of the surety also. 
Sarkar J., ( as he then was )differed and held, that 
l b 
the altered document was not binding on the surety 
for the alteration had not been made to carry out 
the intention of the parties. If .the alteration was 
Ignored, then the document created no liability in 
the surety, because the bank refused to accept the 
guarantee on the terms contained in the document before 
it was altered. 
It is submitted that the majority view does not 
appear to be logical interpretation of section 133, 
The minority view appears to be in confirmity with 
the provisions contained in section 133. it is sub-
mitted with respect that if the bank had handed over 
the guarantee form to the borrower asking him to get 
it signed by tfee guarantor and then return it to the 
bank, the borrower was acting as the bank's agent. Even 
assuming that the borrower was acting as the agent of 
the guarantor, there was no evidence to show that the 
borrower was authorised by the guarantor to make the 
18 
alteration. The principle under section 237 of the 
Indian Contract Act, is not applicable on the ground 
that was the alteration within the apparant authority 
of the borrower so that the principal was bound by it 
vis-a-vis the third party, the bank in this case. 
1/J 
It is difficult to think that the apparent authority 
of an agent who was authorised merely to deliver a 
guaranteed document to the bank, extended to an alte-
ration of the amount guaranteed. Assuming that the 
borrower had the apparent authority to alter the amount, 
the authority of such as would cover not merely a 
reduction in the amount but an increase also-in other 
words, any change of the amount.' If the amount had 
been raised, would the learned Judge still have held 
that the surety was bound by the altered amotint T 
It should be noted here that the Indian Sontract 
Act which was enacted some year after the Holmes v. 
19 
Brunskill decision, provides that any varaince made 
without tne surety's consent in tne terms of the con-
tract between the principal debtor and the creditor, 
discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to 
the variance. The section 133 makes no distinction 
between a variation that is to the advantage of the 
surety and one that goes against him. 
The moral is that any alteration in the guarantee 
should be got duly authanticated by the guarantor. 
Further as a general rule, the guarantor should be 
required to sign the guarantee in the presence of an 
official or officials of the bank. Prom replies to 
the questionnaire by various banks this practice is 
iv:. 
20 
followed. The practice of entrusting the guarantee 
form to the borrower with a request to get it signed 
by the guarantor shoudid be discouraged. Once the 
banks follow this practice a lot of litigation can be 
avoided between the parties. 
Release or Discharge of Principal debtor 
A surety is discharged by an arrangement or by 
a contract between a creditor and a principal debtor 
whereby the principal debtor is released. Release of 
the principal debtor also operates as a release of the 
surety. It has been already noted that the liability 
of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal 
debtor. Therefore, if by any contract between the cre-
ditor and the principal debtor the principal debtor is 
released, or by any act or omission of the creditor,the 
principal debtor is discharged, the surety will also be 
discharged from his liability accordingly. 
Another reason for the discharge of the surety 
on the release or discharge of the principal debtor is 
that according to section 140, after payment or perfor-
mance of his obligation the surety can seek re-imburse-
ment from the princi^ al debtor. If the principal debtor, 
is no more liable the surety's Jtemedy would be affected 
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thereby. If surety's remedy against the principal 
debtor Is affected that should also result In the 
discharge of the surety. The law concerning the dis-
charge of the surety on the release or discharge of 
the principal debtor is contained in section 134 of 
21 
the Indian aContract Act, 
If the creditor, by any contract with the 
principal debtor releases him, *he cannot place his 
remedies at the disposal of the surety without a 
breach of his arrangement with the principal debtor 
to release him. To carry out that arrangement, the 
surety should have right to take action against the 
principal debtor in respect of the debt, engagement or 
liability. This cannot be done without the surety's 
consent. He is, therefore, held discharged altogether 
Likewise, where the surety guaranteed the due performance 
by the debtor of his obligations under a hire-purchase 
agreement in accordance with its terms and paid the 
full amounts due under the agreement, the surety is held 
to be discharged, even though the hire-purchase company 
did not receive the full amount it might have expected 
to receive had the agreement run its full course. 
Difficulty sometimes arises in deciding whether a 
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performance by the principal debtor discharges him in 
respect of the guaranteed liability or in respect of a 
separate obligation which is not subject to the guarantee 
For example, the principal debtor owes two distinct 
debts to the creditor, only one of which is guaranteed 
by the surety, and the principal debtor pays part of 
the money to the creditor the question may arise as to 
whicn debt is discharged. In these circumstances the 
general rule is that the contract of suretyship does not 
affect the normal rights which the principal debtor and 
creditor have of appropriating the payment to a particular 
debt. Thus if the principal debtor pays without making 
any appropriation the creditor is entitled to appropriate 
22 the money to the debt which is not guaranteed. 
An express release of the principal debtor from 
all future will discharge the guarantor since such 
release extinguishes the guaranteed debt. This is so 
whatever the express reservations there may be, except 
where the principal debtor obtained the release by 
fraudulent means. However, a mere covenant not to sue 
the principal debtor with a reservation of the bank's 
rights against a guaranter, does not discharge the 
guarantor. 
1' /^ 
23 
In Kearaley v. Cole, where the principal debtor 
compounded with his creditors, who covenated not to sue 
the principal debtor,but the composition was expressed 
to be without prejudice to any security ( which included 
guarantees) or to any guarantors rights against the 
principal debtor. One of the creditor's then sued the 
guarantor successfully, and the guarantor in turn sued 
the principal debtor. It was held that where the prin-
cipal debtors, creditors expressly reserve their rights 
against the guarantor, the guarantor automatically 
retains his himplied right to an indemnity from the 
principal debtor. Even though the guarantor was not a 
party to the composition, the principal debtors consent 
for the creditor to have recourse to the guarantor 
constituted an implied consent for the guarantor to 
have recourse to the i^ rincipal debtor and consequently 
the principal debtor could not complain when the guarantor 
sought to enforce his rights against the principal debtor. 
The reason why the surety is discharged if the 
princij^ al debtori. .is discharged is that the courts took 
the view that any other rule would lead to one or other 
of two strange results, having regard to the surety's 
normal rights to an indemnity for the principal debtor. 
IVo 
If the surety were compelled to meet the liability, 
any attempt by him to sue the principal debtor for an 
indemnity might be met by the plea that the debt had 
gone and the principal debtor was no longer liable. If 
this were a good answer to the surety he would be 
deprived, by the unilateral act of the creditor,of a 
right which he would have expected to have. On the 
other hand, if the principal debtor remained liable to 
indemnify the surety despite his own discharge, the 
effect would be to render the discharge nugatory. In 
the result it is treated that the discharge of the 
surety as a necessary consequence of the discharge of 
principal debtor. Whatever may be thought of this 
reasoning it has been the rale to have no application 
where the creditor reserves his rights against the 
surety at the time when he discharges the principal 
debtor, for this is a sufficient notice to the principal 
debtor that the surety remains liabdbe, and that, there-
fore, the surety's right to an indemnity remains 
intact. 
Discharge of Principal debtor by operation of law 
A surety isliable for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of the principal debtor. A contract of 
guarantee means a contract to perform the promise or 
to discharge theliability of a third person in case of 
his default. There is nothing in the section to 
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restrict the wQrd default to a voluntary default. 
Naturally, it should be taken to Include an involun-
tary default. The surety is not discharged by the 
24 
discharge of the principal debtor by operation of law. 
Opinion is divided on the question that where 
a debt is acaled down, does the liability of the surety 
extend to the whole of the original debt, or is limited . 
to the reduced amount? The Nagpur High Court has ruled 
that the liability extends to the whole of the original 
debt. The court held that "The debt Relief Court pro-
ceedings had nothing to do with Balkrishna ( the surety) 
They will hold good as between the principal judgment 
debtor and the decree-holder by operation of law, but 
any orders passed therein will not operate in connection 
25 
with the surety, who was not a party to them. In 
26 
Keshearao v. Laxman, pollock J. laid down that "The 
liability of the surety and the liability of the 
principal debtor are separate liabilities although 
arising out of the same transaction. Hence, while the 
application of the principal debtor under the debt 
Conciliation Act is before the Board, the debt of the 
surety cannot be said to be a matter before the board". 
But the Madras High Court has held that the surety is 
2 r j rn»-
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liable only for the reduced amount. It is submitted 
that the Madras opinion is correct as it is clear 
under section 128 that the liability of the surety is 
co-extensive with that of the principal flebtor. It 
cannot be higher than that of the principal debtor, 
28 
Pollock and Mulla while prCfering the view taken by 
29 
the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court observed 
that", the judgment of the Court is, however, remarkable, 
for the curious interpretation placed upon section 140, 
and the ccxnplete failure to mention section 145, The 
Court considers that to hold the surety liable in solidum 
would be injust, as he has no recourse against the 
principal debtor, in as much as section 140 confines 
his rights against him to those the creditor has with 
respect, this is to misread section 140 which is an 
unabling section, and does not purport to confine the 
rights of the surety to those possessed by the creditor. 
The talk of its imposing the burden is a misconception, 
the right of the recourse against the principal debtor 
is provided by section 145", 
Section 145 gives the surety a right of re-
imbursement from the principal debtor. If this is so the 
debtor has no real relief under the Debt Relief Act whose 
object is thus defeated on the Madras view, the law is 
17J 
at least clear that the loss caused by scaling down 
falls uj-on the creditor. As per the Nagpur view, it 
is uncertain whether the surety or the principal 
beStor bears the loss, apparently the latter in the 
absence of any fresh proceedings under the Debt Relief 
Act. 
The Kerala High Court has expressed its full 
agreement with the view of the Madras High Court. 
The Kerala High Court observed: 
" It appears to us that section 128 of 
the Indian Contract Act states the 
ambit of liability of the surety 
when it enacts that the liability is 
co-extensive with that of the principal 
debtor. It has nothing to do with the 
consequences of recovery of the debt. 
Such being the scope and intendment 
section we fell that a statutory reduc-
tion or extinguishment of the principal 
debtor's liability will operate as a 
protanto reduction or extinguishment of 
the surety's debt. A reduction or ex-
tinguishment of the debt is quite diffe-
rent from its unenforceability against 
the principal debtor by operation of 
the law of Bankruptcy or the statute of 
limitation. 
It appears to us that to hold other-
wise, would altogether deny the benefit 
of the aneliorative provisions of the Act 
to the agriculturist-debtor. On any other 
view, it would be open to the creditor to 
recover the debt as scaled down from the 
agriculturist debtor, and the latter in 
his turn could seek reimbursement from 
the principal debtor(vide S.145). Such 
a construction would completely nullify 
the benefits of the ameliorative legis-
lation to indebted agriculturist". 30 
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Act or Omission of the Creditor 
The acts or omissions of the creditor« which 
have the effect of discharging the principal debtor, 
autOTiatlcally discharges the surety as well , The 
act or omission on the part of the creditor roust be 
such the legal consequences of which Is the discharge 
of the principal debtor. Such act or omission of 
the creditor may be those arising under sections 39, 
53, 54, 63 and 67 of the Contract Act, Thus the 
mere fact that the creditor, after having filed a 
suit against the principal debtor and the surety 
allows the suit against the former to oLbate on his 
31 
death, will not operate to discharge the surety. On 
the same principle, where the principal debtor by 
not taking proper steps for service of summons on the 
principal debtor allows the suit as against him to be 
dismissed, the surety's liability on the account is 
32 
not discharged. The reason being that the plaintiff 
can yet bring a fresh suit against the same person. 
The Supreme Court has very recently explained the 
scope of section 134 in M.S»E«B, Bombay v. Official 
T5 
Liquidator, H,C, Ernakulan, and observed: 
i: •Ja 
"The bank cannot take the plea that 
It is liable to the extent of any 
loss that may have been sustained 
by the Electricity Board oweing to 
any default on the part of the 
supplier of the goods,i»e«, the 
company in liquidation. The liabi-
lity is absolute and unconditional. 
The fact that the company in liquida-
tion also would not have any effect 
on the liability of the bank i,e, the 
guarantor. Under section 128 the 
liability of the surety is co-exten-
sive with that of the principal debtor 
unless it is otherwise provided by the 
contract, A surety is no doubt dis-
charged under section 134 by any con-
tract between the creditor and the 
principal debtor by which the principal 
debtor is released or by any act or 
omission of the creditor, the legal 
consequences of which is the discharge 
of the principal debtor, but a discharge 
which the principal debtor may sectxre 
by operationoof law in bankruptcy does 
not absolve the surety of his liability". 
Omission to sue principal within limitation 
Generally, the liability of a surety is made 
depend upon the liability of the principal debtor. 
A positive action of the creditor which discharges 
the principal debtor releases the surety. However, 
the laxity of the creditor in pressing his claim 
against the principal debtor may not be pleaded as a 
18x 
defence by the surety, although he thereby suffers 
a detenknent. Now can a s\irety plead a defence which 
is in essence personal to a principal debtor. Like-
wise can a surety avoid liability on the ground that 
a debt is barred by limitation as against the 
principal debtor. 
There was distinct cleavage of opinion among 
the various High Courts on the point that omission by 
the creditor to sue the principal debtor will or will 
not discharge the surety. The majority of the High 
34 3f 36 3-
Courts, namely, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore , Madras , 
38 39 
Rangoon and Nagpur were of the view that the surety 
40 
is not discharged. While the Allahabad High Court 
took the view that the surety was discharged. The 
conflict has, however, been set at rest by the opinion 
41 
of the privy council, which accepted the view of the 
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majority of High Courts, The Allahabad High Court also 
in its subsequent Full Bench decision accepted the 
majority opinion by over-ruling its earlier decision. 
The reasons in support of the minority view 
were that it is obvious that any act or CMnission of 
the creditor, the legal consequences of which is the 
discharge of the principal debtor, discharges the 
surety, and mere for-bearance an the part of the creditor 
]S 
to sue the principal debtor does not absolve the 
surety from the liability. If we were to interpret 
the plain words of these two statements, we should 
have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that 
the act of the creditor in allowing his suit to be 
barred against the principal debtor would amount to 
an act the legal consequences of which is to discharge 
the principal debtor and, therefore, such act would 
automatically exonerate the surety from his respon-
sibility. The court also held •• we would have no hesi« 
tation in interpreting the words • mere forbearance ' 
to mean forbearance of the creditor from suing the 
principal debtor within the period of limitation. 
The simple reason for this latter interpretation is 
that a person can only forbear to do a thing as long 
as he has got a right to do it. Directly the suit of 
the creditor becomes time-barred, he loses his power 
to enforce his claim . Forbearance after the expiry 
of the period of limitation would therefore be meaning-
43 less". It could not be conceived for a mcmient that 
the draftsman who framed the Contract Act proceeded 
to undo in section 137 what ne had done for the surety 
in section 134, Moreover we must stress the words 
Legal conset^ -iences in section 134, To relieve the 
IH n 
surety, the act or omission of the creditor should 
be such that Its legal consequence would be the 
discharge o£ the principal debtor. It clearly Includes 
the omission to sue within the period o£ limitation 
because It is purely legal consequence of such emission 
that the principal debtor is absolved from payment. 
Again the Importance of the word'mere' before the 
word •forbearance( shows that the legislature meant 
a forbearance by itself that is to say, a forbearance 
which would lead to no serious consequence*. 
On the other hand the majority view is based 
on the ground that a debt does not cease td be a debt, 
because its recovery is barred by the law of limitation. 
The right subsists, though the remedy comes to an end. 
Shadi Lai, C.J. observed, that the balance of judicial 
authority is decidedly in favour of the view, that the 
cvnission of the creditor to sue the principal debtor 
44 
does not discharge the surety". 
The controversy has been, however, resolved by 
45 
the privy Council, where the Judicial committee have 
affirmed the majority view of the High Courts and 
46 
observed that the view of the Allahabad High Court is 
inconsistent with the English Law also. It was held 
that not every unenforceable contract is declared void 
IS^ 
but not those unenforceable by reason of some 
procedural regulation but unenforceable by the 
substantive law« A mere failure to sue within 
the time specified by the statute of limitation or 
an inability to sue by reason of the provisions of 
one of the orders under the civil procedure code 
would not cover a contract to became void. 
It is submitted that the majority view 
appears to be in confirmity with Justice, The law 
47 
Commission in its 13th Report suggests that an 
explanation shall be inserted in section 134 of the 
principal Act to adopt the majority view. The Supreme 
48 
Court has also held that a creditbr is entitled to 
recover the debt from the surety even though the 
suit against the principal debtor is barred, A time 
barred debt does not become extinguished but only 
becomes unenforceable in a court of law. If a debt 
subsists even after it is barred by limitation, in 
law, there is no discharge therefoom. The modes in 
which an obligation under a contract becomes discharge 
are well defined and the bar of limitation is not 
one of them. If the law requires that a debtor can be 
discharged before he can be compelled to pay that 
18o 
requixonent is not satisfied. If he is merely told 
that in the normal caurse he is not likely to be 
imposed to action by the creditor. A barred debt 
is a valid consideration under sec. 25(3) of the 
Contract Act for a written promise to pay signed by 
the party liable to be charged therewith. Equally 
when section 60 of the Contract Act speaks of barred 
debt as lawful debt actually due and payable it cannot 
be considered to be discharged* Surety, as a prudent 
guarantor, to avoid the risk and the cloth himself 
with all the creditor's rights under S, 140 of the 
Contract Act, himself is to pay or perform the obli-
gation within limitation lest he is himself to blame. 
Hence by mere failure or forbearance to sue 
the principal debtor, the surety is not discharged 
from the liability unless there is an express covenant 
in that regard or a release by the principal debtor 
by novation or otherwise. Therefore the ommission to 
sue the principal debtor by the creditor within the 
period of limitation does not discharge the surety. 
IS 
Composition 
The word composition means an agreement, or 
an arrangement, or a compromise, A contract between 
the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the 
creditor makes a composition with the principal debtor, 
discharges the surety unless the surety assents to 
such contract. 
This rule is founded on the principle stated 
50 
by Lord Laugh borough in Ress v« Bessingtan thusj 
" It is the clearest and the most 
evident equity not to carry on 
any transaction without the 
privity of him who must necesseurlly 
have a concern in any transaction 
with the principal debtor. You 
cannot keep him bound and transact 
his affairs ( for they are as much 
his as your own ) without consulting 
him-. 
When the creditor makes composition with the 
principal debtor without the consent of the surety 
this means variation in the original contract. The 
composition must tend to aggravate the surety's 
sufferings. The idea underlying S. 135 of the Indian 
Contract Act, is that where the creditor does something 
behind the back of the surety, and does to his prejudice , 
by advancing facilities to principal debtor, which are 
IS 
likely to harm the surety, the surety is no more to 
be bound by his undertaking. Accordingly a surety 
who seeks to be relieved of the obligation upon him 
as surety and to be absolved from liability must 
not only show that the creditor has, by his acts or 
conduct, either prevented the principal debtor from 
doing the things which he undertook to do, or has 
connived at the principal debtor's omission to do 
those things, or has enabled him to do something 
which he ought not to have done, but he must also 
show that the creditor has done some act inconsistent 
51 
with the rights of the surety. 
The question as to whether a surety is dis-
charged on a comprcxnise being entered into between 
the Judgment, debtor and the decree-holder and a consent 
decree being passed en such compromise depends on the 
facts and circumstances of each case arrcl particularly 
on the terms of the bond executed by the surety in 
each case. Where, therefore, the compromise is effected 
without the consent of the surety by which he is 
seriously prejudiced and where such a compromise was 
not where such a compromise was not contemplated by 
the surety, when he executed the bond. A consent 
18c "> 
decree under these circumstances discharges the 
surety and absolves hJLm of his liability. However, 
a mere passing of a consent decree does not absolve 
the surety because when the surety undertakes to be 
bound by any decree that may be passed such a recital 
includes a bonafide compromise which is entered into 
by the parties without anjc fraud, but in cases where 
there is an express recital in the surety bond or by 
necessary implication by which the liability is res-
tricted only to a decree on contest, the surety will 
stand discharged if a compromise decree is passed. 
The above view is supported by a decision in 
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Trilok Nath v, Kehar Singh, wherein the bond executed 
by the surety provided that he will be liable only if 
a decree is passed against all the defendants and if 
all the defendants are unable to pay the amount, A 
compromise was entered into whereby the decree-holder 
absolves all other defendants and restricts his claim 
only to the principal defendant, it was held that 
such a contract on the part of the decree-holder is 
inconsistent with the rights of the surety, it impairs 
the remedy of the surety against other defendants. 
The surety stands discharged. 
18^ 
In order to determine whether a surety stands 
discharged or continues to be liable under the surety 
bond the real test to apply Is to find out the terms 
of the bond and Its scope. Therefore, where there 
Is nothing In the decree which shows that the compromise 
is at variance with the terms of the surety bond« then 
notwithstanding the fact that the surety was not at 
the time of the compromise entered Into between the 
parties to the suit and the consent decree Is passed, 
the surety continues to be liable and does not stand 
53 
discharged, in Citibank N,A., New Delni v« J,K« Jute 
Mills Co<i Ltd.« Kanpur, the Delhi High Coxirt held that 
the consent decree did not hit the provisions of section 
135 and was not a compromise, stemning out of a contract 
to which the section makes reference. The Court said 
" It would not make the slightest difference if the 
decree is consent decree especially in this case 
when the creditor by way of the consent decree got 
100% relief"! in fact the consent did not in any way 
impair or prejudice the right of the defendant surety. 
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A^yement to give time 
It has long been a rule o£ suretyship that 1£ 
a creditor releases or extends the time for payment 
by the principal debtor, or Impair the collateral for 
^lw,4©bt> knowing of the siirety's right of recourse 
against the other party* and falls either to reserve 
his rights against the surety or to obtain his consent 
for the extension or release, the liability on the 
guarantee will be discharged If the surety should pay 
all or part of the debt- as he has a right to do at 
any time after it matured- he then can sue his principal 
for reimbursement on the theory that the surety was 
subrogated to the creditor's cause of action. 
Therefore, a valid binding agreement between 
the creditor and the principal debtor to extend time 
for payment, although affecting only one material 
element of the existing indebtedness, stripped the 
surety of his rights to exoneration, reimbursement, 
subrogation and contribution because the debt simply 
was not due at the time originally contemplated by 
55 
all the parties* 
Promise to give the time to the principal 
debtor means extending the period of payment which was 
19. 
not contemplated in the contract of guarantee* The 
surety expects that the creditor will take the per-
formance from the principal debtor without any delay* 
A binding agreement between the creditor and the 
principal debtor to give more time to the principal 
debtor or to repay his debt will discharge the guarantor 
from liability if made without his consent^ whether or 
not he is in fact prejudiced by the agreement. The 
reason appears to be that in theory such an agreement 
necessarily prejudices the guarantor by preventing him 
from exercising his right to require the creditor to 
call upon the principal debtor to pay off the debt or 
his right to pay off the debt himself, and then sue 
the principal debtor. Because he himself is the fit 
Judge of what is or is not for his own benefit. If you 
agree with the principal debtor to give him time, it 
is contrary to that agreement that you 'should sue the 
surety, because if you sue the surety you immediately 
turn him upon the principal debtor and, therefore, yotir 
act breaks the agreement into which you have entered 
into with the principal debtor* The point was explained 
56 
by Smith, L.J* in Reuse v, Bradfor- ::^ >>.cing COy, as 
followsI 
1H2 
" A surety is entitled at any 
time to require the creditor 
to call upon the principal 
debtor to pay off the debt,or 
himself to pay off the debt« 
when he has paid it off, he 
is at once entitled in the 
creditor's name to sue the 
principal debtor, and if the 
creditor has bound himself to 
give time to the principal 
debtor, the surety cannot do ^ 
either the one or the other of 
these things until the time so 
given has elapsed, and it is 
said that by reason of this the 
surety's position is altered to 
his detriment without his consent". 
The Supreme Court of India has held that what 
really constitutes giving of time is the extension of 
period at which, by the contract between them, the 
principal debtor was originally obliged to pay the 
creditor by substituting a new and valid contract 
between the creditor and the principal debtor to 
which the surety does not assent. Accordingly where 
a bank gave time to the principal debtor to make up 
the deficiency of the goods pledged, it did noc ten-
tament to giving of time within the meaning of section 
135." 
Where a joint decree Is passed against the 
principal debtor and the surety and after the passing 
of decree, the creditor decree-holder without the 
19 
consent of the surety, grants Instalments to the 
principal debtor, that amounts to the principal 
debtor, that amounts to giving time to the principal 
58 debtor and the surety is discharged thereby. 
An agreement to pay money in Iximp sum or six 
instalments is not the something as one to pay it in 
instalment or ten instalments, if the creditor by a 
valid agreement with the principal debtor, extends 
the time of performance from the shorter to the longer 
time, he supersedes the old obligation by the new, 
and cannot enforce payment until the longer period 
has elapsed , If the surety is sued upon the old 
agreement, to which alone his undertaking was accessory, 
he has only to show that has ceased to exist, and no 
longer binds his principal debtor and if he l^s sued 
upon the substituted agreement, he is entitled, both 
at law and in equity to make the short and conclusive 
answer non hou in foredera veni* The agreement exten-
ding the time of payment or performance must be valid 
and enforceable by the principal debtor in order to 
affect the surety's liability, and if it be void for 
want of consideration or for illegality or Is voidable 
because of fraud or undue influence practiced upon the 
creditor or if for any other cause it is insufficient to 
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say the hand of the creditor as against the 
principal debtor, the surety Is not released. The 
time for which the extension Is granted to the 
principal debtor without the surety's consent must 
be definite and fixed,otherwise the surety is not 
discharged. The reason for this rule is that if 
no definite time is fixed, the surety may pay the 
debt and proceed against the principal debtor at 
any time after its maturity. 
Reservation of Right 
But any binding agreement between the creditor 
and the principal debtor, extending the time of 
payment or performance for any period, however,short, 
entered into without the consent of the surety will 
release the surety. Unless the creditor reserves his 
rights against the surety. The reason being that nor 
does the extentlon constitute a material alteration 
or variation of the contract, so that Itls no longer 
the surety's undertaking, but it deprives the surety 
of the right to pay the debt when it is due according 
to the original contract or at any time thereafter 
and there upon enforce his rights of indemnity and 
subrogation. 
195 
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In Atijaadanajadaya v. Konamma^ the Madras 
High Court observed! 
"If a creditor agrees to discharge 
the principal debtor it would be 
breach of the agreement to entered 
into for the creditor to pursue 
his remedy against the surety, for 
the latter would in his turn enforce 
his remedy against the principal 
debtor, and thus the creditor's 
agreement to discharge would be 
rendered inoperative, but if the very 
agreement to discharge the principal 
debtor contains a reservation of 
rights against the surety, the agreement 
cannot operate as absolute release for 
the obvious reason that the principal 
debtor has notice that the creditor's 
remedy against the surety is preserved 
and that the letter's right of re-
course against him is not extinguished". 
The early development of the right of reserva-
tion grew outof an unreported English opinion, Richard 
BurXen's case, which involved an action by a creditor 
against a co-surety after the former had given an 
extension of time to the principal debtor Lord Thur-
Law in Burken's case, suggested, by way of dictiim, 
that the surety was released only if he were denied 
remedy against the principal debtor and that if the 
creditor had reserved his rights against the surety, 
the action would have been successful for them the 
surety would have had recourse against the principal 
60 
debtor. 
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The orthodon rationale advanced by the Courts 
to upheld the reservation clause In either extension 
of time or release Is premised onichthe assumption that« 
In as much as the principal debtor has specifically 
agreed to accept a conditional release from the cre-
ditor, he thereby Impliedly agreed that the surety's 
right to reimbursement should not be Impaired, Thus 
he cannot complain If the surety, after fulfilling 
his obligations to the creditor, seeks redress frcan 
him. The reason for the existence of these rules were 
criticized, Coherldge J. disliked It so much that he 
would have passed long before upholding any saeh rule; 
but he was bound by the authorities that established. 
The reason why this should prevent the release of the 
surety is difficult to understand. It is said that 
by reserving the rights the principal debtor agrees 
that the surety could go against hlm« the securities 
are Intact, the remedy is gone between the creditor 
and the debtor. In as much as the creditor cannot sue 
the debtor but as against all other persons the rights 
^ 61 
of the creditor are reserved. 
The most serious objection to the rationale 
offered in support of reservation clause is that it 
ignores completely the principal debtor's purpose of 
1S7 
entering Into the transaction. Literally interpreted, 
the agreement unqualifidely absolves the principal 
debtor from the performance of his former obligations 
to the creditor«i£ the reservation has the effect of 
merely forcing the creditor to send another collector 
after the principal, the value of the particular 
agreement to the principal debtor would to a large 
extent be destroyed. 
It has been said that when the principal debtor 
obtains a release from the creditor, he is defrauded 
if the creditor Is allowed to collect from the surety, 
who in turn will collect from him, and that the surety 
must be released. Conversely, if the principal debtor 
consents to a reservation of rights against the surety 
he impliedly consents to this indirect enforcement of 
the released obligation. This argument, however, rests 
upon the doubtful premise that the principal debtor 
did not consent to this circuitous enforcement when 
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he was released without reservation of rights, Thts 
view is also supported by professor Arant as he pointed 
out, the parties contracted with reference to perfor-
mance by the principal, and since the agreement between 
the principal and the creditor makes non-performance 
1^3 
by the principal inevitable, such waa clearly not 
within tha contemplation of parties, and imposes 
upon the aurety an entirely different risk than that 
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which he assumed. 
In addition, the simple 4bV>edient of the reserva-
tion clause effectively nullifies the rule which has 
been declared to be desirable, namely that a surety is 
discharged by any alteration in the original contract 
which varies his risk. Hence direct action against 
the principal debtor is precluded, and the result well 
may be that the debtor will lose all efforts to fulfill 
his obligations to the material disadvantage of the 
surety. 
When the reservation rule is applied to releases, 
however, the surety is likely Jo be injured, for the 
creditor must bring any action that he may start directly 
against the surety Thus the affirmative burden to take 
action against the principal debtor is thrown enterely 
upon the surety, A reservation of rights in an agree-
ment to release the principal debtor so substantially 
increases the surety's burden as to reach an equitable 
result and should be disregarded. 
Thus viratlon in the surety's risk, affording one 
basis for discharging the surety when the principal 
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debtor is released, is equally present whether the 
rights against the surety are or are not reserved. 
An agreement between the creditor and the principal 
debtor* tojwhich the surety is not a party, should in 
no way be allowed to prejudice the surety's rights. 
The Courts should follow the lead of the Ohio Supreme 
Court in refusing to give effect to the reservation 
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clause in a discharge of the principal debtor. 
Mere Forbearance 
Mere voluntary forbearance of the creditor or 
his mere passive indulgence in favour of the principal 
debtor, however, long continued, will not, in general, 
discharge a surety when such forbearance constitutes 
no violation of special contract terms, or involves no 
fraud, collusion or breach of good-faith. The reason 
usually given for this rule is that a surety is in 
default the moment his principal debtor is in default 
and may pay at any time and persue his remedies against 
the principal debtor. The surety is subrogated to 
the rights, remedies and securities of the creditor 
against him. 
2UJ 
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Section 137 clarifies in express terms what 
is clearly implied in section 135. what is required 
to cause the discharge of the surety Is not mere for-
bearance on the part of the creditor to sue the 
principal debtor, but a positive Act, a prcwnise or a 
contract, to give time, or not to sue. In view of 
section 137 the surety's liability towards the cre-
ditor remains unaffected even when the creditor has 
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chosen not to sue the principal debtor. 
The scope of section 137 and 141 has been explained 
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in Hukum Chand Insurance Co« Ltd» v. The Bank of Baroda. 
It has been held that what emerges from a reading of 
sections 139 and 141 is that while a mere forbearance 
to enforce the security against the principal debtor 
will not discharge the surety, any act by which the 
creditor loses, or without the consent of the surety, 
parts with the security, has the effect of discharging 
the surety to the extentof the value of the security. 
Whether any particular act on the part of the creditor 
constitutes mere forbearance without more or constitutes 
an act by which the creditor puts it out of his power 
to hand over the security to the surety, will depend 
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case. 
2lL 
Then another question arising for considera-
tion is what is the difference between forbearance 
to sue and omission to sue? Forbearance to sue means 
refraining or abstaining from suing which may arise 
out of an agreement or because of the protection given 
under law« omission signifies breach of an obligation 
or duty either under law or agreement. Falling to do 
what ought to have been done results in omission. 
From a plain perusal of the meaning of the aforesaid 
terms it is clear that forbearance to sue normally does 
not result in penal consequences whereas omission to 
sue may result in penal consequences because there 
is breach of duty or legal obligation either under law 
or contract. 
Supposing the surety reasonably apprehending that 
the principal debtor is trying to leave the local limits 
of Jurisdiction of country informs the creditor by 
letter to proceed against him without fail and the 
creditor ignores the letter of the surety and keeps 
quit , this will be a positive omission in which case 
the STorety will be absolved from his liability. The 
negative act,i.e., deliberate negligence ( omission ) 
is mentioned in E, venkateran's Mercantile Law, where 
the author says, "that section 141 does not only apply 
n 02 
to cases in^hlch by positive action of the creditor, 
he has lost or parted with security without consent 
of the surety* This implies a negative act or negli-
gence on the part of the creditor which would absolve 
the surety. 
Mere forbearance to sue is not omission on the 
part of the creditor either by positive or negative 
acts. Section 137 has got to be read with section 128. 
According to section 128 the liability of the surety is 
co-extensive, meaning thereby that the creditor can 
straight way proceed against the principal debtor. 
Hence forbearance to sue hinges very much on the right 
of the creditor which gives him power to proceed against 
the surety. The v^ry purpose of the co-extensive 
liability of the guarantor will be stultified if section 
137 is misinterpreted as omission. So let us not read 
section 137 in isolation which is very much coupled 
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with section 128, 
Recently it has been observed in Bank of India v, 
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Matha Goundra, that the mere factxim of forbearance to 
sue is not sufficient to constitute consideration for a 
person becoming a surety for the debt but there must be 
a promise, an undertaking to forbearer or an actual for-
bearance at the sxirety*s express or implied request and 
such promise of the creditor must be capable of being 
enforced. 
Zi}. 
Imparlnq Surety's Remedy 
It ia a very well known rule governing a contract 
of guarantee that a person in whose favour a guarantee 
is given is bound to a faithful observance of the rights 
of the surety and to the perfozroance of every duty 
necessary for the protection of those rights. Section 
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139 ircorporates in substance the rule that it is the 
duty of the person who has secured a guarantee to do 
every act necessary for the protection of the rights of 
the surety. It is the duty of the creditor not to do 
anything which is inconsistent with the surety's rights 
or omit to do any act which his duty to the surety 
requires him to do. If the violation of the aforesaid 
duties impairs the surety's eventual remedy against the 
principal debtor, the surety is discharged. 
Section 139 is a residuary provision, its object 
being to enstire that no arrangement different from that 
contained in the suretyship contract is forced upon 
him and that if the surety pays the debt he has the 
benefit of every remedy which the creditor has against 
72 
the principal debtor. The basic principle of section 
is that it is the duty of the person who has secured 
a guarantee to do every act necesssury for the protection 
of the rights of the surety, as a surety is a person who 
^u 
receives no benefit and no consideration out of the 
transaction but has voluntarily accepted the liability 
of the principal debtor to the creditor. By the 
application of this section surety is discharged, 
when a creditor does any act which is inconsistent 
with the rights of the surety or omits to do any act 
which his duty to the surety requires him to do and 
the eventual remedy of the surety is impaired as a 
consequences thereof. The dUnpairment of the eventual 
remedy of the surety is essential for application of 
the section in addition to the acts of commission and 
omission on the part of the creditor, in order to 
attract section 139 there must not only be an act 
inconsistent with the rights of the surety or any anission 
to do any act which his duty to the surety requires 
him to do, toot also the impairment of the eventual 
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remedy of the surety against the principal debtor, 
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In Darshan Ram Ganesh Das v, Khair Din Allah Buksh 
a canpromise decree was passed against the principal 
debtors providing for the payment of the debt by 
instalments, A person stood surety for the due payment 
of such instalments. Subsequently permission was 
granted to the Judgment-debtors to mortgage and sell 
the property that was attached before Judgment, Abdul 
zu 
Raoof, J., said, " when the surety undertook the 
liability to pay the entire property belonging to 
the Judgment-debtor was under attachment and the 
surety must have felt secure when he undertook the 
liability* The moment permission was granted to the 
Judgment-debtors to effect private mortgages or sales 
the whole position was changed, and in my opinion, 
the surety was Justified in applying to the court to 
be relieved of his undertaking"» 
A person standing as a surety, for several 
defendants in respect of a decree that may be passed 
against them, is discharged if the plaintiff with the 
leave of the court proceeds against one of them alone 
exonerating the rest of the defendants. In a recent 
case decided by the Supreme Court as surety was held 
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discharged due to the action of the Government, The 
facts of the case whre that the Government allowed the 
purchaser even after the default in the payment of the 
price was made to remove the fallen trees which the 
purchaser according to the terms of the contract was 
authorised to remove only on full and final payment. 
In allowing the pvirchaser to remove the fallen trees 
the Government had omitted to do what the surety^ was 
required to do and BO, the surety's eventual remedy 
against the security was lost. 
20u 
The conunission or omission on the part of the 
creditor must prove injurious to the surety. There 
must be the impairment o£ surety's iir«nedy. As in 
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Ramanand v, GhdWdhry Soondar Narain, the decree-holder 
postponed the sale of properties under a decree which 
resulted in ieusreased burden of the interest on the 
sureties who had executed a bond undertaking to pay 
any deficiency after sale. It was held that the 
sureties were discharged frcxn liability for interest 
subsequent to the court's order for sale. 
Mere laches on the part of the creditor or a 
mere passive acquiescence by the creditor in acts 
which are contrary to the conditions of a bond, is not 
sufficient of itself to relieve the sureties. Mere 
non-exercise of their rights of super-intendence by 
the people having that right does not discharge persons 
standing surety for those who are under supervision 
from their liability as sureties. 
To sum up, if there is a contract, express or 
implied, that the creditor shall acquire or preserve 
any right against the principal debtor, and the creditor 
deprives himself of that right which he has stipulated 
to acqxiire, or does anything to release any right which 
20 7 
he has, that discharges the surety unless he can show 
that he has received some Injury in consequences o£ 
creditor's conduct. 
In order to attract this section there must not 
be either an act Inconsistent with the rights of the 
surety, or an omission to do an act which it is the 
creditor's duty to do# but also the impairment of the 
eventual remedies of the surety against the principal 
debtor* The last point is kost crucial, so that if 
there is no such impairment the surety is not discharged, 
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Lord Longdall observed in Calvert v, London Dock Coyf 
"In almost every case where the surety 
has been released either in conse-
quence of time being given to the 
principal debtor or of a comprc»nise 
being with him, it had been contended 
that what was done was benefient to 
the surety, and the answer has edways 
been that the surety himself was the 
proper Judge of that, and that no 
arrangement different from that eon-
tained in his contract is to be forced 
upon him, and beeuring in mind that 
the surety, if he pays the debt, ought 
to have the benefit of all the secxirities 
possessed by the creditor, the question 
always is whether what has been done 
lessons the security". 
0 3 
Losing or Parting with the Security 
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Section 140 enshrines the general common law 
principle relating to cases where a guaranteed debt 
has become due, or default o£ the principal debtor to 
perform a guaranteed duty has taken place. A surety, 
who pays off the guaranteed debt or performs the 
promise is entitled to be subrogated to all the rights 
of the creditor which he had against the principal 
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debtor. Section 141 contains the most practical appli-
cation of the principle laid down in section 140. 
Because under the section a surety is entitled to the 
benefit of "every security" which the creditor has 
against the principal debtor at the time when the con-
tract of suretyship is entered into whether the surety 
knows the existence of such security or not, the sec-
tion also provides that if the creditor loses, or with-
out the consent of the surety, parts with such security, 
the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of 
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security. It has been observed in Craythorns v, Swinburm, 
" The whole doctrine of principal and 
contribution,etc, rests upon the 
established principles of a court 
of equity, not upon contract,except 
it may be so represented ^pon the 
implied knowledge of these principles. 
There is no express contract for 
contribution of bonds generally, if 
not universally being joint and 
2 fJ J 
several-creating several obligations 
by in as surety is to be entitled 
to evttzry remedy which the creditor 
has against the principal debtor; 
to eiUforoe every security and all 
means o£ payment to stand in the 
place of creditor, not only through 
the medium of contract, but even by 
means of securities entered into 
without the knowledge of the surety, 
having a right to have for that, and 
to avail himself of all those secu-
rities against the debtor. This 
right of a surety also stands, not 
upon contract, but upon a principle 
of natural Justice". 
On the scope of section 141 Ramaswami, J,, of 
the supreme Court in Amrit Lai v. State Bank of 
81 
Travancore, said, that as pointed out by the Court 
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in State of Madhya Pradesh v, Kalusan, the expression 
security* in this section is not used in any technical 
sense, it includes all rights which the creditor has 
against the property at the date of contract. The 
surety is entitled on the payment of the debt or per-
formance o^all that he is liable for the benefit of 
the rights of the creditor against the principal 
debtor which arise out of the transaction which gives 
rise to the right or liability. The surety is, there-
fore, on payment of the amount due by the principal 
debtor entitled to be put in the same position in which 
2ia 
the creditor stood in relation to the principal debtor. 
If the creditor has lost or parted with the security 
without the consent of the surety the latter is by the 
express provision contained in section 141 discharged 
to the extent of the value of the security lost or 
parted with. 
Section 141 deals with a situation when the 
principal debtor has offered more than one secxxrity. 
Even if the surety is not aware of any other security 
offered by the principal debtor yet once the right of 
the surety against the principal debtor is impaired by 
any action or in action which JLmplies negligence appearing 
from lack of supervision undertaken in the contract, 
the surety will be discharged under the combined ope-
83 
ration of sections 139 and 141, 
Section 141 embodies the equitable principle 
in favour of the surety. This is one of the instances 
of some favour shown to the surety. Section 137, however, 
make quite clear that by'mere forbearance* the surety 
is not discharged. The difficult question is whether 
there is a mere forbearance' by the creditor or whether 
he has lost or parted with the securities to the pre-
judice of the security. The Supreme Court decided" in 
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favour of the sureties under section 141, 
V 1^ 
On the contrary In Karnataka Bank Ltd. v, Gajana 
35 
Sharkara Rao Kalkarnl^ the Karnataka High Court has 
ccMne to the conclusion that the surety was not dis-
charged under section 141. The bank had financed the 
instalmental purchase of a truck by way of security, 
besides providing two sureties for the repayment of 
the loan. Under the hypothecation bond, the creditor 
was entitled to seize the truck and sell it, if the 
principal debtor conmiitted default in the payment of 
any one hinstalment. Though all the instalments have 
become overdue, the creditor bank did not seize the 
truck. In the mean-while, the truck deteriorated in 
value and was reduced to a mere scrap. The creditor 
sued the principal debtor and sureties for the amount 
due. The sureties invoked the protection of section 141 
and contended as the creditor bank had allowed the 
security to be Impaired and lost owing to its own negli-
gence, they stattd discharged. The trial court found 
favour with their claim but the Division Bench on appeal, 
held that section 141 would not apply to the case, 
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Venkatachaliah J,, stated the reasons thus: 
" A mere passive inactivity or passive 
negligence on the part of the creditor 
by falling to realise the debt from 
the collateral security is not suffi-
cient in itself to discharge the 
21 
surety, for the reason the surety 
can himself avoid consequences of 
such passivity by himself paying 
the debt and becoming subrogated 
to the rights of the creditor, in 
the absence of a contract to the 
contrary, the creditor is under no 
obligation of active diligence for 
the protection of the surety, so 
long as the surety himself remains 
inactive. Thus tested, the inaction 
on the part of the bank will not of 
itself, mitigate sureties liability". 
The court distinguished the Supreme Court 
decisions on the ground that unlike the present case, 
the creditors there had physical custody of the secu-
rity and that they were not cases of • mere forbearance' 
but of security lost owing to the negligence of the 
creditors. There was a unsuccessful contention that 
a hypothecation of goods was only an entended idea of 
the pledge and that the obligation to preserve the 
security enjoined by law upon a creditor extended not 
merely to the security which was in his actual passession 
but also that which he ought to have taken Into his 
actual possession by exercising the right to seize 
the goods upon default. The decision which, it is 
submitted with respect, is eminently soui^ d and is 
bound to be welcomed by bankers and other instalment 
87 
credit financeries. 
/I ' 
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The same High Court reached the same conclusion 
88 
In R. Lllavatl v. Bank of Baroda« The Punjab and 
Haryana High Court in a recent decision while over-
89 
ruling its earlier decision has in Bank of JB8)dia«Bom« 
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v# Yeoeshwar Kantwadhera/ held that a surety in the 
case of hypothecation is not entitled to invoke section 
141 of the Contract Act for his benefit. Under the 
said section if the creditor loses or without the 
consent of the surety, parts with the security pledged, 
the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of 
the security. Such a question cannot arise In the case 
of hypothecation, of goods for the simple reason that 
when the goods are not in possession of the hypothecatee, 
there is no question of his losing or parting with the 
same. Therefore, the sureties could not claim the 
benefit of section 141 of the Act, 
Section 141 of the Indian Contract Act has 
limited the suret^S right to securities held by the 
creditor at the date of his becoming surety and has 
modified the English rule that the surety is entitled 
to the securities given to the creditor both before and 
after the contract of surety. 
According to section 141 a surety Is entitled 
to the benefit of every security which the creditor had 
'dli 
against the principal debtor and section 140 lays 
down that the rights should have been available to 
the surety upon payment or performance of all that 
he is kiable for. But the Act no where lays down at 
what point of time the creditor*s securities should 
be made over to the surety. Whether when the debt is 
paid off, or when the surety pays the sum guaranteed , 
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In Goverdhandas v. Bank of Bengal, it was held that 
the surety was not entitled to the creditor's securities 
until the whole of the debt was paid off. Parran,J,, 
said: 
•' It seems to me to be a strange 
doctrine that a creditor not 
fully secured by a mortgage who 
obtains the benefit of a surety 
for part of his mortgage debt in 
order to further sec\ire himself 
by that very act is deprived of 
portion of the security the in-
adequacy of which was a reason 
for demanding the surety; or that 
a person advancing say P3« 10«000 
on a mortgage which is valued 
only at rts, 5,000 and has s^, 5,000 
of his advance guaranteed by a 
surety is only in reality secured 
to the extent of Rs, 7,500 by 
reason of the surety's right to 
claim the benefit of half the 
mortgage security on paying his 
half of the debt. To hold so 
would, I think, defeat the inten-
tion of the parties to such a 
transaction, A principle offequlty 
is seldcwi adopted which had that 
effect. If such were the result of 
215 
section 141 of the Contract Act, 
I should exp«ct to find the wording 
In section 140 repeated In section 
141, The striking difference In 
the language of the two sections Is 
a strong argument against the plain-
tiff's contention", 
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In Porvatenenl Bhushayya v, Pootlurl Suryanasayana« 
a different view has been taken while In the case only 
section 141 was Invoked, In the Madras case both sections 
140 and 141 were relied upon. But in the Madras case 
the security was given subsequent to the contract of 
guarantee. In this case the surety had guaranteed only 
part of the debt. This guaramtee he discharged and so 
the coxirt held that as against the subsequent assignee of 
the creditor he was entitled to a proportionate share In 
the security held by the creditor at the time the surety 
discharged his liability. This was so even if the cre-
ditor wasmnot fully paid. The Madras High Court held* 
•• There is little doubt on the language 
of section 140 that the surety Is 
entitled to demand all the securities 
held by the principal debtor at the 
time of the payment . whether they 
had been received simultaneously with 
the loan advanced or subsequently 
What Is Important to Jpem^ aber In this 
connection is that section 141 does 
not enable the creditor to withhold 
from the surety any security actually 
held by him at the time when the debt 
is paid or in any way to detract from 
the rights of the creditor as declared 
by section 140, Section 141 only gives 
213 
him liberty in action in respect 
of sectirities not held by him at 
the time of the contract of surety-
ship provided he exercises it 
before payment",93 
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Pollock and Mulla, agreed with the opinion 
expressed by Faran J.« when they state t 
" The Madras Court doubts the view 
of Faran J, but no attempt is 
made to deal with his argtiment on 
the equities. Further, the solu-
tion in the Madras case, it is 
submitted, is inequitable. The 
Coxirt considers that any other 
view would enable a creditor to 
make an appropriation to the detei-
ment of the surety who has already 
paid. But it is submitted that if 
the creditor has negligently sold 
the security to H at least than its 
market value the sxurety is protanto 
released«95 If on the other hand 
H has paid the full market value, 
it is inequitable that he should be 
called upon to share it with B, 
Further, the very basis of the 
svirety's right to securities rests 
upon the obligation of the principal 
debtor to indemnify the surety. It 
would be strange if the surety could 
use these rights to hamper the cre-
ditor in recovering the debt,96 
It is submitted that the creditor's 
right to hold securities until the 
whole debt has been paid is peura-
mount to any claim of the surety 
whether based on section 140 or sec-
tion 141, " 
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The above view is In con£innity with the 
provisions of law and no surety can step Into the 
shoes of the creditor until he has discharged his 
liability and until the entire debt due to the 
creditor has been paid In full. This rule shall 
apply also where the surety Is only for the part of 
the debt, 
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The Law Commission has also taken the same view 
Another question worth eHamlning relates to the 
case where more than one security Is available to the 
creditor. In case the creditor takes more than one 
security on the basis of which the advance was made. It 
shall not mean that section 141 would not be attracted 
and the surety will not be discharged. Even If It Is 
found that sxirety gave personal guarantee on the good-
faith of the other security being offered by the principal 
debtor, which Itself may be a consideration for the 
surety offering his personal guarantee, and the creditor 
by his own negligence lost the securities. In case such 
an interpretation is provided, it would mean that law 
is rewarding negligence and that law is putting a premium 
on the negligence of the creditor to the detriment of 
the surety who is usually described as a favoured debtor. 
21S 
In any case the bank should exercise the care of 
a prudent man one would eacpect In management o£ Its 
own a££alrs« 
The next cjuestlon for consideration Is that 
whether under section 141 of the Contract Act, a 
surety undertaking to pay the amount due to the credi-
tor under a particular debt or account is entitled 
to the benefit of the secxxrity held by the creditor 
against the same debtor to secure the same amount under 
other debt due to him. This matter came up for 
decision in the Raj as than High Court in Bank of Baroda 
98 
V, Krishna Ballabh and others, the court heldi 
"Keeping in view the leuiguage of 
section and illustration appended 
to it, it is clear that the principle 
in-corporated in section 141 applies, 
so as to discharge the security 
from the liability, only in a case 
where the creditor loses or parts 
with the security held by himkto 
secure the same debt for which the 
contract of suretyship was entered 
into. If there are two or more debts 
each secured by security the sxirety 
for one of the debts is not discharged 
if the creditor loses or parts with 
the security relating to other debts. 
In view of the above, i do not agree 
with the learned Additional District 
Judge that the plair^tiff's liability 
as surety was discharged on account 
of the release of the goods pledged 
219 
with the Bemk to sec\ire the 
amount \xnder cash credit 
Account o£ H/B Jem Chemical 
and Pharmaceutical Works"* 
In every contract of guaramtee there is an 
implied promise by the principal debtor to Indemnify 
the surety. In fact the contract of suretyship has 
the foundecion of indemnity. The surety can claim 
from the principal debtor whatever sum he has right-
fully paid under the guarantee. He however, cannot 
claim any amount which may have been paid by him wrong-
fully. In case surety pay less than what is due from 
the principal debtor he is entitled to receive the sum 
actually paid by him* 
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CHAPTER - VI ^'^ 
LETTERS or CREDIT AND PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES 
Bemking, if we equate It with money lending, 
is perhaps as old as civilization itself. When "money* 
in its modern form was not in existence, people in 
order to obtain goods or services, offered goods or 
services in return. This was barter, a clumsy and 
Inconvenient system in many ways* Nevertheless people 
could and did lend or borrow in the form of specific 
goods which they received back or repaid in the same 
form or any other mutually acceptable form. Banking 
institutions today form the heart of the financial 
structure of any country, developed or developing,rich 
or poor, advance or backward in the fields of science 
and technology. Developing economics are in greater 
need of the creative and ptirposeful role of the banks 
the 
than/developed ones. 
Banks borrow in order to lend. Every lender 
of money must have a lively regard to the chances of 
obtaining repayment, and from the earliest times he 
has seldom been content with relying upon the mere 
obligation of the borrower to fulfil his obligation 
22. 
unless buttressed by a proper security* The business 
of lending money Is very speculative, and can only 
be carried on by charging interest so yhigh that it 
could hardly serve the ordinary requirements of 
commerce and industry* 
At the present time perhaps the most important 
ancillary service rendered by a banker to his commercial 
customer is the providing of credit which will enable 
the customer to discharge his obligations. The main 
feature of this^ ^ however, is that the banker through 
his business connections is able to place the machinery 
of international commercial banking at his customer's 
disposal. 
In the absence of a continuous course of dealing, 
sellers are concerned with the availability of pr<xnpt 
payment for their merchandise* Buyers, on the other-
hand, are naturally anxious to have an opportunity of 
inspecting the goods before payment of price in order 
to ensure that the goods conform to the agreed quality. 
The whole question is, of course, resolved when there 
is mutual trust emd respect among the parties developed 
by continuous and repeated advantageous dealings between 
them* 
.J ^2. 
In the absence of such dealings, however, it 
becomes necessary for a system to be developed where 
by a seller can sell his goods to a buyer to their 
mutual satisfaction in those situations where neither 
party knows the other. This basic need has brought the 
development of the letter of credit. 
International trade needs sc»ne mechanism whereby 
payments may be made across national boundaries, and 
currency of one country be valued in terms of the other, 
credits are used to facilitate commercial 
Commercial/relations, say, between an importer or 
exporter in one country, and a merchant abroad, or in 
financing the shipment of merchandise from one country 
to another. The importer gets his banker to issue a 
docximentary credit which incorporates an undertaking 
to accept or pay bills of exchange upto a certain 
amount by the merchant abroad provided that they are 
accomp€Uiied by specified documents. 
When bank participation is desired, the usual 
vehicle for such participation is the use of a letter 
of credit which has the added advantages of permitting 
each party to the transaction to deal with a financial 
institution in which he has confidence and which is 
known to him. 
Z2o 
Purpose and functions 
Coinmerclal letters of credit are In constant 
U8e« they involve large accounts« their nature and 
effect are well understood in the business vforld. When 
a prospective buyer in some locality desires to ptirchase 
goods of a prospective seller in another locality there 
arises the problem of financing the sale. If the seller 
is to manufacture the goods^ or to procure the merchandise 
from some third person, he wishes to be certain that 
the buyer will take and pay for them when they came into 
existence, or are procured, and put on board the ship 
or cars. If the seller already had the goods, he desires 
to b^r paid the purchase price upon shipment. The buj^r, 
on the other hand, wishes to be certain that the goods 
have been shipped according to the instructions and he 
does not desire to pay before they have been received 
and marketed. 
Payment may be made, according to the terms 
of the sales contract, in one of five waysi (1) Cash with 
the order or against shipping docxunents; (2) the buyer's 
promissory note or the note of a third person, or bill 
of exchange en a person other than the buyer, properly 
accepted and Indorsed, sent with the order, or servant 
dciJ 
against the shipping documents; (3) open or book, credit 
with subsequent remittance cash or cororoerolal paperi 
(4) trade acceptance or bill of exchange drawn by the 
seller on the buyer; (5) letter of credit. None of the 
first four methods Is satisfactory - both to the buyer 
and to the seller. The business problem Is how to meet 
the desires of both the buyer and the seller, how to 
enable the buyer to postpone actual payment until the 
goods have been received and resold, how to enable a bank 
to lend Its credit and not Its funds, how to utilize the 
goods aar security In the meantime. The Instrumentality 
of the commercial letter of credit meets these requirements 
perfectly. 
Under a commercial letter of credit S, a seller 
In Pakistan, wants to sell to B, a buyer In India, B goes 
to his bank, the State Bank of India, and requests them 
to send a letter Icof credit to S in Pakistan, Such letter 
acknowledges that upon presentment of the proper documents 
of the title ( e,g, bill of lading, invoices, custcxns 
documents etc, ) from S to the bank, the bank will pay any 
drafts drawn on B upto a certain amount. The bank honours 
its letter of credit, pays the daaft and remits the pay-
ment to s for a small charge. The bank now turns to B for 
payment. This can be done either by debiting B's account 
for the amount of draft, by taking a security Interest 
^3; 
in the yoods in transit,or by holding the documents 
of title until B can find another buyer who will pay 
the bank* 
The commercial letter of credit is used as a 
means of financing and paying for international sales 
of the documentary variety. Its purpose was to unable 
an exporter to draw his draft or bill of exchange upon 
a bank or factor of known solvency, instead of upon the 
importer. The banking or factoring house to accept or 
pay the sellers draft or demand for payment, according 
its promise with a specification of the doctoments required 
to be presented by the seller or seller's agent or bank. 
The commercial letter of credit may be defined as a 
formal promise by a bank or other party of known solvency 
to accept or pay or just to pay, the draft or the demand 
of payment by a beneficiary, whose compliance with the 
terms of the credit is a prereqpiisite of the enforcea-
bility of the promise. 
The main alternative methods of payment that 
were available to an exporter at the time the commercial 
2 
letters of credit began to be used were the following! 
He could be paid befox-e or after shipment by 
receiving a remittance of exchange directly from his 
23, 
buyer «u: through a bank* Z£ the escporter wmv paid 
prior to shipment it RMiant that the sale was on a 
strictly cash basis, the buyer, was to trust implicitly 
the sellers honesty in shipping the bargained goods«X£ 
payment •y^Tem to take place after shipment or reception 
of the goods by the buyer, the seller would normally 
face the credit risk of an insolvant or dishonest buyer 
refusing to honour his obligation in a foreign country, 
and the additional risk of an interim devaluation of 
the currency of the payment, 
A second method of payment was the drawing of 
a documentary draft on the buyer. The seller's draft 
would normally be accompanied by the customary C«I.F«, 
F*0«B., F«A«S* etc« documents which would only be released 
to the buyer by a third party, usually a bank, upon the 
buyer's paying or accepting the seller^! draft. One 
important practical implication of the documentary draft 
method of payment was that it favoured the interests of 
the foreign buyer. Not only did the buyer enjoy the 
disposition of cash until the monent of payment of the 
accepted draft, but in addition, and perhaps more 
importantly, the buyer could e.xact more liberal terms 
from his seller by refusing to accept the documentary 
6<. 
dra£t or instructing his baunk not to pay a sight 
draft* The sellar was then forced with the prospect 
of litigating in a foreign country without material 
possession of the goods, which were either traveling 
across the ocean or awaiting final adjudication in 
a foreign customs house* 
In contrast with these two methods« the advan-
tages offered by the commercial letter of credit are 
obvious. The seller can wmnt on an enforceable 
promise of payment by a party of known solvency as 
soon as he receives a formal document ( issued by a 
bank a board or by a confirming bank at his domicile ) 
stating that his draft will be honoured when accompanied 
by the specified docxiraents. This viirtually ends the 
seller's credit risk and allows him to cope better 
with the exchange risk* 
The buyer is assured that the payment under 
the commercial letter of credit will take place only 
when the seller complies with the terms of the credit 
as specified in the buyer's instructions to the opening 
or issuing bank* In addition, the buyer also has access 
to bank credit because he can provide security for his 
borrowings from the issuing bank by transferring to 
the bank possession of the documents of title over the 
2'd-
merchandise shipped under the commercial letter 
of credit* 
Finally* importers dealing through banks are 
protected against a drop in the value of their 
national currency by the issuing banker's mechanism 
for the adjustment of its exchange position. For a 
bank with international connections, the setting 
aside or the transfer of exchange is a routine and 
relatively inexpensive transaction. 
Its foreign currency obliga-
tions to correspondents abroad as well as its local 
cxirrency credits on foreign banks are periodically 
settled through respective book enteries* Because of 
these as well as other factors the conunercial letters 
of credits has become the most significant instrument 
in the financing and payment of international sales. 
The function of a documentary credit can best 
be described and the parties identified by giving a 
simple example suppose that a buyer in London wishes 
buy a consignment of raw Jute from a seller in India 
at a cost of £ 45,000, The contract for the saled 
Jute, which is on C,I,F. ( cost, insurance and freight ) 
23, 
terms, provides that the payment shall be by confirmed 
irrevocable letter of credit against delivery of the 
shipping docviments concerning the Jute, i,e, bill of 
lading, invoice and policy or certificate of insurance. 
The contract further provides that the letter of credit 
must be opened by the buyer at least one month before 
the intended shipment date. The bank will require the 
buyer to complete and sign a request form. The request 
form sets out details of the required letter of credit. 
Specifies that the letter of credit is to be subject 
to the uniform customs and practice and specifically 
gives the bank a charge over the shipping documents and 
the goods represented thereby together with, if necessary 
a power of sale. The bank may also require other secxxrity 
since, by opening the credit, the bank will be making 
the credit, the bank will be making itself primarily 
liable to make payment \inder it. 
The bank which is called the issuing bank, then 
opens the letter of credit and sends it to its corres-
pondent bank in india by letter, or in xirgent cases 
communicates the terms of the letter of credit by telex 
or cable, in either case asking the bank in India to 
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add its confirmation to the letter o£ credit and 
notify the seller ( i.e« the beneficiary under the 
letter of credit), By adding its confirmation the 
confirming bank itself accepts liability to make 
payment under the letter of credit in that way, the 
seller has a bank resident in his own country to 
look for the payment. 
When the goods are shipped, the beneficiary 
draws a draft as instructed in the letter of credits 
i«e. on the confirming haxik or on the issuing bank 
or on the buyer and hands this draft to the confirming 
bank, or t& his own bank in India ( i,e, a negotiating 
bank), together with the letter of credit and the 
shipping documents specified therein, if he presents 
these to the confirming bank, that bank honours the 
draft if drawn on.itself or negotiates ( i.e. buys ) 
the draft if drawn en or other party, always provided 
that the accompaning documents are in order. If he 
presents then to his own bank, that bank negotiates, 
the drafts in reliance on the undertaking of the 
confirming bank supported by that of the issuing bank. 
In this way, the seller is paid immediately but the 
Z ' 6 : 
buyer does not have to pay for the goods until 
the draft and the shipping documents are presented 
to the issuing bank for payment. 
The object from a business point of view of 
the coiranercial credit is to facilitate dealings 
between merchants dcxniciled in different countries^ 
by ensvfing payment to the seller on the one hand and 
delivery to the buyer of the contract goods on the 
other. It is in international commerce that the 
banker's commercial credit plays a leading part, A 
transaction of this nature presupposes the case of 
a merchant whose credit in his own country may be all 
that could be desired, but who is not sufficiently 
well known in other markets to enable him to rely solely 
on his reputation for solvency and honest dealings 
when buying goods abroad, it may be essential that 
he should be able to purchase on credit, if he cannot 
afford to be deprived of the use of his capital during 
the period which must of necessity elapse between the 
shipment of goods and their receipt and resale by him 
in the home market. Similarly, the exporter also may 
be in need of credit, for he may not be able to afford 
to lock up capital which is required in his own business 
^ J 
pending the receipt of payment for his goods. Thus 
some esqpedient is necessazry which will, on the one 
hand, enable the e9q>orter to obtain prompt payment, 
whilst allowing the importer to postpone payment until 
such time as he has been able to market the imported 
goods• 
Letter of credit is no novel device. Foreign 
trade has been financed in this way, or in some similar 
manner, commerce has at times been carried on in new 
channels, and not always with parsons of unblemished 
repute, and moreover, exporters of goods have been 
much embarressed by violent fluctuations in rates of 
exchange and by devaluation of currencies. For these 
reasons there has been a marked disinclination on the 
part of e^ qporters to rely on the individual credit of 
buyers and an increasing tendency for the e9q>orters 
to stipxilate in contracts for the sale of goods that 
the responsibility for payment of the price shall be 
undertaken by a banker, it is submitted that even if 
importers and exporters are of good repute it may be 
preferable to finance a transaction by means of a docu-
mentary credit, for in times which are uncertain by 
reason of hostilities or the chance of hostilities. 
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payment may be more easily forthcoming, as bankers 
maintain accounts with each other which cannot so 
easily be subject to foreign governmental control or 
Interference* 
Nature of letter of credit 
The consnerclal letter qcf credit has a long 
mercantile history. It has«however, a much shorter 
legal history. It Is not a new thing In English and 
American Law, Although merch€uits and bankers have 
been using letter of credit for decades, and for long 
experience, more or less uniform, understood in a 
business way the business obligations which are 
created as a result of their issue. It is nevertheless 
uncertain in what manner or at what moment of time the 
3 
law predicates upon their legal rights and obligations. 
Do rights and obligations arise at the moment the 
letter is issued as the result of a contract which Is 
founded at that time or to obligations and rights arise 
4 
at a subsequent time* 
Just as the bill of exchange had Its origlon in 
the necessity of settling accounts between merchants 
residing in different countries without the necessity of 
transiK>rtlng money Itself, so the letter otf credit was 
£ix8t uA«d to fulfil the purpose of providing a 
person abroad with money Itself and thus obviating 
the necessity of his carrying money with hlra. In 
their earliest letters of credit were used as long as 
the twelfth century by Popes, princes and other rulers 
who wished to purchase advances for their servants. 
They were sometimes used In the name of king, or for 
the benefit of his subject, who were thus enabled to 
5 
raise loans upon a known security* 
The modern commercial letter of credit Is of 
recent growth. It is given not to the customer, but 
to some third person named by the costomer, with whan 
the customer has commercial dealings In order to carry 
through a particular transaction* In effect, the 
name and reputation of the banker are substituted for 
those of his customer. 
This dist|irJaed economic condition of the world 
following two world wars, the great Increase in world 
trade, the more rapid means of ccxnmunlcations and 
transport, the embeurklng upon commercial ad^ reTifcures by 
men of doubtful honesty, the fluctuations of foreign 
exchange and all factors which It is believed have had 
a profound influence in shaping the form of letters of 
credit. 
^ 4 . 
A letter of credit ia in principle an under-
taking by a banker to raeet drafts drawn under the 
credit by the beneficiary of the credit in accordance 
with the conditions laid down therein. A letter of 
credit where the credit is designed to facilitate 
trade ( generally* but not always foreign trade ) to 
another specified banker ( called the intermediary 
banker ) or to the beneficiary. 
The credit is addressed to the intermediary 
banker, it may contain an instruction to that banker, 
either a^ely to advice the beneficiary of the credit 
without any cc»nmitment, or to add his confirmatary 
undertaking to it, in which case the beneficiary has 
the prcxnlse of both bsmkers except when the confirming 
bank issues his own credit to the beneficiary when a 
credit is intended to facilitate trade it is called a 
6 
commercial letter of credit. 
According to another definition of documentary 
credit the banker acting on behalf of the buyer and 
either directly or through the intervention of a banker 
in the country of the seller, assumes liability for 
payment of the price in consideration, perhaps of the 
security afforded to him by a J)ledge of the documents 
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o£ title to the goods or hla being placed in funds 
in advance or o£ an undertaking to reimburse and of 
a commission* 
This description reveals the essence of the 
transaction, viz, that the goods represented by the 
bill of lading oc a doc\ament of title are used as a 
means of financing the transaction. Lord Wright 
describes the function of docxmentary credit as 
follows t 
The general coxirse of international 
commerce involves the practice of 
raising money on the documents so 
as to bridge the period between the 
shipnent and the time of obtaining 
payment against documents. 8 
A comprehensive definition of the documentary 
credit is to be found in the uniform customs and 
9 
practice for documentary credits« 1974, sponsored 
by the international chamber of ccxnmerce, where it 
is provided that a commercial credit ist 
Any arrangement, however, named or described 
whereby a bank ( the issuing bank ) acting at the 
request and in accordance with the instructions of a 
customer ( the application for the credit ), 
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(1) is to make payment to or to the order of a 
third party ( beneficiary ) or to pay, accept or 
negotiate bills of exchange ( drafts } drawn by the 
beneficiaury, or (ii) authorise such payments to be 
made or such drafts to be paid, accepted or negotiated 
by another bank, against stipulated documents, 
provided that the terms and conditions of the credit 
are c(xnplied with* 
The fundamental principle of the uniform 
customs is to provide for a strict separation of the 
docxjunentary aspect of the export transaction from the 
goods aspect and to make it clear that the banks are 
only concerned with the former but not with the latter, 
The uniform customs further demand that credit 
instructions and the credits themselves shall be 
complete and precise and that the issueing bank shall 
discourage any attempt on the part of the buyer to 
include exercise detail* 
Many provisions of the 1974, which have stood 
the test of time, have been retained. The general 
temar of 1983 Revision is to relent to some extent, 
the doclirine of strict compliance, by stating that 
24 / 
more transport dociunents shall be acceptable by the 
banks« 1£ the parties have specified this in the 
instructions to the issuing bank. This change is 
due to transport revolution which in many cases had 
led to the use o£ other transport documents than 
the traditional bill of lading. ° 
The 1983 version of U.C.P. set-out to achieve 
three aims. It adopts the U.C.P. to the changing 
documentary requirements of the transport revolution, 
it makes it possible to use in documentary credit 
transactions modern means of tele communications and 
11 
automated transmission, and thirdly it is more precise 
in Its wording than the previous version of the U.C.P. 
There are three stages in the transaction 
First, a term is inserted in the contract of sale 
made between the buyer and the seller whereby the buyer 
undertakes to furnish an irrevocable letter of credit 
in favour of the seller. Secondly, the buyer approaches 
his own banker and instructs him to issue an irrevocable 
letter of credit, giving him the details of the tran-
saction. This constitutes a contract between the 
buyer and the banker. Thirdly, the banker advices 
the seller that an irrevocable letter of credit has 
been opened in his favour, that is to say, the banker 
24o 
gives an irrevocable undertaking to pay the seller, 
provided that the seller sends the. required shipping 
documttnts in compliance with the terms o£ the letter 
of credit. An irrevocable letter of credit may also 
be confirmed by a banker operating in the seller's 
country ( known as the comaspondent banker ) who iny 
confirming the credit, adds to the promise of the 
issuing banker his own undertaking to ensure payment. 
The irrevocable letter of credit does not fit easily 
into the common law. If the transaction is regarded 
simply a contract between the buyer and the banker, 
the seller is a third party to this contract and 
technically would be unable to sue should the banker 
revoke the letter of credit or for some reasons fail, 
to make the payment. But the letter of credit is 
treated as a unilateral contract between the banker 
and the seller to pay on the tender of the shipping 
12 
documents. In Trans Trust S,R,R.L.v. Danubian Trading 
13 
Co, Ltd», the question was what is the legal position 
of a stipulation in a contract of sale of goods which 
related to the opening by the buyer a letter of credit 
in favour of the seller? Sometimes it is a contract 
precedent to the formation of a contract, that is, it 
is a contract which roust be fulfilled before any contract 
24o 
is concluded at all. In thoae caaea the atipulation 
aubsequent to the opening of credit la rather liXe 
a atipulation aubject to the contract* 
Aa to the nature of the transaction^ we can 
say that It Is Independent of and unqualified by the 
contract of sale or underlying transaction. It has 
an autonomy of :ilts own« that the opening of a conf jmeed 
letter of credit« constitutes a bargain between the 
banker and the vender of the goods, which imposes 
upon the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irres-
pective of any dispute that may be between the parties 
as to whether the goods are up to contract or not. A 
vendor of goods selling against a confirmed letter of 
credit is selling under the assurance that nothing 
will prevent him fr<xa receiving -the price. On this 
aspect, lord Dinning M,R», in the case of Edwardowen 
Engineering Ltd, v, Barclays Bank international Ltd., 
I? ^ — — 
point outt 
" A bank which gives a performance 
guarantee must honour that guarantee 
according to its terms. It is not 
concerned in the least with the rela-
tions between the supplier and the 
customer, nor with this question 
whether the supplier has performed his 
contracted obligation or not; nor with 
the question whether the supplier is in 
default or not. The bank must pay 
according to its guarantee •" 
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In this case the British suppliers agreed to erect 
green houses In Libya and established a performance 
guarantee o£ 10 percent of the contract price Issued 
by the English bank payable at the Libyan bank. The 
letter of credit was never opened. The English 
suppliers considered this as a repudltatlon of the 
contract. The Libyan Importers claimed on the bank 
guarantee. It was held that the Libyan Importers 
Indeed had the right to call upon the guarantee. Irres-
pective of the dispute concerning the underlying con-
tract. The on demand guarantee was payable on first 
d«nand without proof or conditions. In Edwardowen case 
15 
Lord Denning M.R. remarked - " these performance 
guarantees are virtually promissary notes payable on 
demand". 
One fundamental principle which operates In letter 
of credit transactions Is that a letter of credit Is a 
separate transaction from the coijtract sof sale and the 
bankers who Issue a letter of credit are In no way 
concerned with the contract of sale. The basic principle 
16 17 
is embodied in Article 3 and Article 4. 
Although the underlying basis of a letter of 
credit are clearly stated in the above articles, buyers 
of the goods have often sought to interfere with the 
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bank's payment obligations* This would occur« for 
instance^ in cases where the seller is in breach of 
his contract by supplying goods which are defective 
or not upto standard. Another situation where the 
buyer might seek to interfere with the bank's payment 
obligations is where the buyer suspects that the 
seller is acting fraudulently in the transaction* 
Once a credit has been ccmonunicated by the 
issuing bank to the beneficiary, it constitutes a 
definite undertaking by the issuing bank to the bene-
ficiary that it will pay on the credit if the terms 
of the credit are met. If the seller is in breach of 
his contract to the buyer by supplying goods which 
defective are not upto the stand, the buyer may 
attempt to stop the seller from drawing on the credit 
in order to preserve his own claim for damages against 
the seller. The courts have always refused to Inter-
fere with the banker's undertaking to make payment 
under the credit on the ground that any such inter-
ference would undermine the confidence in this system 
of payment* They have consistently held that banks 
are in no way concerned with the contract of sale and 
the buyer should seek his remedy against the seller 
in a separate action* In Hanzeh Males & Sons v. 
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British iraex Induatries Ltd, the court of J^peal 
decided that the buyer must seek his rwnedy for 
breach of contract In separate action against the 
seller. The plaintiffs^ In this case, a Jordanian 
flrm# agreed to purchase from the defendants* a 
quantity of reinforced steel rods. The goods were 
to be delivered In two klnstalmehts and the payment 
was to be effected by two confined letters of credit. 
After the first delivery, the plaintiffs alleged that 
the goods were not upto the contract. The plaintiffs 
applied to the court for an injunction to prevent the 
defendants from drawing on the second letter of credit. 
The plaintiffs contended that this move was Intended 
to seciire for themselves in respect of any damages they 
might become entitled in a subsequent action against 
the sellers. This application was disallowed by the 
court of appeal on the ground that a vendor selling 
under the assurance that nothing would prevent him 
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from receiving the prices. Jenkins L.J. saidi 
" we have been referred to a number of 
authorities, and it seems to be plain 
enough that the opening of a confirmed 
letter of credit constitutes a bargaining 
between the banker and the vendor of the 
goods, which imposes upon the banker's 
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an absolute obligation to pay* irres-
pective of any dispute th«re may be 
between the parties as to whether the 
goods are upto the mark or not* An 
aleborate comraeroiaX system has been 
built up on the footing that the 
banXer's confined credits are of that 
character, and,in any judgment, it 
would be wrong for this court in the 
present case to interfere with that 
established practice* A vendor of 
goods selling against a confirmed letter 
of credit is selling under the assurance 
that nothing will prevent him from 
receiving the price- That system of 
financing these operations, as I see it, 
would break down ccxnpletely if a dispute 
as between the vendor and the purchaser 
was to have the effect of 'freezing', if 
I am use that expression, the sum in 
respect of which the letter of credit 
was opened** • 
The above principle was recently applied in the 
case of Forestal Mimosa Ltd, v. Oriental Credit Ltd., 
the plaintiffs in this case sold to buyers in Karachi 
five consignments of solid wattle mimosa extract. 
The goods were to be paid for by means of irrevocable 
letter of credit and the credits were to be subject 
to the U.C.P, ( 1983 revision ). The plaintiffs tendered 
the recjuit^ d documents to the defendants, the confirming 
bank. The defendants in turn transmitted the documents 
to the issuing bank which claimed that the doctmients 
contained a number of discrepancies and that funds 
would be r««iitted upon their receipt from the buyers. 
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subsequently the Issuing bank informed the defendants 
that the buyers had accepted the drafts with the 
following endorsement, * Accepted on clean collecting 
basis not under L/C*, The plaintiffs refused to 
accept this amendment. They then sued the confirming 
bank for falling to accept and pay the drafts. The 
confirming bank contended that their obligation tinder 
the letter of credit only arose upon the buyers 
accepting the drafts. Rejecting this argument, the 
court of Appeal held that the bank was imder an 
obligation to accept and pay for the drafts once 
proper documents have been tendered. Sir John Mcgow 
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saidt 
" The purpose or, at any rate, one 
of the important purposes- of such 
a credit, as it is understood in 
international finance, is that it 
shall not be open to the buyers by 
his own choice with, it may be, no 
kind of legal justification whatever, 
when proper documents are tendered, 
to render the bank's obligation to 
the seller under the credit wholly 
useless obligation and one that has 
no legal effect". 
In United City Merchants ( investments ) Ltd. v, 
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Royal Bank of Canada and others. Lord wilber force 
described the four autoncxnous though inter connected 
contractual relationships" involved in the documentary 
credit. 
•1 • "» 2 1' •0 
(1) The underlying contract for the sale of goods, 
to which the only parties are the buyer and the seSiler; 
(2) the contract between the buyer and the issuing 
banker under which the latter agrees to issue the 
credit and either itself or through a confirming bank 
to notify the credit to the seller, and to make 
payments to or to the order to the seller against 
presentation of stipulated documents; and the buyer 
agrees to reimburse the issuing bank for payments made 
under the credit. For such reimbursement the stipulated 
dociiments; if they include a document of title such as 
bill of lading, constitute a security available to 
the issuing bank; 
(3) If payment is to be made through a confirming bank, 
the contract between the issuing bank and the confirming 
bank authorising and requiring the latter to make such 
payments and to remit the stipulated documents to the 
issuing bank when they are received, the issuing bank 
in turn agreeing to reimburse the confirming bank 
against the payments made under the credits; 
(4) the contract between the confirming bank and the 
seller under which the confirming bank undertakes to 
pay to the seller up to the amount of the credit against 
presentation of stipulated documents* 
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It Is clear frc^ the above discussion that a 
letter of credit gives rise to a separate contract 
between the bank and the seller, separate and distinct 
from the contract for the sale of goods between the 
seller and the buyer. The autonomy of a letter of 
credit is entitled to protection. 
In documentary credit operations all parties 
concerned deal in documents and not in goods, 
A letter of credit is a mechanism of great 
importance in international trade and any interference 
by courts with that mechanism would have serious 
repercussion on internation trade, except under very 
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special circumstances. 
Once the seller complied with the requirements 
of the letter of credit the court will not be justified 
in granting injunction restraining the bank from paying 
the seller. 
There is an absolute obligation upon the bank 
to pay irrespective of the dispute between the buyer 
and the seller as to whether the goods supplied by 
the seller were in accordance with the contract. 
Kinds of lettar of credit 
It Is veil settled that letters of credit 
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could be both revocable and Irrevocable • Irrevocable 
letters of credit might be confirmed or unconfirmed. 
The contractual relationship between the issuing bank 
and the buyer is defined by the terms of agreement 
between the under i«hich the letter opening the credit 
is issued* and or between the seller and the banker, 
the issue of credit duly notified to the seller create 
a new contractual nexus and renders the banker directly 
liable to the seller to pay the purchase price or 
accept the bill of exchamge upon tender of the documents. 
In Sassoon (M«A«) and Sons liitd, v. International Banking 
Conaoration^ Lord Summer said, * that there is no 
distinction from a legal point of view between an irre-
vocable credit and a confirmed credit, and that both 
were concluded contracts, but he was presumably referring 
to the legal effect of each, which as regards the benefl** 
clary, is the same. An irrevocable credit is confirmed 
if it is added to the confirmation of another banker, 
by which that banker also binds himself irrevocably. 
It depends on the nature of the credit whether 
it be revocable or irrevocable. In order that bank may 
claim to be reimbursed for any payment he makes under 
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thtt credit, the paying banker must obey strictly 
the instructions he areeeives, for by acting on them 
he accepts them and thus enters into contractual 
relations with the opening or issuing banker. 
There is also a difference between standby 
letters of cxredit and traditional letters of credit. 
Although both are mechanisms for allocating risks 
among the parties in cOTunercial transactions. By 
placing in the hands of a neutral third party the res-
ponsibility f3ir-making the payment when certain conditions 
are met, one party to a transaction is able to avoid 
the risk of non-payment or non performance. The standby 
letter of credit differs from the traditional letter 
of credit, however, in the method by which it allocated 
the risks among the parties. The traditional letter 
of credit usually requires a third party to generate 
SOTue of the documents that the beneflclaiy must present 
to the issuer ( usually a bill of lading ), \inder the 
standby letter of credit, the beneficiary usually 
generates all of the necessary documents himself 
casually a simple statement that the customer is in 
default' • 
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The standby letter of credit thus Involves 
a greater* risk o£ improper demand than the tradi-
tional letter of credit, both for the customer and 
the issuing bank. Because the bank is prohibited 
from inquiring into the truth of the beneficiary's 
assertion* the customer faces a risk that it will 
have to reimburse the bank for making a payment that 
was unjustifiably demanded. The bank's risk of loss 
is also increased because, unlike a bank issuing a 
traditional letter of credit,It receives no bill of 
lading. In a traditional letter of credit transaction 
involving the sale of goods, one of the docxiraents 
that must be presented for payment is a bills of lading, 
which gives the bank Jltle to the goods and allows 
the bank to claim the goods if the customer refuses 
to reimburse the bank without such security interest, 
the bank's only recourse is against the customer 
himself. Because of these increased risks, the 
standby letter of credit is analytically distinct 
26 from the traditional letter of credit. 
The standby letter of credit is intended as a 
safeguard against the account party's failure to 
perform a non-«ionetary obligation - e,g, the submission 
2^? 
of a tender under a construction contract, or the 
due perfoxmance of his obligations under such a contract. 
But the bank's undertaking to pay is not dependent on 
actual default by the account party* merely en presen-
tation of the specified dociunents and in the absence of 
fraud the bank is not concerned to enquire whether 
default has in fact taken place* An on demand guarantee 
fulfils precisely the same function as a standby letter 
of credit by contract the surety, or conditional, bond 
is a true guarantee under which the issuer is liable 
only if there is actual default by the account party. 
Documents in letter of credit Transaction 
The letter of credit invariably specifies the 
documents which the beneficiary has to tender to the 
advising bank in order to avail himself of the benefit 
of the credit • If the documents tendered by him agree 
with those listed by the bank in its advice and agree 
in every respect with the doctrine of strict compliance , 
no problem arises. But if they differ, a discrepancy 
of documents occurs. Such a discrepancy raises difficult 
problems for the bank to which the documents are tendered. 
It has to decide,usually in an extremely short period of 
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tlroc« whether to reject or accept them or to accept 
them under a protective mechanism* Moreover, if the 
advising bank accepts non-confirming documents« 
either because it does not notice the discrepancy or 
because, having noted it, considers it as irrelevant, 
and then passes the documents on but they are rejected 
by the issuing bank or the applicant for the credit, 
serious legal difficulties might ensue. 
Considering that letters of credit have been 
known for more than a hundred years and are a common 
method of payment in international trade, it is asto-
nishing hfflw frequently discrepancy situations arise. 
There are cases in which docxunents tendered by 
the beneficiary do not correspond to the specifications 
in the credit and are therefore irregular but the irre-
gularity may be disregeurded by the bank. First, the 
Uniform Commercial Practice (U.CP.) contains several 
provisions which sanction the acceptance of irregular 
docxunents and these provisions can be invoked by the 
beneficiary, provided that the credit is operated under 
the U.CP, Thus, the credit may require the shipment 
of 100 tons of particular commodity but the beneficiary, 
ships only 97 tons and this figure appears in the 
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Invoice and the bill of lading. If the credit does 
not stipulate that the quantity of goods specified 
must not be reduced, this undershipment is within 
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the tolerance admitted by U.C.P,, consequently the 
bank should accept the documents but reduce the amount 
payable under the credit accordingly. Further the 
credit may expressly prohibit transhipment but the 
tendered documents« which is a bill of lading« contains 
on its reverse a printed clause allowing transhipment, 
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In spite of this printed clause, the u.C.P. authorises 
the bank to pay under the cjredit. This is a very 
sensible provision because, in principle, the bank when 
scrutinising the documents, is not bound to read the 
small print on the reverse of the bill of lading. In 
fact, it can hardly arrive at a decision on the accep-
tance of the documents within a reasonable time if it 
were bound to scrutinise the small print of every bill 
of lading tendered to it. 
Secondly, irregularities relating to commercial 
invoices may cause problems It happens sometimes 
that the description of the goods in the credit and 
in the invoice do not agree literally but that it is 
clear that both descriptions relate to the same goods. 
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This kind of irrelevant variation is totarable under 
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U.C.B* This view is also supported by the following 
statement of Sehaitt Loffi 
"If the tendered documents are 
ambigous« the tender is, in 
principle, a bad tender. But the bank, 
when examining the tendered documents, 
should not insist on the rigid meticulous 
fulfilment of the precise wording in 
all cases* If properly read and under-
stood, the words in the instructions 
and in the tendered document havejkthe 
same meaning, if they correspond 
though not being identical, the bank 
should not reject the documents'31 
Thirdly, the courts consider the irregularity 
to be irrelevant, A typical illustration is Golodetz & 
32 Co, Inc, V, C2arnikow~ Rionda Co, inc. The Galatia, 
This case concerned the sale of sugar from kandia in 
India to Iran, The sale was on terms C and F, an Iranian 
port. In order to perform the contract, the seller 
bought a quantity of sugar frcan the State Corporation 
of India Ltd, This supply contract was P,0,B, Indian 
port, payment by the letter of credit. The buyers in 
the Supply Contract was P,0, B, Indian port, payment 
by the letter of dredit. The buyers in the supply 
Contract ( sellers in the Iranian Contract) opened a 
letter of credit in favour of State Trading Corporation, 
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the goods to be shipped in the Golatia« ^ich was 
to load at Kandia» When the vessel was paxrtly 
loaded fire broke out and a large quantity of the 
sugar already on board was damaged by the fire 
itself and the water used to extinguish it. The 
damaged sugar was discharged and the following note 
was typed on the bill of lading* 
"Cargo covercKl by this bill of 
lading has been discharged 
Kandia view damaged by fire/ 
and/or water used to extinguis;^ 
for general average declared*" 
The bank refused to take up the bill of 
lading on the ground that in view of the above note 
on it was a claused bill. The court of Appeal held 
that the bill was a clean bill because the note on 
it referzred to an event which had occurred after the 
goods were looKled in good order and condition. The 
Court preferred the legal view to the commercial view, 
according to which every bill, which contains a nota-
tion or clausing, is automatically to be regarded as 
a claused bill. The same test has been applied in 
33 
Westpac Banking Corp, v. South Casolina National Bank. 
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Where the discrepancies are relevant, the 
bank has no other option but to reject the documents, 
Hence«i£ the credit is operated under U.C.P., the 
tendered documents must satisfy the conditions laid 
dovm in document. In these cases the U.C.P* sha>uld 
be the bible of the banker. He should consult it 
constantly. Of course, many provisions of U.C»P, begin 
with the words, " unless otherwise stipulated in the 
credit". Consequently the banker, who notices something 
unusual in the mandate in order to ascertain whether 
it covers the deviation from the usual practice. 
It is an obvious and gross discrepancy if the 
credit calls for "Shipped on board", bills of lading is 
only received for shipment". Of course by notation a 
received for shipment can be converted into an 'on board 
bill. But it has to be dated and signed or initialled 
by the carrier or his agent. If the notation is not in 
34 
order the bank is bond to reject the documents. 
The documents should be properly linked 
35 
together. Linkage means that the documents must 
make it plain that they all refer to the same goods. 
The docuJBents must thus indentify the goods. If there 
is an ambiguity, i,e, if some documents may refer to 
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oth«r good8« the tender Is bad and the bank should 
reject ttm documents. In Soprcxna a«P»A. v. MARINE 
SI 
and Animal By-products Corporation^ a case, which 
concerned the sale of Chilean flshfull meal« the 
credit required a bill of lading marked " freight pre 
paid" and an analysis certificate stating that the 
goods had a content of minimtmi 70 percent protein, but 
the tendered documents included a bill of lading marked 
"collect freight" and an analysis certificate showing 
a protein content of 67 percent minimum. The documents 
were rejected as defective by the bank, 
professor Clive M. Schmitthoff's observation 
regarding the discrepancy in letter of credit transac-
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tion is as follows! 
" The bank deals with a vast multitude 
of letter of cre'dit transactions all 
over the world and the decision must 
be rapid. In case of doubt or 
ambiguity the safest course is for 
the bank to reject the docxxments. It 
would be within his rights to do so. 
But one cannot always insist on ones 
rights. Rejection of documents inva-
riably causes difficulty to the bene-
ficiary of the credit. He may be 
valued customer of the bank or a 
businessman of unpeacable reputation 
and good financial standing or the 
discxrepancy of the documents may, in 
the judgment of the bank, be of 
peripheral character. In these 
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circumstancea the bank has to 
perfonn a balancing act* On 
the other hand, it incures a 
risk if it accepts non-oonfirming 
documents. On the other hand, it 
does not want to make unnecessary 
difficulties. Here the bank has 
to take a very difficult decision. 
Things eften look different from 
i^at they appear to be when first 
uncountexred* The possibility 
that later the transaction ia 
examined under the nitfroscope of the 
law cannot be disregarded by the 
bank when making its decision. 
In these difficult cases the bank 
has essentially two possibilities, 
either to reject the documents 2.^_ to 
accept them under a protective mechanism". 
The object of payment against documents before 
goods arrive is to enable the purchaser to deal with 
docujaents representing the goods before the goods them-
selves arrive. To hold that the issuing bank might 
make the purchaser liable on documents which did not 
represent the goods, because at sometime latter the 
goods themselves arrived, seems entirely to defeat the 
commercial objects of the transaction. 
The bank must protect his customer's interest 
as the purchaser of the goods represented by the documents 
and in the absence of specific authority as to documents, 
they must be the usual documents required In the trade 
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and umst; be merchan table« 
To quote Viscount Sumen 
**The documents have to handled by 
banks» they have to be taken upaoi 
or rejected promptly and without 
any opportxmlty for prolonged 
Inquiryf they have to be such as 
can be retendered to sub-purchasers« 
and It Is essential that they 
should so conform to the accustomed 
shipping docvunents as to be rea-
sonably and readily fit to pass 
current In conmerce, 38 
The contract guarantee has, therefore, the 
difficult task of creating a fair equilibrium among 
the legitimate Interests of the parties ( principal, 
beneficial and guarantor ) and of defining the rights 
and obligations of the three parties with precision 
to avoid disputes. Unfortunately these concepts 
have not always been appreciated or applied In practice. 
Lack of experience In certain cases, or abuse by one 
party of Its dominant position in other cases, has 
tended to create Inequitable situations, heading to 
dispute and distrust. This state of affairs Is a 
hlnderence to the development of international commerce, 
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The Uniform Rules Centre the tqulllbrlum on the need 
for appropriate documentation to support a claim. By 
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this means It Is sought to protect the principal 
from liability because of unjustified calls on 
the guarantor by the beneficiary, while both the 
guarantor and the beneficiary know what documenta-
tion must be prepared and presented before there can 
be payment under the guarantee* 
A clear provision on the lines of the Uniform 
41 
Rules* which concerns the doctimentation reqiiired to 
support a claim to prevent alsuse by unscrupulous bene-
ficiary should be inserted in the contract between the 
seller and the buyers. The uniform rules provide that 
evidence of default by the principal is required to 
Justify the honouring of a claim under a contract of 
guarantee. So far, as possible, the guarantor will be 
well advised to require documentation prepared inde-
pendently of the beneficiary, and in a form capable of 
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verification by the guarantee. 
The truth of the matter is that the courts 
decline to be tied to a particular academic principle 
when dealing with the discrepancy of documents. This 
branch of law is too multiform to admit generalisation 
when a problem of discrepancy of documents arises, the 
2S7 
facts of the case are decisive* The scorch for a 
general principle underlying all these cases would 
be fruitless. 
The beneficiary must learn to understand the 
banks point of view. He must realise that the bank 
rejects non conforming documents not for petty bureau-
cratic reasons but because it wishes to avoid personal 
liability. The documents tendered to the bank should 
be standardised, to a large extent, and standardised 
on a global basis. Although discrepancies in documents 
can and should be reduced, it would be unrealistic 
and an idle dream to assiire that they can be eliminated 
entirely. 
Bank/ Performance guarantee 
Bank guarauitee, or properly styled these days 
as performance guarantees by banks, have become a 
Catchwerd in the trade. As a service to their customers, 
banker sometimes issue guarantees and indemnities of 
various types on customer's behalf to third parties. 
Performance guarantees are given to government or 
public bodies on behalf of contractors undertaking 
the payment of penalty ( say, 10% or 20% of the cost 
project), in the event of non-fiilfilment of the contract. 
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The Jaunmu and Kashmir State Financial Corporation 
also gives p«rformance guarantees for loans raised 
by industrial concerns* which are repayble within a 
period not exceeding twenty years and are floated in 
the public market. The corporation also give bank 
guarantee for loans raised by industrial concerns from 
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schedule banks or State co-operative banks. In a 
performance guarantee, bank does not undertake to 
perform the contract itself but will only make good 
the loss suffered by the creditor to the extent of 
amount agreed to in the guarantee. 
Bank guarantees in internal and international 
trade are common features of commercial practice. Tran-
sactions involving financial liabilities of some magni-
tude are now almost invariably accompanied by bank 
guarantees. In India until recently, business on a 
large scale was confined to a few large cities. The 
position has now changed with an accelerated progress 
of development, the variety and magnitude of commercial 
activities have expended. Large scale construction and 
collaboration contracts involving huge financial outlays 
have naturally increased the need of taking guarantees 
from banks, mostly for tenders and performance. 
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The purpose o£ guarantees by banks are many. 
These include performance of a contract^ repayment 
of a loan, repayment of an advance pai^ent made in 
respect of a contract involving the sale goods and 
80r OQ. 
Purpose and Function 
The undoubted value of guarantee on behalf of 
a customer is becoming an increasing practical advantage 
to commerce. In practice the banker who gives the 
guarantee takes from the custcmier what, in fact, is a 
counter indemnity, usually indicating that he is to 
pay on first demand. 
A bank guarantee is an undertaking given by a 
bank, insurance company or other party ( the guarantor ) 
at the request of a tenderer or contractor ( the bene-
ficiary ) whereby the guarantor undertakes that, in 
the event of default by the principal in the performance 
of his obligations, the guarantor shall pay the bene-
ficiary a stated sum of raondy or ( if the contract so 
provides ), the guarantor shall arrange for the per-
formance of the relevant obligations under the tender 
or contract. 
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The mention of 'tsnder ' or 'contxact* needs 
explanation. Bank guarantees may be required 
(1) in connection with the submission of tenders; or 
(ii) they may be required after approval of the tender 
in connection with the performance of the contract. 
This is %rtiy two different lables have come into being -
44 tender gu«ucantee and performance guarantee* 
In the case of a tender guarantee the obligations 
undertaken by the guarantor is to effect that if there 
is a default by the principal in the obligations resulting 
frc«n the sutmission of 'tender, the guarantor shall make 
payment to the beneficiary within the limits of a stated 
sum of money. In the case of a performance guarantee, 
the object is to safe guard the beneficiary from the 
consequences of the failure of the principal to meet 
his obligations under the contract. The international 
Chamber of Commerce in its Uniform Rules for contract 
guarantees defines a performance bond as " an undertaking 
given by a bank whereby the guarantor undertakes in the 
event of default by the principal the due performance 
of the terms of a contract between the principal and the 
beneficiary within the limits of a stated sum of money, 
or, if the guarantee so provided, at the guarantor's 
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option, to arrange for performauice of the contract. 
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Whether a bank guarantee can be enforced or 
not by the benefieiaxy depends on the terms of the 
contract * if the terms and conditions entitle a party 
to ask for payment of money from the bank* then that 
right cannot be interferred with merely for the reasmi 
that there exists a dispute between the party and the 
client at whose instance the bank guarantee has b4ien 
issued is a stranger to the contract of gurantee between 
the bank and the beneficiary. If the language of the 
guarantee entitles the beneficiary to receive payment 
from the bank, the dispute between the initiating party 
and the bank would not be a bar for the beneficiary to 
enforce the guarantee. 
The Suprewne Court of India has drawn a parallel 
between the bank guarantee and letters of credit as 
follows J 
"The rule is well established that a 
bank issuing or confirming a letter 
of credit is not concerned with the 
underlying contract between the 
seller and the buyer. The courts 
usually refraiji from granting injunc-
tion to restrain the performance of 
the contractual obligations arising 
out of a letter of credit or a bank 
guarantee between one bank and tether". 
So observing* the Supreme Court addedt 
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"A bank guarantee Is very much like 
a letter of credit* The Courts 
will do their utmost to enforce it 
according to its terms* They will 
not in the ordinary course of things 
interfere by way of injunction to 
prevent its due implimentation." 46 
Recently the Supreme Court of India in U.P, 
Coop* Federation Ltd. v* Singh Consultants And 
Engineers (P) Ltd* has upheld its earlier decision 
regarding the similarity between letter of credit and 
bank guarantee* The Court observed that it is true 
that the Court dealt with a contract to sell specific 
commodities or a transaction of sale of goods with an 
irrevocable letter of credit. But in modern commercial 
transactions, various devices are used to ensure perfor-
mance by the contracting parties. The traditional 
letter of credit has taken a new meaning. In business 
circles, standby letters of credit are also used. 
Performance bonds and guarantee bonds are also the 
devices increasingly adopted in transactions. The 
Courts have treated such documents as analogous to 
letter of credit* 
To the same effect is the observation of Lord 
Denning M,R, in Edwood Owen Engineering Ltd. v, Barclays 
Bank International Ltd,, It was observed as followst 
27 J 
" All this leads to the conclusion 
that the performance guarantee 
stands on a similar footing to a 
letter of credit* A bank who 
gives a performance guarantee 
must honour that guarantee accor-
ding to its terms* It is not 
concerned in the least with the 
relation between the customer and 
the supplier, nor that the question 
whether the supplier has performed 
his contract obligation or noti nor 
that the question whether the supplier 
is in default or not* The bank must 
pay according to its guarantee* on 
demand if so stipulated, without 
proof or conditions"* 
Pesticides India v* 3.C* and p Corporation of 
49 India* raised the question of performance guarantees 
by bank, particularly in the light of the absolute 
nature of liability of the principal debtor, on whose 
behalf the guarantee was given* Quoting Lord Denning 
50 
M,R* the instant court said, •• it is virtually a 
promissory note payable on demand". According to the 
instant court the unqualified terms of the guarantee 
could not be interferred with by the coiirts, irrespective' 
of the existence or non-existence of the dispute. 
There is a lone decision of the Calcutta High 
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Court, namely, MMTC v, Suraj Shetty, wherein it has 
been held that the distinction between an irrevocable 
letter of credit and a bank guarantee was not merely one of 
27^ 
function* The more important point of this distinction 
was the autonony of an irrevocable letter of credit 
and the dependance of a bank guarantee on a contract 
between the beneficiary of the guarantee and a third 
party. Payment under an irrevocable letter of credit 
did not depend on the performance of obligations on 
the part of the seller except those which the letter 
of credit imposed. Then the obligation was of the 
bank to the beneficiary. No third party came into pic-
ture. In the case of a bank guarantee^ however by defi-
nition the third party was always on the scene,Bnless 
there was some act of omission or commission on the part 
of the third party, payment under a bank guarantee did 
not became due. In other words a bank guarantee did not 
52 
enjoy the autonomy of an irrevocable letter of credit. 
It is submitted with due respect that the above 
decision is not correct in view of the ruling given by 
53 
the Supreme Court, The question whether the under-
taking amounts to a guarantee or a letter of credit 
depends upon the nature of the terms and conditions. 
Where the liability is absolute and unqualified it amounts 
to a letter of credit and where it is conditional and 
qualified it amounts to a guarantee but not a bank 
guarantee. 
Z'ia 
This importation of the English Canmon Law 
by the Indian Courts would be In the Interest of 
development of business transactions unhampered by 
pendency in courts and would avoid underhand tricks 
to which the business parties will resort to, if the 
courts stood in their way* The developnient of the 
theory of perforroance guarantee, however, would 
enrich and grow if the businessmen, particularly the 
creditors, played a healthy role and Ignored flimsy 
and minor contractual irritations In the national 
interest of business climate. 
Professor X«€«Saxena*s observation with respect 
to the bank guarantee is as followst 
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** This case is not a laon-post for 
laissez faire and ignored the 
extent to which absolute discxreation 
could be conferred on a party in 
the teeth of section 29 of the Con-
tract Act and the concept of illusory 
consideration. One must also take note 
of the English and Australian curbing 
legislations, the English unfair 
Terms Act, 1977 and the New South 
Wales Review Contract Act, 1980 
empowering the Courts to amend the cc 
contract at the instance of a party", 
A spate of cases, particularly belonging to 
56 57 
Delhi and Culcutta jurisdictions with an ^}ex deci-
58 
sion which made its debut in 1981 and was reiterated 
I'h. 
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in 1982 and 1987 have brought out tha case law 
to the fore. Although the primary law has been 
settled in its essential aspects, there are matters 
of detail and procedure which still are left at the 
root. The Indian Contract Act, cost in the tradi-
tional mould of the nineteenth century, is barren 
of specific problems and provisions on the subject and 
the cases have been decided on the terms and condi-
tions between the parties which have now assvuned the 
position of standard form contracts. 
Nature of Liability 
Under the systemof bank guarantee, the bank 
binds itself to pay unconditionally and unequivocally 
without protest or demur on failure of performance 
by the principal debtor. The decision of the bene-
ficiary is, under the deed, made final and binding 
on the bank, so that there is an absolute liability 
of the bank to perform its guarantee. 
The bank which has opened a bank guarantee/ 
letter of credit is not concerned with the relation-
ship between the seller and the customer, nor with 
the qfuestion whether the seller had performed its 
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contxacted obligations or not* The machinary and 
the coiniDltment of the bank are on dl££er«nt level. 
The bank muat be allowed to honour Its coinmltinents 
under a letter of credit free from interference by 
the courts* otherwise* trust in international 
coimnerce will be irreperally damaged* The dispute 
as to the sufficiency of the performance between 
the buyer and the seller cannot be the reason for 
withholding the payment under a letter of credit. 
The bank is only required to see whether the event 
has happened on which its obligation to pay has 
arisen. Whether the goods that have been delivered 
are of merchantable quality or not or whether the 
goods are upto the contract or not or whether they 
are of the specified quality or quantity cannot be 
gone into by the bank. Similarly, the question 
whether the goods cavrespond with the description 
is also a question that must be resolved by the 
buyer and the seller in an appropriate proceeding. 
The bank which has given bank guarantee cannot refuse 
to pay where all the terms of the bank guarantee 
h^ve been fulfilled to its satisfaction on the plea 
that the goods are not upto the contract or do not 
2VJ 
correspond with the description. The bank is not 
entitled to with hold payment after its obligation 
to pay has arisen merely because an allegation o£ 
fraud has been made against the seller. It is not 
enough to allege fraud wherever there is a dispute 
95 to quality or quantity of the goods and cannot 
be a ground on which the bank will be entitled to 
refuse payment. The buyer must not only allege but 
clearly establish that the documents that were presentet 
by the beneficiary wejre forged or fraudulent. 
In Vinay Bngineering jf^ Nayveli Lignite Corpo-
61 
ration Ltdy^ theve questions were raised; 
(I) Whether the guarantees executed by the bank in 
favour of the ist* respondent were independent con-
tracts y 
(II) Whether the guarantees were conditional or 
unconditional contracts? 
(III) Whether the 1st respondent had made demand 
on the bank in accordance with the terms and clauses 
of the guarantee? The Madras High Court laid down 
that it is well settled if the bank guarantee is un-
conditional* the bank has no defence when its guarantee 
is sought to be enforce, it is the document of 
27J 
guarantee that has to be scared to ascertain whether 
the guarantee Is conditioned, or otherwise and whether 
it is an autonomous contract by itself. Oidinarily* 
the court shall not grant an injunction restraining 
enforcent save where there is a clear case of fraud 
of which the bank has notice and where the special 
equity was in favour of the beneficiary* 
The above view is also supported by a decision 
given hy Kamataka High Court in Kudrenukh Iron Ore 
go 
Co. Ltd, V. Korula Rubber Co. Pvt, Ltd., wherein it 
has been laid down that in case of a bank guarantee 
it cannot be said that the bank is bound to pay not-
withstanding the fact that an arbitration is pending 
between the parties or dispute is started between 
the parties and notwithstamding the fact that the 
amount of loss has not been as yet calculated,because 
every contract entered into will have to be inter-
preted with reference to the specific terms, phrases 
and words used in it.Sf the bond whatever be its 
nature shows that the bank has undertaken to pay with-
out any demur or contestation on demand, it would be 
an irrevocable or unconditional contract and the bank 
is bound to pay the amount to the person concerned 
28u 
notwithstsmding the fact that the disputes between 
the parties are pending* But on the other hand« 
if the bond which comes up for interpretation before 
the courts does not contain any irrevocable or un-
conditional undertaking and does not contain anything 
to indicate that the payment should be made on demand, 
the Court should insist on compliance with the 
requirements laid down by the bond* 
Recently Sabyasachi Mukharji and Jagannath 
Shetty, JJ, of the Supreme Court of India in U,P, 
Cooperative Federation Ltd» v* Singh Consultants 
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and Engineers (P) Ltd,, have reiterated its view 
regarding bank guarantee and held that the principles 
upon which the bank guarantees could be invoked or 
restrained are well settled* Only in exceptional 
circumstances would the courts interfere with the 
machinery of irrevocable obligations assured by 
banks. In the case of a confirmed perfoirmance gua-
rantee, just as in the case of a confirmed letter of 
credit, the bank was only concerned to ensure that 
the terms of its mandate and confixttation had been 
COTiplied with and was in no way concerned with any 
contractual disputes which might have arisen between 
2S1 
the parties• Therefore, the cornmitments of banks 
must be honoured free from interference by the courts* 
Otherwise« trust in commerce« internal and interna-
tional « would be irreparably damaged, it is only in 
exceptional cases, that is to say^ in case of fraud 
or in cases of irretereivable injustice to be done, 
the courts should interfere. 
The interest of India's foreign trade requires 
that Indian businessmen and financial institutions 
should faithfully and honestly fulfil their coiwnit-
ments. This places greater responsibilities on the 
courts to see that mere technical pleas are not allowed 
to shake the faith of foreign JLmporters in the honesty 
and integrity of Indian export houses and their 
guarantors. Otherwise the foreign custoners may be 
scared of dealing with Indian traders and it may 
cause loss of foreign trade. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
BANK QUARAMTBES AMP INJUNCTIONS 
The function of the Civil Law ia not only 
to lay down or define the rights of the parties but 
to provide for and grant relief when a person is 
prevented from realizing or enjoying his rights or 
when the right has been infringed or in other words, 
when the corresponding duty is not being fulfilled 
or has been violated. The highest form of protection 
which may be expected from or should be aimed by the 
state is to see that no one encroaches upon or inter-
cepts the rights of another. Palling that, the aim 
of the Law should be to give a suitor the very thing 
or nearly equivalent or similar to it as possible 
which is being or has been deprived. 
An injunction is a discretionary r^nedy, and 
for the grant of an injunction we have to refer to the 
provisions of the specific Belief Act and the Code of 
Civil Procedxire, This means that the Courts in India 
have to deal with Injunction not only as an equitable 
relief but as a relief founded on the basis of law 
which embodies the principles of injunction. 
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Lretters of credit are now coming Into wide 
spread use as an effective commercial device. More 
small manufactures and business are engaging in 
international trade« necessitating their use. 
Letters of credit are also becoming more common in 
domestic trade. Most important* however* is the 
dramatic development of performance guarantee/ bank 
guarantee used in both domestic and international 
transactions to guarantee the performance of such 
contractual promises as construction of roads, 
sewers* or buildings* malntainaDce of Sophisticated 
communication* manufacturing* or other facilities 
in foreign countries. The spread of credit into 
nonsale areas* moreover* has just begun. The only 
limits on their use are the creative abilities of 
those who use them. In short* performance guarantees 
are being used in more ways* in more business tran-
sactions* than ever before. The telling proof of 
the broadenced Interest in letter of credit law is 
dramatic Increase in the number of reported cases. 
In the great bulk of these cases the critical Issue 
has been under what circiunstances may an Injunction 
issue restraining a bank from making payment on its 
letter of credit. In other words two questions are 
important in this regard. Firstly* is there any 
29J 
situation in which the bank is under a duty to 
refuse payment when requested to do so by the 
customer? Secondly, if so, when will an injunction 
lie that orders the seller not to draw under the 
credit or the issuing banker not to accept or pay? 
Corresponding to cases in which buyers try 
to take advantage of minor deviations known in 
banking parlance as technicalities, beneficiaries 
occassionally engage in fraudulent practices such 
as falsification of bills of lading or other docu-> 
ments of title. When this comes to the attention 
of the customer or the issuing bank, a thorney legal 
problem is in the making. 
The Courts will only interfere to grant an 
injunction against the beneficiary of the credit pre-
venting him from receiving payment under the credit 
Af a sufficiently grave reason could be shown, namely 
forgery or fraud by the beneficiary or by some one 
for whom he is responsible. 
Fraud will be inferred In circumstances when 
the goods shipped by the beneficiary are of a totally 
different nature from thos contracted for and the 
contract of sale ^s specified in the contract of 
29J 
credit, or the godds shipped contain rubbish. In 
cases of fraud the court will not c^npel the 
Issuing or confirming banH to honour the credit 
because the beneficiary deliberately acts wrongfully 
in seeking to avail himself of the credit when the 
Icnows that he ( or a person for whOTi his respcMMliale) 
has shipped goods which are not those called for by 
the terms of the credit* 
In accordance with customary law, the bank's 
duty to verify and subsequently to accept or pay is 
Independent of failure of consideration in the 
underlying agreement. The issuing banker is, there-
fore, in an unconfortable position, he knows that 
the acceptance or the payment he is going to make, 
although warranted by the law because the documents 
appear on their face to be genuine, will possibly 
cause a loss to his custcxner, especially if the 
transaction is an international one. If a seller is 
willing to risk the consecjuences of a criminal action 
on fraud, it is quite likely that his assets are 
either virtually non exlstant or so well hidden that 
an action in restitution by the distant purchasers 
would result in nothing but an expensive academic 
29; 
victory for the pucchaser. The banker could became 
'technical* himself and pick some deviation, however, 
slight, in order to avoid payment, but, if there is 
compliance on the face of the documents the bank 
would be hard put to make such a claim, especially 
if the drafts and documents were presented by an 
intermediary negotiating bank. 
Since the development of Modern letters of 
credit law in the nineteenth century, courts have 
uniformly held, as a general rule, the issu^ obli-
gation under the letter of credit is independent of 
any defence the customer may have against payment on 
the underlying contract. To this rule there is a 
recognised exception. This exception provides that 
the Courts will give relief if it is established that 
the seller is acting fraudulently in the transaction. 
In Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v, Barclays Bank 
International Ltd, Brown L,J, stated the exception 
as follows I 
"The exception is that where the 
docviments under the credit are 
presented by the beneficiary himself 
and the bank knows when the documents 
are presented that they are forged 
or fraudulent, the bank is entitled 
to refuse payment". 
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Under the Anglo-American Law, the customer 
should be entitled to the Injunctive relief only 
when he could show irreparable damage, for example, 
if he had deposited cash with the issuing bank and 
the bank was in danger of insolvency, but that. 
where the credit was issued merely against the promise 
of the buyer to indemnify the bank, the former can 
in no way control the discretion of the bank in 
paying out its funds under the credit. In sztejn v« 
2 
Henry Schsoder Banking Corporation, the plaintiff 
in New York contracted to purchase a quantity of 
bristles from a supplier in India* Payment under 
the contract was to be effected by an irrevocable 
letter of credit. The letter of credit provides 
that the drafts by the beneficiary for a specified 
portion of the siile price would be paid by the defendant 
bank upon shipment of the merchandise and presenta-
tion of an invoice and bill of lading made out to 
the order of the bank. The letter of credit was 
delivered to the beneficiary by a correspondent of 
the issuing bank in India. Both the bills of lading 
and the invoices described the material shipped 
exactly as required in the credit as bristles. 
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The plaintiff alleged that the beneficiary 
had filled the fifty crates with cow hair and other 
worthless material and rubbish, with the intend of 
simulating the merchandise and defrauding the plain-
tiff then alleged that the beneficiary had drawn a 
draft under the letter of credit to the order of the 
correspondent bank in olndia for collection. The 
correspondent bank presented the draft and dociiments 
to the issuing bank for payment. The plaintiff there-
upon brought an action seeldng that the letter of 
credit be declared void, and asking for an injunction 
to prevent of the drafts. Justice Shientag observed! 
"It would be a most unfortunate inter-
ference with business transactions 
if a bank before honouring drafts 
drawn upon it was obliged or even 
allowed to go behind the doctiments, 
at the request of the buyer, and 
enter into controversies between 
buyers and the seller regarding the 
quality of the merchandise shipped. 
If the buyer and the seller intended 
the bank to do this they could have 
so provided in the letter of credit 
itself, and in the absence of such 
a provision the court will not 
demand or even pennit the bank to 
delay drafts which are proper in 
form". But he further said} 
"this is not a controversy between 
the buyer and seller concerning a 
mere breach of warranty regarding 
the quality of the merchandise. 
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On the present motion, it must 
be assumed that the seller has 
Intentionally failed to ship 
any goods ordered by the buyer. 
In such a situation,where the 
seller*s £raud has been called 
to the bank's attention before 
the drafts and documents have 
been presented for payments» the 
principle of independence of the 
banks' obligation under the letter 
of credit should not be extended 
to protect the unsczupulous seller 
It is true that even though the 
documents ojr forged or fraudulent, 
if the issueing bank has already 
paid the draft before receiving 
notice of the seller's fraud, i£ 
will be piayteeded if it exercised 
reasonable diligence before 
making such payment. 
The restraint which was granted, in 
SJZTezn's case is subject to two impori:ant qualifi-
cations. First^ that the bank which was collecting 
the draft was s^ erely acting as the agent of the seller. 
This point is significant because if the drafts had 
been negotiated to a third party, the court would 
have not restrained payrant. Secondly, the case 
proceeded on the basis that fraud has been established. 
The difficulty which most buyers face in practice 
is establishing that fraud had taken place, Vfhen 
the buyer is merely alleging that the seller has been 
fraudulent* as opposed to actually establishing fraud. 
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the courts are normally cjulte reluctant to interfere. 
Equally, if the drafts drawn under the credit had 
been negotiated to the holder in due course, the 
courts again will not interfere with the payment 
Both these facts were taken into account by Megarry 
3 
J, in Discount Redards v» Barclays Bank, when he 
dismissed the buyer's application to stop the issuing 
and confirming bank from making payment under the 
letter of credit. In this case, the plaintiff, an 
English company, ordered from a French Canpany, 8,625 
gramophone records and 825 oassetters. A confirmed 
irrevocable letter of credit was opened by the buyers 
through the defendant bank. When the goods were 
delivered, the plaintiffs found that only 275 records 
were as oi!"dered and that 75% of the cassetters 
delivered vfere not as ordered. The Inspection of 
the goods was done in the presence of a representative 
of the bank. The plaintiffs instructed the Bank not 
to pay on the ground that the seller had acted fraude-
lently. Counsel referred to Sztejn's case for the 
proposition that where the seller's fraud has been 
called to the bank's attention before the drafts and 
documents have been presented for payment, the 
3o: 
principle of the Independence of the bank's obliga-
tion under the letter of credit aught not to be 
extended to protect the unscrupulous seller* In 
dismissing the application, Megarray J, distinguished 
Szte^n's case on two grounds. First, that Satejn's 
case was dealing with established fraud and secondly 
in that there was an absence of any possible holder 
4 
in due course. He saidt 
" In the present case, there is, 
of course, no established fraud, 
but merely an allegation of 
fraud, I do not say that the 
doctrine of that case is wrong 
or that it is incapable of exten-
sion to cases in which fraud is 
alleged but has not been established, 
provided a sufficient cause is 
made out". 
Adding the usual caution against undue inter-
ference with the bank's payment obligations, 
5 
Megarry J, saidg 
" 1 wouflid be slow to interfere 
with bank*s irrevocable cre-
dits, and Hot least in the 
spare of international banking, 
unless a sufficiently grave 
cause is shown, for intejrventions 
by the Court that are too ready 
or too frequent might gravely 
impair the relliance which, quite 
properly, is placed on such 
credits". 
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The difficulty of establishing actual fraud 
has been one of the causes which has prevented the 
plaintiff from getting an injunction. In United city 
Merchants ( investments) Ltd, v* Boyal Bank of Canada, 
the House of Lords further decided that a plea of 
fraud will only apply If the person applying for 
payment is a pazrty to the fraud. The plaintiff in 
this case agreed to sell to peruvian buyers equipment 
for a glass fibre making plant, Paj^ent was to be by 
way of a letter of credit. The contract of sale 
provided that shipment was to be made on or before 
December 15, 1976, The goods were loaded on boardship 
at Flen±4towe on Deceotiber 15, but the loading agents 
issued a set of bills of lading on December 15, stating 
that the goods were"received for payment". The defen-
dant bank objected to the bills of lading on the ground 
that they were not on board bills of lading. The 
carriers freight brokers then issued a fresh set of 
bills of lading stating that the goods were loaded on 
board ship at London on December 15, The bank again 
refused to pay, this time on the ground that they had 
information which suggests that shipment had not been 
made on the date stated in the bills of lading. In an 
action by the plaintiffs against the bank, the bank 
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conteiided they were under no obligation to pay i£ 
the documenta presented although conforming on 
their face with the credit, nevertheless contain 
seme statements of material facts which were not 
accurate. This contention was rejected by the House 
of Lords on the ground that to accede to it would 
undermine the whole system of financing international 
trade by means of documentary credits. Lord Diplock 
saidt 
•• The exception for fraud on the 
part of the beneficiary seeking 
to avail himself of the credit 
is a clear application of the 
maxim exturpi causa non orifxxr 
actio or, if plain English is to 
be preferred, fraud unravels all". 
The Courts will not allow their 
process to be used by a dishonest 
person to carry out the fraud. The 
instant case ,however, does npt 
fall within the fraud exception". 
In spite of the fact that the Courts have 
expressly acknowledged the existence of the fraud 
exception, they have, however, shown extreme reluc-
tance to apply the rule lest any damage be done to 
the confidence in this system of payment. As in 
the case of Bolivinter Oil S,A, V. Chase Manhattan 
7 
Bank, the court granted an injunction against the 
30o 
beneficiary of the credit of /performance bond but 
left the bank free to honour their obligations if 
they chose to do so* The plaintiff's in this case 
were freight contractors who entered into an agre«nent 
with Homs, an Iranian Company to carry 238 million 
tons of Iranian cnide Oil to Syria, The plaintiffs' 
gave Hone a performance bond for US fi million payable 
at your first request without any other producers 
whatever from your side". There was some delay in 
the performance of this contract and Homes made a 
claim on the plaintiff. The parties entered into 
second freight agreement and it was agreed that the 
performance guarantee would be released upon the 
arrival ofthe cost vessel carrying oil to Syria, The 
plaintiffs agreed to provide Homes with a letter of 
credit for US^ 4,3 million to cover their disputes. 
In spite of the argument Homes made a claim under 
the performance guarantee. The plaintiffs obtained 
injunctions against Homes# the issuing bank and the 
confirming bank« the commercial bank of Syria from 
paying out on the performance guarantee, Staughton j. 
diacharged the injunctions against the issuing and 
confirming bank in a subsequent hearing and the 
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plaintiff*a appealed againat this deciaion. The 
plaintiffs contended that the injunction was sought 
to prevent the beneficiary from profiting from his 
own fraud. The court of Appeal decided that this 
was not a case of established fraud* 
It is clear from the above decisions that 
courts maintain a great and fundamentally important 
separation between the rights of the peurties under 
the underlying contract and the rights of one of them 
under the independent banking contract. 
Whether fraud has been established in any 
given case is a question of fact and closely related 
to this is the question of the burden of proof that 
lies on the plaintiff before a case of fraud is made 
out. The issue was considered by the court of Appeal 
g 
in United Trading Corporation v. Allied Arab Bank. 
The plaintiffs in this case contracted to supply 
Agromark, a state enterprise in Iraq* with eggs, 
chicken* lamb and beef, A total of 19 contracts* 
worth some US ^ 950 million were involved. The plain-
tiffs provided the buyers with a performance guarantee 
of 10% of the total value of the contract. The 
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guarantee payable unconditionally against any claim 
for damages was given hy Rafidian BanX in Iraq on 
behalf of the plaintiffs. The buyers made a claim 
under the performance bond and the plaintiffs sought 
an injunction against the issuing and the confirming 
bank to restrain th«m from paying under the guarantee. 
The plaintiffs contended that the buyers were acting 
fraudulently in that the claims related to contracts 
which had been satisfactorily perfoinmed many years 
before. The court of Appeal was of the view that 
the plaintiffs have established a seriously arguable 
case that fraud Y^ad occiired but on the balance of 
convenience, they would not grant the injunction, 
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Ackner L.J. said. The evidence of fraud must be 
clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to banlcs 
knowledge. The mere assertion or allegation of fraud 
would not be sufficient. The Courts require strong 
corroborative evidence of the allegation, usually in 
the form of contemporary documents, particularly 
those emanating from the buyer. In general, for 
evidence of fraud to be clear, courts would also expect 
the buyer to have been given an apportunity to answer 
the allegation and to have failed to provide any, or 
10 
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any adequate euiswer in circumstanoes where one could 
properly be esqpected* where the Courts consider on 
the material before it the only realistic inference 
is that of a fraud* Then the seller would have made 
out a sufficient case of fraud. 
Commenting on the reluctance of the courts to 
apply the exception in practice, AcJcner L,J« observed! 
"Moreover we would find it an unsatis-
factory position if, having established 
an important exception to what had 
previously been thought an absolute 
rule, the courts in practice were to 
adopt so restrictive approach to the 
evidence reguired as to prevent them-
selves fran intervening were this 
to be the case, in pressive and high 
sounding phrases such as fraud unravels 
all". 
It is well recognised that letter of credit lore 
their economic viability if they are constantly subject 
to delay or uncertainty. Letters of credit work well 
only if payment under theOR . is pranpt and inevitable 
when the beneficiary's documents are in order. C«nmer-
cial law has always recognised the high cost of fraud, 
however, and some courts are justifeably concerned 
that the credit not become a device for perpetrating 
fraud. In cases of fraud, courts have been willing to 
resort to their ecjuity powers to delay payment of the 
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credit unfortunately, courts are not in a position 
to know whether an account party's claim of fraud 
is valid« and sometimes are properly reluctant to 
entertain the fraud defence of an issuer or of an 
account party seeking to enjoin honour of the credit. 
The fraud inquiry entails considerable investigation 
and time, if courts delay honour of credit until 
the parties have litigated the fraud issue, the 
credit will not survive as an efficient cannmercial 
device and will not achieve some of its significant 
commercial functions. Although there is a split of 
authority on the scope of ffaud question, even those 
courts that given the fraud defence broad scope 
acknowledge that the costs of doing so are high. 
Section 5-111(1) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code imposes on the beneficiary of a letter of credit 
a warranty obligation. The statute provides that 
the beneficiary transfer or presentation of a docu-
mentary drafts or demand for payment warrants to all 
interested parties that the necessary conditions of 
the credit have been complied with. 
First, the existence of warranty often gives 
the complaining account party an adequate remedy at 
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law and should deprive him or her of the Equitable 
relief so Often sought at great expense to the letter 
of credit transaction. Second, the warranty gives 
independent significance to the beneficiary's certi* 
ficate common in perforraance guarantee transactions 
and thereby over-comes the impliaation that the 
purpose of the certificate is to give the account 
party/beneficiary a fraud defence to a claim for 
payment under the credit. Third, the warranty relieves 
the account party from sometimes burden some proof 
problems in his or her action for damages against 
beneficiary that has obtained payment under the credit 
with documents that contain latent defects. 
In performance guarantees, the credit commonly 
requires the beneficiary to certify - - i^_ that 
the account party has failed to perform his or her 
executary permission. This is also known as a 
certificate of inspection. A certificate of inspection 
is a document which is issued by some one designated 
euMl by both parties, or by a third party that is 
asked to inspect the goods prior to shipment or at 
the moment of shipment, or whatever is the nature 
of credit. It may be a construction of something,it 
may be, now-a-days drilling equipment or whatever, a 
certificate of inspection is a documents then which 
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says, " I have inspected that which is to be 
inspected under the credit. I hereby render an 
opinion that this is in accordance with that was 
12 
stipulated to be the goods or service to be performed" , 
The requirement of other documents, and particularly 
certificates of analysis, quality, weight and the like, 
is a reasonable precaution for a prudent buyer to take, 
since he may in this way obtain some measure of 
assurance that the merchandise is as ordered. Courts 
unaware of the beneficiary's warranty may be inclined 
to see these certificates as a protection against the 
beneficiary's fraud, under this view the account party 
has insisted on the certificate in order to have a 
fraud defence should the beneficiary present a false 
certificate. This view beccmies all the more compelling 
when the certificate referes to the underlying contract 
by reciting for example, that a sum is due under a 
contract or a lease. In these cases, the courts are 
wont to say that the certificate incorporates the under-
lying contract and opens the letter of credit litiga-
tion to the resolution of underlying contract disputes, 
that is, whether the sxun is in fact due. It is impor-
tant to recognise that the certificate plays an important 
role in the transaction without serving as a vehicle for 
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entering the underlying dispute in the credit 
transaction. It is true that the warranty forces 
the court to look beneath the face of documents but 
the warranty inquiry occures after the credit is paid 
and does not interfere with the proper functioning 
of the credit, 
Cotirts can achieve two desirable results by 
giving full rein to warranty provisions. First, they 
can enhance the remedies for a defrauded account party. 
Second, they can reduce the number of orders restraining 
issuing bank from paying credits. This first result 
puts fraud costs on beneficiaries withoat damaging 
the credit. The second protects the credit device 
from the impredictable costs and delays that equitable 
interference inevitably imposes on credits in general 
By reducing these costs and delays, courts will enhance 
13 
•to the benefit of all industries that use them, 
A ccMiunercial letter of credit is independent 
of the underlying sales contract between the customer 
and the beneficiary. The issuers responsibility:K >to 
honour a draft drawn under the credit is not affected 
by the sellers* breach of warranty concerning the 
quality or the conditions of goods involved. Thus in 
the usual course the issuer must honour the draft for 
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payment that complies with the terms of the relevant 
credit, regardless of whether the goods or dociiments 
conform to the underlying contract. However, where 
the documents or the underlying transaction are 
tainted with the beneficiary's intentional fraud the 
issuer need not honour the draft even though the 
documents comply on their face, A proper definition 
of fraud will necessarily encompass and be limited 
by the recjuirement of scienter, that there be an affir-
mative, knowing misrepresentation of fact or that 
the beneficiary state a fact not having any idea 
about its truth or falsity, and in reckless disregard 
of truth. 
The stand-by letter of credit is useful in 
such transactions precisely because it allows the 
parties to shift the risk of unjustified demand from 
the beneficiary to the custaner. This legitimate 
purpose can best be served by a narrow definition of 
fraud in the transaction. A strict definition of 
fraud in the transaction would ultimately made the 
standby letters of credit more valuable v/here it is 
appropriate and thus preserve its usefulness in commer-
14 
cial transactions. 
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Such a Btand«rd would not destroy the 
coinmercial utility of letters of credit because it 
serves no commercial purpose to provide certainty of 
payment to one who has intentionally deceived other 
parties to a transaction. Nor would such a standard 
make injunctions readily available. Not merely 
fraud be pleaded with particularity, but also the 
four traditional factors Justifying a preliminary 
injunction must be considered, First the probability 
that the plaintiff will eventually succeed on the 
merits; second, the presence of irreparable injury 
to the plaintiff; third, the injury to the defendant 
if the injxinction is granted; and, finally, the 
interest of the public or third parties. 
It is clear that the fraud exception is now 
firmly recognised by the English Courts, in spite of 
this recognition one seases an extreme reluctance by 
the courts to apply it in practice for fear that irre-
porable damage would be done to the system of payment 
that has grown up with the letter of credit. The 
Courts have strived to maintain confidence in this 
system of payment at the expense of a few individuals 
who have entered into inexpedient contracts and this 
is by no means a bad thing. 
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The letter ot credit to-day Is an extremely 
useful and viable financing device« both In the 
sale of goods transaction 
traditional/and In the more recent performance guarantee. 
In the future the letter of credit will become 
Increasingly Important In both International and 
domestic earamercial and business transactions. As 
the letter of credit grows in popularity the principles 
of law applied to th«n- must be more fully elaborated 
if their efficacy is to be maintained, in case of 
letter of credit of international trade requires presen-
tation of documents prepared independently of the 
beneficiary. In the case of performance guarantee 
the documents called for is usually the beneficiary's 
own certificate that the other party to the underlying 
transaction is in default there under an open initiation 
to abuse by the unscrupulous beneficiary. In any events 
instances of fraud involving performance guarantee 
appears ^ to be much ra«er than theoretical fears 
could indicate. Loss of reputation in the interna-
tional community is a severe and immediate sanction 
awaiting a dishonest beneficiary. 
Indian poaltlon 
Vfhether a bank guarantee has become enfor-
ceable or not wiil depend on its terms and the 
language of the letter of demand. In other words. 
In case of bank guarantee or a letter of credit 
the enforceability of such an instrument against 
the bank depends on the terms and conditions of the 
same. In practice, the questions that most frequently 
arise relate to the guarantor's liability. The 
guaranteeing bank is liable for non-performance of 
the underlying contract. This much is elementary 
and flows from the very nature of the contract. But 
in practice there arises questions of enforcement. 
Is the guaranteeing bank entitled to defnahd proof 
of non-performance, or is it bound to comply with 
the guarantee as soon as it is called upon to do so 7 
If the former is the case, then there can possibily 
arise disputes as to non-performance. This is likely 
to drag in the conflict between the Principal and 
the beneficiary in the correspondence between the 
guarantor and the beneficiary. On the other hand, 
if the beneficiary and the bankioat to avAid such 
three dimensional controversy, the guarantee can 
either be made absolute and unconditional or at least 
JIV 
some acceptable mechanism for concrete proof of non-
performance may be laid down in the contract of 
guarantee. 
The same principles of Law which have been 
adhered to and accepted by the courts in England and 
the United States have been adopted and adhered to 
by the courts in India as well. In Ten Maco Ltd, v, 
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State Bank of India and others^ it was held that the 
bank must pay according to its guarantee, on demand, if 
so stipulated, without proof or conditions. The only 
exception is when there is a clear fraud of which 
the *tbank has notice. The facts of the case wh«=»re that 
at the request of the Pet|:tdkoner company the respondent 
bank had given an irrevocable and unconditional 
performance guarantee in favour of the State Trading 
Corporation of India Ltd, ( S,T,C, ) which provided 
interalia that in the event of the company's failure 
to fulfil their contractual obligations the bank shall 
pay to S,T,C, on its first demand the guarantee amount 
without any contestation, demur or pro-test and/or 
without amy reference to the ccmipany and /or without 
questioning the legal relationship subsisting between 
S,T,C, and Texrmaco, The guarantee was later invoked 
by the S,T,C, and asked the bank for full payment. 
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the petitioner company there upon filed a suit. 
A question, therefore« arose whether the Textnaco 
was entitled to the Injunction as asked for, res-
training the bank from making any payment to the 
S,T»C, In pursuance of the performance guarantee. 
The Court said that In the absence of any 
special equities and the absence of any clear fraud, 
the bank must pay on demand, if so stipulated and 
whether the terms are such must have to be found out 
from the performance guarantee as such* Though the 
guarantee was given for the performance by Te^^aco 
In an orderly manner their contractual obligation was 
taken by the bank to repay the amount on first demand 
and without contestation, demur or protest as without 
reference to Te^^aco and without question the legal 
relationship subsisting between S.T.c. and Termaco. 
The performance guarantee fxorther provided that the 
decision of S.T.C. as to the liability of the bank 
under the guarantee shall be final and binding on the 
bank. It has further stipulated that the bank should 
forthwith pay the amount due " notwithstanding any 
dispute between S.T.C. and Texmaco." In that context 
the moment a demand is without protest and contestation 
the bank is obliged to payirrespectlve of any dlsjmte 
as to whether there has been performance In an 
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orderly maaner of the contractual obligation by 
the party. There was no question here of any fraud or 
equity entitling Tcamaco to an injunction. 
Another case on the subject is National Oils 
and Chemical Industrie3« Delhi v, Punjab and Said Bank 
n 
Ltd.J Delhi. In this case it was contended that a 
confijnmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between 
the banker and the vendor of the Qoods^ which imposes 
on the bank an absolute obligation to pay irrespective 
of any dispute which there may be between the parties 
and it would be wrong for the courts to interfere with 
that established practice by granting and in confirming 
the injunction, because an eleborate coramercial system 
has been built upon on the footing that the bankerts 
confirmed credit raises an rassurance that nothing 
will prevent the vendor from receiving the price, that 
the character-istlc feature of the irrevocable credit 
own 
is its/independence of the contract for sale and of 
contract between the banker and the buyer and that ano-
^^®^ important feature is the duty of strict compliance 
being a mechanism of great* importance in international 
trade, interference with which is bound to have serious 
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repercussions on the international trade in the 
country and that the letter of credit being the life 
blood of international commerce and except possibly 
in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have notice, 
the courts ought to leave the merchants to settle 
their disputes under the Contract by litigation and 
arbitration available them as stipulated in the 
contracts, the courts being not concerned with the 
difficulties of the merchants to enforce their claims 
because these are the risks which the merchants take* 
In case there are serious allegations of fraud 
on prima facie examination of the said allegations in 
the light of the averments of the parties, the matter 
cannot be allowed to rest at that and deserves to be 
fully probed and determined. In such a case the 
principle of Independence of bank's obligation under 
the letter of credit is not to be extended to protect 
the unscrupulous seller. 
Pesticides India v, S«C^ and p. Corporation 
of India, raised the question of performance guarantees 
by banks, particularly in the light of the absolute 
nature of liability: of the principal debtor on whose 
behalf the guarantee was given. In the instant case 
J2'^ 
the £act8 were* 
W« the Statui Bank o£ Bikaner and Jaipur, 
Udalpur bind ourselves xincondltlonally and Irrevocably 
guarantee and undertake that in the event of any 
default/ failure on the part of the Actual user/ Allottee 
to observe all or any of the conditions prescribed/ 
to be prescribed by you. We shall on your first 
demand without protest or demur and without reference 
to the Actual user/Allottee and notwithstanding any 
contestation by actual user/Allottee or existence of 
any dispute whatsoever between you and the Actual user/ 
Allottee pay forth with to you that you may deanand. 
It was held that the bank was bound to pay on 
the first demand without any contestation by the 
Pesticides India, the principal debtor. Thus according 
to the Court the unqualified terms of the guaranttee 
could not be interfered with by the courts, irrespec-
tive of the existence of the dispute. 
The above has been supported bv the Supreme 
Court in Centeen (India) Ltd. v. Vlnmor/lnc. The point 
before the Suprane Couri; was whether in view of its 
earlier decision in United Cooanercial Bank v. Bank of 
20 
India* it could interfere to grant Injunction for th 
Enforcement of the bank gueurantee. The sellers, a 
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Singapore oonoern, agreed to sell high density 
polythene to the buyer^ em Indian Company^ Canteix 
(India) Ltd. on the basis of an irrevocable letter 
of credit in favour of the former. The buyer complied 
with the condition. The seller failed to forward, 
through bank, the original bills of lading, marine 
insurance policy, signed invoices etc, to enable the 
buyer to take the delivery of goods. The buyer 
secured bank guarantees In favour of the shipping 
Company, where-after the latter released the goods 
to the buyer without furnishing to it the above 
documents. The buyer receive the goods, sold them 
and realised the sale proceeds* But no amount was 
paid to the seller. The buyer brought a suit for res-
training the bank from paying the money on the alleged 
ground of inferiols quality of goods. The Supreme Court 
held that the balance of convenience was that the 
injunction should not be granted. Affirming the deci-
sion of the High Court the Supreme Court held that 
commitments of banks must be allowed to be honoured 
free from interference by the courts, otherwise, trust 
in international ccxnmerce would be irreparably damaged. 
The courts usually r«frain from granting 
injunction to restrain the performance of the contractual 
liZ. 
obligations arising out o£ a letter o£ cjredlt or 
bank guarantee between ane bank and another. If 
temporary Injunctloas were to be granted In a tran-
saction between a bank and a banker, restraining a 
bank fvon recalling the amoiint due when payment Ip 
made under reserve to another bank or In terms of 
the letter of credit executed by lt« the whole banking 
system In the country would fall. In view of the 
Banker's obligation under an Irrevocable letter of 
credit his buyer customer cannot Instruct him not to 
In the following cases the enforcement of bank 
guarantee as a qpilck mode of recovery of sums due under 
the printed terms of the contract has been considered 
and the law Is almost settled. 
In National Project Constinictlon Corporation 
22 Ltd. V. M/s G. Ranjan^ the bank guaranteed the recovery 
of the sumof te, 3,50«000 by the petitioner,corporation. 
The bank guarantee provided If the said contractor faljs 
to utilise the said advance for the purpose of contract 
we the Bank of Baroda, hereby unconditionally and Irre-
vocably undertake to pay the corporation on demand and 
without demur and any claim made by the corporation on 
:i2 
us for the loss or damage caused to or suffered by 
reason of the corporation not being able to recover 
In full the said sunt* 
The trial court Issued an Injunction res-
training the corporation from enforcement of the bank 
guarantee. The Calcutta High Court allowed the 
revision application and set aside the order of 
injunction. The Court cited with approval the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in MSEB Bombay v» Official 
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Liquidator^ The Cotxrt held thusi 
** The petitioner is entitled to fall 
back upon the bank guarantee when 
the balance sum had not been paid 
petitioner's right to realize that 
balance is not dependent upon adjudica-
tion of the dispute to arbitration* 
To this extent^ the bank guarantee 
can very well be enforced on its own terms," 
The law is thus settled that extraneous claims 
and counter claims do not injunct the enforcement 
of the bank guarantee. The enforcement depends upon 
its terms and conditions. 
In a recent case D»T»H, Construction (P) Ltd,, v, 
24 
Steel Authority of India,,# the Calcutta High 
Court refused to issue an injunction restraining the 
J :id 
enforcement of bank guarantee. The contract In the 
Inatant case was for dredging and deepening a reservlor 
and the plaintiff received from the defendant No«l 
Rs, 30 lakhs for bringing machinery for the work, A 
survey revealed that the reservoir could neither be 
dredged nor deepened because of the brlck« railway 
tracks and rocks under neath. The judge did not accept 
the Contention of the bank that under section 56 the 
guarantee was rendered void an account of Impossibility 
of performance. The Judge observed: 
Even If the main contract between 
the plaintiff and defendant No.l 
was entered Into by the plaintiff 
on account of lackof knowledge of 
certain facts by the defendant No,l 
or even because of misrepresentation 
made by defendant No, 1, the bank co\ild 
have no say In the matter. This Is 
now %rell established by several 
decisions of this ootirt as well as 
the Supreme Coxirt and of the English 
Courts, 25 
The decision correctly follows the judicial 
preeedctata and Is grounded on the theory that the 
contract between bank and defendant No,l was Independent 
26 
of the Contract between the plaintiff an6 defendant No,l 
Again, In United CCTtimerclal Bank v, Hanuman~ 
27 
Synthetlces Ltd,, the latter agreed to buy from a 
323 
Singapore concern specified quantity of vis core 
staple fibre. The purchasers opened an irrevocable 
letter of aredit at the Central Bank of India in favour 
of the seller. The United Commercial Bank Singapore, 
paid the amount ag2Li.n8t the documents for the goods 
shipped and forwarded them to Central Bank of India, 
Bombay* The united Commercial Bank refunded the amount 
on arrival, the customs authorities declared that the 
imported stuff was not vis core but polyester fibre. 
The purchasers asked its bank to repudiate its liability 
and sought a perpetual injunction against it from 
making any payment or giving credit to the seller an^er 
the irrevocable letter of credit. The Court held that 
except possibly in clear caMe of fraud of which the 
banks have notice, the courts will leave the merchants 
to settle their disputes under the contracts by liti-
gation or arbitration as available to them or stipulated 
in the contract. 
If the bank guarantees are unconditional the 
bank has no defence when its guarantee is sought to be 
enforced. It iai :th« document of guarantee that has to be 
scanned to ascertain whether the guarantee is conditional 
or otherwise and whether it is an autonomous contract by 
itself. Only in case of a clear fraud of which the 
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bank haa notice and where the special equity was 
in favour of the beneficiary - the courts may grant 
an injunction restraining enforcement of bank 
28 guarantee* 
Recently Sabyasachi Mukharji and Jagannatha 
Shetty, JJ, of Supreme Court have considered the 
various Supreme Court and High Courts cases in U»P. 
Co«>operative Federation Ltd, v» Singh Consultants and 
29 
Bngineers (P) Ltd, The Court heldi 
The principles upon which bank guarantees 
could be invoked or restrained are well settled, only 
in exceptional circumstances would the courts interfere 
with the machinery of irrevocable obligations assured 
by the banks. In the case of a confined performance 
guarantee^ Just as in the case of a confined letter of 
credit, the bank is only concerned to ensure that the 
terms of its mandate and confizitnation had been complied 
with and is in no way concerned with any contractual 
disputes which might have arisen between the parties. 
Therefore the commitments of banks must be honoured 
free from interference by the courts, otherwise trust 
in commerce* internal and international, would be irre-
porably damaged. It is only in exceptional cases of 
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fraud or in cases of irretrievable injustice to be 
done* the courts should interfere. 
The facts of the instant case were that the 
appellant, a State Government enterprise, on May 17, 
1983 entarttd into a contract, a private limited 
company for the supply and installation of a vanaspati 
manufacturing plant at Hardeecharu in the District 
of Nainital. The contract bond contemplated guaranteed 
performance of work at various stages in accordance 
with schedule prescribed therein and provided for 
completion and commissioning of the plant after due 
trial run by the May 15, 1984, 
Two bank guarantees were executed by the 
Bank of India, Ghaziabad, and the bank guarantee 
provided, inter alia as followsi 
Now, therefore, the Bank hereby guarantees 
to make unconditional payments of Rs, 16,5 lacs to the 
Federation on demand at its office at Lucknow without 
any further question or reference to the on the seller's 
failure to fulfil the terms of the sale on the following 
terms and conditionsi 
(A) The sole judge for deciding whether the seller 
has failed to fulfil the terms of the sale, shall be 
the PCB. 
a2j 
(B) This guarantee ahull be valid upto twelve 
months from the date of is8ue«i,e« upto June 24,1984« 
(C) Claims, if any, must reach the bank in 
writing on or before expiry date of this guarantee 
after which the bank will no longer be liable to make 
payment to PCF. 
(D) Bank's liability under this guarantee 
deed is limited to 16,5 lacs ( Rupees sixteen lacs 
fifty thousand only )« 
(£} This guarantee shall not be revoked by the 
bank in any case before the expiry of its date without 
written permission of the Federation, 
And whereas to secure the said advance, the 
seller requested the bank to fxirnish a Bank guarantee 
of the said amount of Rs. 33 lacs ( Rupees thirty three 
lacs) in favour of the PCF and the bank accepted the 
said request and agreed to issue the required bank 
guarantee in favour of the Federation, 
Now, therefore, in consideration of the 
aforesaid advance of the said sum of Rs, 33 lacs (Rupees 
thirty three iacs) to be paid by the PCF to the seller 
as aforesaid the bank hereby agrees and guarantees to 
make unconditionally immediate payment to the Federation 
at its office at Lucknow of the sum or any part thereof. 
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as the case may be, due to PCF from the seller 
at any time on receipt of the notice of demand 
without any question or reference to the PCF or to 
the seller on the seller's failure to fulfil the 
terms of the said advance. 
In the instant case, injunction was sought 
against the bank and not against the respondents, it 
was held by the Supreme Court that the net effect of 
injunction was to restrain the Bank from performing 
bank guarantee. That could not be done.one cannot 
indirectly do what one is not free to do directly. 
But a mal ~ treated man in such circumstances is not 
remedyless. The respondent was not to suffer any 
injustice which was irretrievable» The respondent 
could sue the appellant for damages. This is not a 
case where an injunction can be granted. Irrevocable 
ccxnmitment either in the form of confirmed bank 
guarantee or irrevocable letter of credit cannot be 
interfered with except in the case of question of 
apprehension of irjretrievable injustice , This is a 
well settled principle of law in England, This is 
also a well settled principle of law in India, 
33x 
Each case has to be examined In the light 
of the followingI 
(1) Whether demands for enforcing the bank 
guarantees has been made strictly In accordance 
with the terms of the document concerned; or 
(2) Whether there is any allegation of fraud 
against the beneficiary of which the bank has 
notice; or 
(3) Whether there is any special equity arising 
out of the peurticular situation of the case giving 
rise to a strong prima facie arguable case against 
enforcement of the bank guarantee or not. This test 
was applied in f^ /s Banerjee and Banerjee v, Hindustan 
Steel Works Construction Ltd, in the instant case 
the bank guarantees were g]bren pursuant to the express 
terms of the contract entered into between the peti-
tioner, a principal debtor and the respondent No.l, 
a beneficiary, a company for constjruction of works in 
the Super power Thermal project. Out of the seven 
bank guarantees, two were in lieu of security deposit 
and five were for securing mobilisation advance by 
the respondent No.l to the petitioner under the terms 
of guarantees^ for enforcement of the guarantees the 
respondent No,l had to make a written demand stating 
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that the petitioner has coramitteed breach of any 
terms of the contract and the extent and the 
quantum of JLOSS or damage suffered or to be suffered 
by the respondent No.l as a result thereof. The 
decision of the respondent No«l regarding the quantum 
of damage was not to be questioned or challanged by 
the banks or fulfilment of these tvro conditions, the 
bank was bound to release the guaranteed amount. 
However the respondent No.l while seeking the enforce-
ment of the bank guarantees failed to discharge its 
duty as the sole Judge to quantify the damages and 
to mention the extent of recoveries made by it although 
it was within its special knowledge. Although a 
large amount was recovered by the respondent No.l 
there was no whisper about the same in the demand 
letters. 
It was held that by suppressing the material 
fact from the bank the respondent No, 1 attempted to 
recover the entire sum under the seven guarantees and 
the suppression of such material fact in the demand 
letters have given rise to a special equity in favour 
of the petitioner to stop payment by the bank on the 
basis of these demand letters. Although in the 
33o 
petition, there was no allegation of fraud, the 
said wilful flase representation by the beneficiary 
that the entire guaranteed amount has become due and 
payable by suppressing the facts of recoveries 
already made, was a factor, which must be treated 
on the same footing as fraud giving rise to a 
special equity and must be treated as an exception 
to the general rule that the court should not Inter-
fere In these matters. 
Similarly in Jute .^^ corporation of India v# 
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M/s Konark Jute Ltd,, the principal had given two 
bank guarantees to the purchasing agent. The principal 
sought to restrain the purchasing agent of Jute from 
enforcing the bank guarantee and restrain the banks 
from making payment thereof. The Court found that 
the balance of convenience was in favour of the 
principal. It was held that in the peculiar circum-
stances of the case, the receipt of the money on bank 
guarantee would ruin of the principal which cannot be 
repaired. The balance of convenience in such a situa-
tion would be in favour of the principal. 
The Court also wanted to protect the business 
of the agent so that the ends of Justice were not 
defeated. It, therefore, held that this could be best 
,} d -i 
done in case the principal securiBd the commercial 
rate of interest on the amount on both the bank 
guarantees £or six months to the satisfaction of 
the trial court. 
In M,S,J,R» Enterprises v« M/s State Trading 
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Corpn, of India Ltd,, the bank guarantee provided 
that the bank hereby unconditionally and irrevocably 
guarantee that if the Agents fall to perform any of 
th^i^obligatlons contained in the contract dated 
10,9.1982 including any amendments or modifications 
to the aforesaid contract dated 10,9,1982 made between 
the Agents and STC, The bank shall pay forthwith to 
the STC such amount or amounts as the bank may be called 
upon to pay subject to the mauclmum of Rs, 10 lakhs pro-
vided -that the guarantee herein furnished shall be 
released and discharged after the expiry of 30 days 
from the day of the shipment of the I'ost lot of goods, 
in respect of the export contracts between the STC and 
the foreign buyers. 
It has been held that since prima facie the 
guarantee stood discharged and although no element of 
fraud existed yet the guarantee having been Invoked 
after it had prima facie esqpired. It was a fit case 
d:i 
that during the pendency of the suit the injunc^on 
was granted restraining the corporation frcxn realising 
the amount o£ the bank guarantee. 
Although the courts are not concerned with 
the underlying contract on the basis of which the 
bank guarantee have been given. Yet the situation 
may arise where the underlying contract was not 
concluded one. In such a case the cjuestion is v Can 
there be enforcement of the bank guarantee or not? 
The Bombay High Court in Kirtoskar Pneumatic Co,Ltd»v, 
N,T»P, Corpn. Ltd, it was held that there was no 
contract between the parties to keep to bid alive 
that the bid could be revoked before the acceptance 
or the appellant have done, that the respondents did 
not act to their detriment relying on the bid of the 
appellants, the bid guarantee couM only be invoked 
if the contract were to be awarded to the appellant•s 
and they had failed to pay the amount or to perform 
their part which stage never arose. The respondents 
could not invoke the bid guarantee in terms of the 
contract and hence a clear prima facie case exists, 
where in an injunction can be issued whereby the bank 
is restrained by making the payment. The court 
ri * 
J 3 
further held that the balance of convenience also 
Is clearly in favour of the appellants because even 
are 
if the above findings/ found to be wrong all that 
would happen is that at the end of the litigation Appea-
lants would be able to recover the amount of the 
bid guarantee or such other sum as may be determined 
by the Court, It is nobody's case that the appellant's 
are not solvent to the extent of bid guarantee and 
hence all the conditions of Issuance of temporary 
injunction are satisfied. 
In M/s Synthetic Foams Ltd. v, aimplex C»P« 
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(India) Pvt, Ltd», the facts were that the completion 
of the contract by the plaintiff has been withheld 
not due to any default of the plaintiff but due to 
the intervening fire which has taken place at the site. 
There is nothing to suggest that the plaintiff has 
committed any default in the performance of the contract 
or any breach of the terms of the order, where as the 
peirusal of letter filed by the plaintiffs shows that 
the guarantee was sought to be invoked by the defendant 
No, 1 on the ground that the plaintiff have not fulfilled 
the obligation contained in the terms and the conditions 
of the order, which is misrepresentation of facts. 
secondly, the contract has been cancelled by the 
defendant No, 1 due to technical reasons and also 
due to Increase in prices rather than due to any 
fault of the plaintiff. 
The bank guarantee was as follows: 
••we, Indian overseas Bank hereby 
agree and undertake that if in 
your opinion any default is made 
by M/s Synthetic Foams Ltd, in 
performing any of the terms and/or 
conditions of the order or if in 
your opinion they commit any breach 
of the order or there is any demand 
by you against ^^ /s Synthetic Foams 
Ltd, then on notice to us by you, 
we shall on demand and without demur 
and without reference to M/s Synthetic 
Foams Ltd, immediately pay to you, in 
any manner in which you may direct, 
the said amount of Rs, 1,00,000/-
(Rupeea one lakh only ) or such portion 
thereof as may be demanded by you not 
exceeding the said seen and as you may 
from time to time require . •• 
The courts ?Iown where there are allegations of 
misrepresentation or suppression of material facts or 
violation of the terms of guarantee, the courts would 
not hesitate in granting an injunction. In this content, 
misrepresentation or suppression of material facts or 
violation of the terms of the guarantee can be treated 
as a species of the same genus as fraud. What is 
necessary that there exists special equity in favour of 
li'S 
the pl«dntlff to grant of injunction. No doubt an 
obligation of a bank under the bank guarantee is' 
absolute^ but such an absolute obligation arises 
only if the conditions of the bond are satisfied 
and if the demand made on the bank is in strict accord 
with its terms and there is no element of fraud, 
misrepresentation or suppression of material facts 
involved but where there are allegations of fraud, 
misrepresentation or suppression of facts made by the 
party against the beneficieiry and there is prima facie 
evidence to suggest that there is some truth in these 
allegations then there would possibly be no absolute 
bar against the courts from granting an injunction 
restraining the bank fran making payment on the basis 
of the bank guarantee* Similetr would be the position 
where the dememd made by the beneficiary is in violation 
of the conditions of the bond or is not in strict 
accord with its terms keeping in view the nature of 
obligation of the bank the terms of the bank guarantee 
would have to be strictly construed in such cases. 
Accordingly in the instant case an injunction was 
granted restraining the defendants from enforcing the 
bank guarantee. 
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By enunciating the general principle of non-
interference by the courts in respectof the bank 
guarantee and letter of credit^ the courts only 
Intended that the International trade and commerce 
should function smoothly without interference from 
court. At the same time, the courts expected that 
the merchants and traders in international trade and 
ccwnmerce will honour their respective ccxnmitments 
and the business honesty would be maintained. By 
the theory of non-interference in cases of letters 
of cxredit and bank guarantees, certainly the courts 
did not intend that international trade and commerce 
should flourish by adopting dishonest unscmpulous 
practice. These trade practices and the commitments 
by the banks are treated on a different level by the 
courts and are allowed to function without interference 
frcxn courts only with the view that the trust in inter-
national com/nerce is not damaged in any way and not 
for encouraging malafide activities of unscrupulous 
traders. If so, fraud or the special equity arising 
out of the peculiar situation of the case could not 
have been made exceptions to the general principles 
of non-interference by courts. 
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CHAPTER - VIII 
CONTRACT OF GUARANTEE AND FREEDOM 
TO CONTRACT OUT 
4 i ^ 
The bankers as a part of their business 
execute guarantees favouring the third parties on 
behalf of their constituents. These guarantees aire 
called generally "bank guarantees". These guarantees 
so executed may be either a performance guarantee or 
a financial guarantee* Performance guarantees are 
given for the due performance of obligations under 
a contract by the one on whose behalf the guarantee 
is issued while as the financial one is issued in lieu 
of any deposit of money to be made by such person. 
It is a settled principle of law that the guarantor's 
liability is co-extensive with that of the principal 
debtor, it is secondary, arising only out of a default 
by the principal debtor. The surety occupies a 
privileged position in law. He can claim to be dis-
charged by certain commissions and omissions on the 
part of the creditor. 
The bank strengthens its own position by the 
Insertion in the guarantee of various clauses whereby 
the guarantor renounces his statutory rights. These 
days standard bank guarantee forms are so comprehensively 
worded that the guarantee is made to contract 
out many of his normal legal rights. These standard 
bank guarantee forms contain all types of exclusion 
clauses. A standard bank guarantee form may be 
explained as one wherein all or any of the contractual 
terms have been fixed in advance by, or on behalf of 
the creditor. It is not possible for a private 
person to settle the terms of his agreement with a 
powerful corporation. The question, however, is 
crucial one. It needs to be determined as to how a 
party can surrender his legal rights, enshrined in 
statutory provisions, unless those are made subject 
to a contract to the contrary or in accordance with 
the policy of the Indian Contract Act, 
It is the usual practice with banks to incor-
porate in all the guarantees issued by them a clause 
stipulating the expiry of the date of the guarantee. 
Further at the end of the guarantee, they incorporate 
a clause called •limitation clause' which read in 
either of the two forms: 
(i) Unless a demand or claim under this guarantee 
is made in writing on or before the (specified date), 
We shall be discharged from all the liability under 
this guarantee thereafter. 
.ViJ 
(il) Unless a suit or action to enforce the claim 
under this guarantee is made on us in writing on or 
before ( specified date }. We shall be discharged 
under the guarantee thereunder. 
1 
In State of Maharashtra v, Dr, M«N. Kaul, 
the Supreme Court dealing with limitation clause in 
the guarantee held that the cordinal rule is that 
the guarantor must not be held liable beyond the 
teirms of the agreement. The contention that is inva-
riably raised to meet defence the limitation is that 
the 'limitation clause' inserted in the guarantee 
deed is violative of the provisions of the Act, It 
is contended that it is not within the conpetence of 
the parties to consent or contract so as to alter 
either the statutory period of limitation or the 
statutory starting point of limitation. The time,within 
which rights may be enforced, being period fixed by 
the statute, it is not open to the parties by agree-
ment to alter such time, or to waive and contract 
themselves out of the operation of the statute, limi-
tation being a matter of public policy^ consent or 
waiver is not allowed to defeat it. 
34 
No doubt under section 28 of the Indian 
2 
Contract Act, ayreaments whidh provide shorter period 
o£ limitation them the one prescribed by the law are 
void, the reason being that such an agreement will 
absolutely restrict the parties frcxn enforcing 
their rights after the expiry of the stipulated 
period, though it may be within the period of limi-
tation. But these agreements must be distinguished 
frc»n those which do not limit the time within which 
a party may enforce his rights, but which provide 
for a release or for feiture of rights if no suit is 
brought or no claim is made within the stipulated 
3 
period. The Bombay High Court keeping this dis-
tinction in mind had upheld a clause in a policy of 
insurance which provided, 
"If a claim be made and rejected 
and an action or suit be not 
commenced within three months 
after such rejection...all 
benefits under the policy shall 
be forfeited"• 
The clause was upheld on the ground that it 
operated as a release or forfeiture of the rights of 
the assured if the condition was not complied with and 
a suit could not be maintained on such a policy 
34; 
after the expiry of three months from the date of 
rejection of the plaintiff's claim. Similarly, a 
clause that the company shall not be liable If a 
suit was not brought within 12 months after the 
occurrence of the loss was upheld as not violative 
4 
of section 28 of the Contract Act, Construing a 
similar clause In Government contract providing that 
the president of India shall be discharged frcan all 
liability under the contract unless an arbitration 
or suit is commenced within six months fran the 
expiration of the period, Jammu and Kashmir High Court 
5 
held in Prithvi Nath Malla v. Union of India,as follows: 
"The distinction may be fine one but 
it is nevertheless a fundamental 
distinction. The arrangement in 
the one case takes it for granted 
that the right as well as the 
liability exists but the time for 
enforcing it is sought to be 
limited. While in the other ^^^^ 
the parties agree that the right 
as well as the liability shall 
stand extinguished, if a specified 
event occurs". 
This view was upheld by the Supreme Court in 
no uncertain terms. Their lordships of the Supreme 
6 
Court pointed out that an attempt should be made to 
enforce the guarantee within the period agreed to 
between the parties and it is impossible to ignore the 
time limit which is an integral part of the contract. 
J4 i ^ 
The aame principles that are applic«Ut3le to 
the limitation clause in the insurance policies 
would equally apply to similar clauses in the "bank 
guarantees". If a party in whose favour the bank 
guarantee is executed agrees for curtailment of the 
period and limits his rights to enforce within a 
particular time, he is bound by the same although 
under law he Is entitled to a larger period of limi-
tation. This view is not also against the law of 
limitation on the ground that the purpose of the 
limitation Act is that the suits are instituted well 
within a period specified so that it is easy to prove 
the case* 
A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court had 
an occasion to consider the 'limitation clause' in a 
bank guarantee in Kerala Electrical and Allied Engineering 
Co« Ltd, V, C^nara Bank, In this case the third 
defendant, the proprietor of a unit, entered into a 
contract with the plaintiff company for purchase of 39 
motors and offered a bank guarantee of the first 
defendant bank; duly signed by its Manager, the second 
defendant, for a sxim of rupees 15,000 when part of the 
bills were not paid, the plaintiff had invoked the 
34 
guarantee and later filed the suit for its recovery. 
The main contention of the bank was that no claim 
could be made under the bank guarantee as the plain-
tiff lost his rights under the said guarantee as he 
did not institute the suit within a period of six 
months frc»n the date of the expiry of the period of 
guarantee. The trial court found that since the suit 
was -filed after one year and six mcbnths from the date 
of expiry of the bank guarantee, the plaintiff lost 
all rights under it and hence could not enforce the 
claim against the first and the second defendants. 
The trial court, however, found the third defendant 
liable. It is the above Judgment and decision of the 
trial court that were challenged by the plaintiff in 
this appeal. Clause 6 of the bank guarantee dated 16th 
Jan, 1970 read as followst 
" This guarantee will remain in force 
for a period of one year from the 
date hereof and unless a suit^ or 
action to enforce claim under* the 
guarantee is filed against us within 
six months from the date of expiry 
of ( the guarantee), all your rights 
under the said guarantee shall be 
relieved and discharged from all 
liability thereunder". 
The learned Judges of the High Court upheld the 
validity of the ^imitation clause in the guarantee deed. 
3 b./ 
A condition in a contract that the rights 
thereunder accruing to a party will be forfeited 
or released if he does not sue within a time 
limit specified therein will not offend section 28. 
This is because* as per the contract itself, the 
rights accrued to the party cease to exist by the 
expiry of the limited period provided for in the 
contract. In such a case, in effect, there is no 
limiting of time to sue so, an agreement which 
provides for a simultaneous relinquishment of rights 
occured and the remedy to sue for them will not be 
hit by section 28. But at the same time an agreement 
relinquishing the remedy only, by providing that if 
a suit is to be filed that should be filed within a 
time, the time limit being shorter than the period 
of limitation under the limitation Act* 1963 will be 
hit by section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 
Therefore, it is open to any two parties to 
agree that the promisor would only be liable if he is 
informed of the indemnification within the stipulated 
period and there seems to be a great deal of sense in 
it. Lapse of time may result in all kinds of claims 
which are not capable of determination. With any 
account of exactitude and when memories of men may 
35'x 
become rather hazy* A clause limiting the period 
to file the suit does not defeat any provisions of 
law, it is not opposed to public policy and it 
neither contravene the Contract Act, nor the 
Limitation Act* 
Anothefr important clause is one in which the 
bank takes power to releae or modify securities, 
renew bills, grant time, discharge or vary arrange-
ment etc. with the principal debtor without the 
consent of the guaremtee and without in any way 
prejudicing or diminishing the validity of the 
guarantee. Almost all guarantee deeds contain some 
clauses whereby it is laid down that bank shall have 
the fullest liberty without affecting this guarantee 
to postpone for any time or fran time to time the 
exercise of the power of sale or any other power or 
powers conferred by the Deed of Hypothecation and to 
exercise the same at any time and in any manner and 
either to enforce a forbear to enforce covenants 
for payment of principal or interest or any other 
covenants contained or implied in the Deed of Hypo-
thecation or any other remedies or securities available 
to the bank and guarantor/s shall not be released 
by any exercise by the bank of its liability with 
reference to the matters aforesaid or any of them or 
i) vi ^ 
by reason of time being given to the borrower, 
its successors or assigns of any other forbearance 
act, or omission on the part of the bank or any 
other indulgence by the bank to the borrower or 
by any other matter or thing whatsoever which 
under the law relating to the sureties vrould but 
for this provision have the effect of so releasing 
8 
the guarantor/s. 
In the absence of such power, if the creditor 
bank, for instance gave time to the principal debtor 
by a binding contract, the position of the 
guarantor preJudicAlly affected, for if he paid up 
under the guarantee his remedy against the principal 
dabtor woulbd be delayed. Similar considerations 
would apply if the creditor bank were the accept a 
ccwnposition under a deed of arrangement executed by 
the principal debtor. 
Another clause will State that the guarantee 
shall be in addition to and shall not be in any way 
prejudiced or affected by any collateral or other 
security of any kind. This provision is necessary 
lest it be eurgued that other securities were taken 
in substitution for the security afforeded by the 
3b 
guarantor, or by merging or suspending the debt, 
have affected the liability of the guarantor, 
because a guarantor who pays off the creditor's 
indebtedness is entitled by subrogation to the benefit 
of any other securities held by the creditor in 
respect of that indebtedness* 
The crucial point is as to how the parties to 
the guarantee deed can contract out these legal rights. 
The Judicial opinion over this issue is divided. It 
will be in the fitness of the subject to mention both 
the opinions in full detail, 
9 
In Chitguppi & Co. v. VINAYAK KASHINATH/ 
The guarantee provided as followsi 
" The surety ( defendant No,2) 
undertook to indemnify the 
firm against all losses, damages, 
and expenses whatever the 
plaintiff might suffer by reason 
or in consequence of any default 
on the part of the principal 
debtor Surety ( defendantNo, 2) 
expressly waived allor any of the 
rights as surety ( legal, equitable, 
statutory or otherwise) which may 
at any time be inconsistent here with 
and which he might be otherwise 
entitled to claim and enforce." 
K • 
:ib-. 
Subsequently the terms were varied without 
the knowledge and constant of the surety. It was 
argued that defendant No,2 consented to the variation 
in anticipation without knowing the nature of the 
variation. Shah J, held that under section 133 of 
the Indian Contract Act the variation involves the 
result that the surety is discharged as to transac-
tions subsequent to the variation, " I do not think 
that the general clause in the letter of indemnity 
under which he waived all rights under the statutes 
canbe read as implying any consenjt to the variation 
within the meaning of section 133 or as entitling 
the plaintiffs to enforce the liability against the 
surety even though according to law, he is discharged 
from such liability", 
Hayword,, J, concurning observed: 
"It seems to me impossible to hold 
that these provisions of the letter 
were not in express terms inconsis-
tent with the provisions of the 
Contract Act. where-ever it has been 
intended that independent provisions 
should be permitted, it has always 
been expressly provided for such pro-
visions by the introduction of the 
phrase " in the absence of any contract 
to the contrary" which occur in section 
146 and a number of other sections and 
the Indian Contract Act**, 
:ib 
10 
Again In Union of India v, PEARL HOSIERY MILLS« 
It has been held that the provisions of section 133 
are not subject toa contract to the contrary between 
the parties to the contract. This section is in 
unqualified terms. It was not necessary to put in 
the words notwithstanding any contract to the con-
trary in this section, because whenever the legislatxire 
wanted that the terms of the contract between the 
parties should take precedence over the provisions 
of any section, the words " in the absence of any 
special contract" have been inserted in that particular 
section as has been done in sections 152 and 163 of 
the Act» 
On the other hand in Krishnaswaml v. Travancore 
11 
national Bank, CI, 9 of the guarantee providedj 
•' It is further agreed that any 
contract between the borrower 
and the lender by which the 
lender makes a composition with 
or pranises to give time or not 
to sue the borrower will not dis-
chcurge the surety or sureties," 
The plaintiff's agreed to accept a sum of four 
annas in the rupee in full satisfaction of their claim, 
so that there was as envisaged by clause 9 a compositior 
It was argued that this composition bond extinguishes 
3^0 
the debt to the principal debtor and therefore, 
there Is no debt for which the sureties can be 
made liable. It was held that although a composition 
bond between the principal debtor and the creditor 
extinguishes the debt to the principal debtor It does 
not absolve the sureties trom their llsUalllty under 
the surety bond, where the surety has expressly con-
tracted to remain liable notwithstanding the dlschajrge 
of the principal and therefore the discharge of the 
principal debtor cannot be said to be Implied dis-
charge of the surety. 
The Calcutta High Court has also expressed 
12 
the same view In Ramjan v. Chief Administrator, where 
a clause in the guarantee provided as follows a 
"I agree that failure on your part 
to enforce any of your remedies 
against the borrower or to observe 
and perform any of the stipulations 
contained In the said agreement or 
any time or other Indulgence given 
by you and the borrower, shall not 
have the effect of releasing me from 
my liability under this guarantee, 
I also agree* that this guarantee 
shall In no way be affected by your 
taking or varying or giving up any 
securities, held by you from time 
to time In respect of this loan *• 
'.iD^ 
It was held that the guarntor could not 
be held discharged of his guarantee on the ground 
of indulgence alleged to have been granted by the 
Government to the borrower. The decision conforms 
to the express terms of the guarantee deed. 
13 
In B.S, Patra v. State Bank of India, where 
creditor bank failed to take action against 
principal debtor, in response to letters from 
surety requesting creditor bank to take steps to 
reilise dues by taking possession of hypothecated 
goods belonging to the principal debtor. The latter 
was making speedy arrangements to sell away entire 
stock with a view to escape his liability. In the 
guarantee deed it had been agreed that the default 
on the part of the creditor bank in requiring or 
enforcing the observance or performance of any 
stipulated terms should not have the effect of 
releasing surety and accordingly it was held that 
the surety is not discharged. 
Again in Citibank N,A,, New Delhi v, J,K, 
14 
Jute Mills Co. Ltd,< Kanpur» the Delhi High Court 
15 
disagreeing with Punjab and Haryana High Court held 
:ib 
that there was no necessity for the legislature 
to provide the words In the absence of any contract 
In section 133 or 135 or 141, because the sections 
themselves speak of consent of the surety, regarding 
variance In the terms of the Contract between the 
principal debtor and the creditor, composition 
with the principal debtor • In the absence of the 
words without the surety's consent the words "In 
the absence of any contract to the contrary would 
have been surplus. Therefore the rights conferred 
on the surety under sections 133, 135 or 141 could be 
waived by specific agreement in the deed of guarantee. 
As a matter of fact such an agreement would amount 
to consent within the meaning of these sections. 
The Karnataka High Court has recently e3q>res8ed 
16 
its opinion in R, Lilavati v. Bank of Beuroda, that 
the Contract Act has created rights and liabilities. 
But the parties have got a right to contract out of 
the rights and liabilities mentioned in the Act, 
This is envisaged by section 128 of the Contract Act, 
Therefore we do not find words notwithstanding any-
thing contained to the contrary etc, in section 141 of 
<) O ., 
the Contract Act, in the instant case the surety 
has agreed that she will not claim the benefit given 
to her under section of the Contract Act, She herself 
Is a party to the surety bond. Therefore it is not 
open to her now to contend that the said clause is 
either bad at law or is not enforceable, Vj/a Mohendra 
17 Kximar ChanduXal v. Central Bank of India* Ahmadabad, 
was relied on. It Interprets section 151 of the 
Contract Act what the Gujarat High Courthheld was that 
the bailee cannot contract out of the minimum liability 
Imposed under section 151, But section 151 is to be 
found in chapter IX while section 141 is to be found 
in Chapter VIII, The rights and liabilities created 
under chapter VIII are entirely different from the 
rights and liabilities in Chapter X of the Contract 
Act, 
The surety can waive or rellnguish the rights 
he is entitled to as a surety. He does this by consent. 
The consent can be Inferred or can be express. Section 
135 of the Indian Contract Act can be avoided by a 
clause in the contract that the dealings between the 
creditor and the principal debtor shall not affect 
the surety. It would have the effect of avoiding the 
rule whereby a surety would be zreleased. The consent 
can be given in advance or after the event. 
H {) "j 
There Is a conceptual difficulty about 
consent In advance. It can be argued how could a 
party consent to something that has not happened 
because ke would not have the requisite knowledge, 
A party can enlarge the terms of his liability and 
give a blank chequejcto the credj|.tor. If he wants 
any restrictions Imposed It is for him to do so. 
He can consent In advance by the terms of his 
suretyship to be liable notwithstanding any varia-
tions or modifications. If the bank or the creditor 
chose to exercise the wide discretionary power the 
surety cannot ccanplain. He can waive his rights of 
subrogation and be answerable to pay the full amount 
of his debt notwithstanding the excess of the limit , 
His contract to be answerable for the ultimate balance 
of the debt without taking into account any payments 
already made has been upheld, if the instrument makes 
the surety liable for the full amount irrespective 
of any payment made by him, the debtor,or third 
parties« the creditor can prove for that amount. The 
surety can disable himself by express and distinct 
terms the advantages he has as a surety, 
Hore recently the standard bank guarantee forma 
are so comprehensively worded that the surety Is made 
Jh 
to contract out almost all of his normal legal rights. 
In this conte^ tt It is worth nothing the observation 
18 
made In an English case In the Judgment of Lord Dlplock 
when he saldt ** This ( that is the standard form 
contract) Is of comparatively modern orlglon. It is 
the result of concentration of a particular kind of 
business in relatively few hands. The terms have not 
been the subject of negotiations between the parties 
to it,or approved by a organisation representing 
the interests of the weaker party. They have been 
dictated by that party whose bargaining power either 
exercised alone or in conjunction with others providing 
similar goods or Services, enables him to say, " if you 
want these goods or services at all, these are the 
only terms on which they are obtainable take-it-or-
leave-lt," 
Subsequent promise stands on a different footing. 
Originally such promises were declared ineffective 
for Want of consideration. It was later held that the 
objection for the lack of consideration was unfounded. 
The promise was valid " not as a Constitution of but 
ri 
the revival of an old debt. 
./h^ 
There must be clear evidence of knowledge 
where acquiescence is alleged against the surety 
on the other hand it is not sufficient for the 
surety to allege that he was not informed by the 
creditor, but he should allege and prove the ignorance 
of the facts. 
To conclude in the well known words of Anson 
the Law of Contract is that branch of law, which sets 
a number of limiting principles subject to which 
parties may create rights and duties for themselves 
and the whole business of that law is to enforce the 
contracts which comply with those limiting conditions 
19 
and principles. 
Moreover in England, pursuant to the Law 
CcMunission's Report of 1975, the British Parliament 
had enacted the unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, It 
is time that the Indian parliament followed suit in 
the interest of the weaker sections of the society 
at large. The question to be determined is as to the 
extent to which the law would or should assvime that 
parties would enjoy freedom of economic decision when 
entering into contracts, particularly when more and more 
economic activity come under computerisation that the 
country is being ushered into the twenty first century 
of our dreauns. 
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CHAPTER - IX 
C O N C L U S I O N 
A guarantee often demanded by a banker or 
creditor as an additional security to reinforce a 
clean advance or buttress a tangible security 
which, for one reason or the other. Is not consi-
dered adequate, 
A guarantee Is one of the simplest forms of 
security, easy to obtain but replete with legal 
complications, practical difficulties and conside-
rable unpleasantness. If unfortunately there be need 
to release It. It Is common knowledge that while 
the guarantor signs the guarantee he haxtily thinks 
of the eventuality that he may be called upon to pay, 
and Is surprised or even annoyed when he Is asked by 
the banker or the creditor to meet his obligation on 
the fault of the principal debtor. The complfent 
guarantor had probably never had visualised such a 
contingency. In an embrassasslng situation like this, 
aai attempt is possibly made by the guarantor to get 
out of the obligation. Even if he is unable to evade 
the obligation and has ultimately to pay, the transac-
tion often strains his relations with the banks. The 
[ib 
best course for the banker would, therefore, be to 
explain tactfully in the beginning itself to the 
prospective guarantor his obligations on the guarantee 
althoagh he ( the banker ) is not legally bound to 
do so. It is enough if the guarantor knows he is 
signing an instrument of guarantee and no other docu-
ment. It is not necessary for the banker to read or 
explain to him the different clauses of the memorandum 
of guarantee. It is sufficient if the guarantor knows 
the type of transaction he is entering into. 
Bank guarantees in internal and external trade 
are common features of commercial practice. Transac-
tions involving financial liabilities of some magnitude 
are now almost invariably accompanied by bank guarantees. 
In India until recently, business on a large scale was 
confined to a few large cities. The position has now 
changed with an accelerated proces of development, the 
variety and magnitude of commercial activities have 
expanded. Large scale construction and collaboration 
contracts involving huge financial outlays have natu-
rally increased the need of taking guaorantees from 
banks, mostly for tenders and performance. 
In modern commercial transactions, various 
devices are used to ensure performance by the contrac-
ting parties. The traditional letter of credit has 
:^b; 
taken a new meaning* In business circles« standby 
letters are also used, Perfoxmance bonds and guarantee 
bonds are also the devices increasingly adopted in 
transactions. The courts have treated such documents 
as analogous to letter o£ credit. 
Guarantees certainly have their uses, though 
they are subject to some Inherent defects not found 
in other securities, A guarantee by a relative or 
friend or joint and several guaranteesfrom two are 
more of them may mean that a bank can support a small 
business with at that time little or no free assets, 
but with an arbitious and enterprising proprietor who 
can thereby develop the business over the yeeurs into 
a considerable one whose account and good-will the 
bank will be pleased to have. 
Answers to the questionnaire clearly point out 
that the banks are playing a leading role in socio-
economic development. Almost all sections of the 
society are the beneficiaries of the bank loans. The 
financial assistance given under various schemes has 
defintely brought about a rapid industrilization, 
provided means of employment opportunity and brought 
:a: } j 
fantastic changes in the socio-economic pattern and 
liking standard. The cherished goal of a welfare 
state can be reality if only the majority of the 
people who live in villages are motivated and involved 
in developmental activities. Bankers with their 
resources and proves ability have certainly an impor-
tant role to play. 
Before considering a further explansion of the 
role of commercial banks in expanding the area of 
economic weJJ&re, solutions have to be found for a few 
issues which have surfaced in the course of the post 
decade of welfare banking. In the first place, one 
has to take the note of the fact that credit can by 
itself create nothing. Credit places in the borrower's 
hands founds that can be used to purchase productive 
inputs . Several factors have been identified as 
essential complements of credit in promoting develop-
ment* These are opportunities for putting credit 
to pro-iuctive use, adequate marketing infrastructure 
to make investment profitable, availability of necessary 
Inputs in adequate quantities and favourable govern-
ment policies. Under the circumstances increased 
availability of credit alone may have little effect 
on production and Income if other factors militate 
.'(b o 
against the profitable use of credit. Failure of 
borrowers to repay their debts on time or repay them 
at all, is a serious problem for most of the commer-
cial ^ anks. 
Guarantees have both attractions and dis-
advantages. Banks prefer third party guarantees as 
compaired to other securities. This becomes clear 
from the repay to the questionnaire. The reason 
given is that in case of default the guarantor's 
pursuation results in the repayment of the loans. 
By the nature guarantees are as ideosyncratic as the 
persons giving them, for they cover a wide gamut from 
fully supported and first class one to wholly un-
supported one by persons of doubtful standing taken 
more in hope than anything else. 
Thus by and large, guarantees are not so 
reliable as other securities which possess an intrinsic 
value they can be something OL a gamble, and the 
degree of reliance which can be placed on may not be 
easy to estimate, varying as it does from guarantor 
to guarantor. 
Whether a contract is one of guarantee or 
Indemnity can thus be assumed, sometimes, anly by 
J /J 
referring to the circumstances which gave rise to 
the need for the use of that distinction, and there 
certainly can not be any basis for predectlng, at 
the time a contract is made, into which category it 
may fall. The question whether the agreement amounts 
to a contract of guarantee or indemnity is almost a 
barren controversy and, an unproductive semantic 
wrangling involving hair splitting distinctions. 
This role of law and lawyers exposes them to public 
ridicule and contempt* 
The remedy, if any, would seem to lie in 
ignoring entirely the supposed categories and actually 
deciding the cases on the particular factual issues 
presented. But in the absence of such a remedy, it 
must be recognized that definitions of the guarantee 
or indemnity are cost in terms of the result rather 
than in terms that will lead to results. 
Whether the obligation of a surety becomes 
primary one where no liability has ever been fastened 
on the principal debtor by reason of his minority at 
the time of the contract or notV The best course open 
to the courts is that where all concerned parties know 
that the first promisor ( principal debtor ) is an 
.r; 
Infant, so that as against him, the promise cannot 
be enforced, the court should incline to constxrue 
the document signed by the major ( the second pro-
misor surety ) as an independent contract. 
There is considerable conflict of opinion as 
to whether the past benefit to principal debtor 
amounts to a good consideration. Though the conflict 
has not yet Judicially resolved the researcher 
agrees with the view that past consideration or past 
benefit to the principal debtor should not be good 
consideration for a contract of sale for the reasons 
submitted earlier. 
Again whether a guarantee is continuing or 
non-continuing cannot be determined by a rule of 
or fi^ed rules of construction, nor by reference to thumb 
decide cases. They simply illustrate what the courts 
have done under the peculiar facts and circumstances 
of particular cases. Disputes frequently arise as 
to whether an instrument falls within the description 
of a continuing guarantee or not. There is conside-
rable difficulty in reconciling all the cases on this 
subject, and the difficulty arises chiefly from their 
:w-
being not at one principle of decision. Some laying 
down that the guarantee should be construed liberally, 
in favour of the person giving it and the others, 
that it ought to be construed strictly. Lord Ellen-
borough observed, if a party means to confine his 
liability to a single dealing, he should take care 
to say so, such a recital would restrain the gene-
rality of the engagement, and explain whether it has 
reference to past or future transactions or conti-
nuing with reference to future transactions depends 
always on the circumstances under which it is given, 
A review of some of the situations in which a 
guarantors liability is not co-existensive with that 
of the principal debtor shomftd that the courts have 
treated such cases as exceptional thereby emphasising 
the existence of the general principle. However, it 
also becomes apparant that the exceptions to the 
general rule are not insignificant in number and 
importance. It is not easy to find out a common 
thread in the exceptions. It would, for example, be 
stretching these concepts beyond breaking point to say 
that the voidness of a hire-purchase agreement, which 
is the subject matter of a guarantee, is a vitiating 
M 
element attaching to the principal obligation, but 
the ultra-vires character of a transaction, which is 
the subject matter of a director's guarantee, is a 
defence personal to the principal debtor. So, too , 
where a debt is statute barred this has not been 
allowed to prevent the complete performance of the 
transaction by obliging the surety to pay the creditor 
and then reimbursement from the principal debtor, 
for in this way the contractual rights and obligations 
of all parties are satisfied and honoured. 
It can fairly be said that there has been no 
rigid application of the general rule that the surety 
is a favoured debtor, modifications have been made and 
exceptions created by the courts, but these have been 
the result of the attempts, not always consistent in 
the same direction, to adjust the conflicting interests 
of creditor, principal debtor and surety and also the 
public interest in favour of the enforcement of con-
tractual obligations formally assumed. 
Any alteration in the guarantee should be got 
duljt authenticated by the guarantor. Further as a 
general rule, the guareuitor should be required to •i.qn 
the guarantee in the presence of an official or 
3 7. 
officials of the bank. The practice of entrusting 
the guarantee form to the borrower with a jrequest 
to get it signed by the guarantor should be dis-
couraged. Once the banks follow this practice a 
lot of litigation can be avoided between the parties. 
The reseJTvatlon clause effectively nullifies 
the rule which has been declared to be desirable, 
namely that a surety is discharged by any alteration 
in the original contract which varies his risk. Here 
direct action against the principal debtor is precluded, 
and the result will may be that the principal debtor 
will ease all efforts to fulfill his obligations to 
the material disadvatage of the surety. Thus viaatlon 
in the surety's risk, affording one basis for dis-
charging the surety when the principal debtor is 
released, is equally present whether the rights against 
the surety are or are not reserved. An agreement 
between the creditor and the principal debtor to 
which the surety is not a party, should in no way be 
allowed to prejudice the surety's rights. 
The creditor's right to hold the securities 
until the whole debt has been paid is paramount to any 
claim of the surety whether based on section 140 or 
r/o 
section 141, No surety can step into the shoes of 
the creditor until he has discharged his liability 
and until the entire debt due to the creditor has 
been paid in full* This rule shall apply also where 
the surety is only for the part of the debt. 
When a problem of discrepancy of dociiments 
arises, the facts of each case are decisive. The 
beneficiary must learn tounderatand the bank's point 
of view. He must realise that bank rejects non-
conforming documents not for petty bureaucratic reasons 
because it wishes to avoid personal liability. The 
docximents tendered to the bank should be standardised, 
to a large extent and standardised on a global basis. 
The contract of guarantee has, therefore, the 
difficult task of creating a fair equilibrium among the 
legitimate interests of the three parties ( principal, 
beneficiary and guarantor ) and of defining the rights 
and obligations of the three parties with precision 
to avoid disputes. Unfortunately these concepts have 
not always been appreciated or applied in practice. 
Lack of experience in certain cases, or abuse by one 
party of its dominant position in other cases, has 
tended to create inequitable situations leading to 
riu 
dispute and distrust. This state o£ affairs is a 
hindrance to the development of international trade. 
There should be appropriate dooimentation to support 
a claim* 
A bank who gives a performance guarantee must 
honour that guarantee according to its terms. Although 
the pirimary law has been settled in its essential 
aspects, there are matters of detail and procedure 
which still are left at the root. The Indian Contract 
Act/ cast in the traditional mould of the Nineteenth 
century. Is barren of specific problems and provisions 
on the subject and the cases have been decided on the 
terms and conditions between the parties which have 
now assumed the position of standard form contract. 
The ievelojxnent of the theory of performance 
guarantee, however, would enrich and grow if the business-
men, particularly the creditors, played a healthy role 
and ignored flimsy and minor contractual irritations in 
the national interest of business climate. The interest 
of the india*s foreign trade r^ .gUires that the business-
men and financial institutions should faithfully and 
honestly fulfil their commitments. This places greater 
responsibilities on the courts to see that mere technical 
:w; 
pleas are not allowed to shake the faith of foreign 
importers in the honesty and Integrity of Indian 
export houses and their guarantors. Otherwise the 
foreign customer may be scared of dealing with Indian 
traders and it may cause loss of foreign trade. 
In performance guarantee, the credit commonly 
requires the beneficiary to certify that the account 
party has failed to perform his or her executory 
promise. This is, also known as a certificate of 
inspection. The requirement of the dociiments and par-
ticularly certificates of analysis, quality, weight 
and the like is a reasonable precaution for a prudent 
buyer to take, since he may in this way obtain some 
measure of assurance that the merchandise is as ordered. 
The bank guarantee is useful in commercial 
transactions precisely because it allows the parties 
to shift the risk of unjustified demand from the bene-
ficiary to the customer. This legitimate purpose can 
be served by a narrow definition of fraud in the 
transaction would ultimately made the bank guarantee 
more valuable when it is appropriate and thus preserve 
its usefulness in commercial transactions. 
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Such a standard would not destroy the commer-
cial utility of letters of credit because it serves 
no COTunercial purpose to provide certainty of payment 
to one who has intentionally deceived other parties 
to a transaction* Nor would such a standard make 
injunctions readily available. Not merely must fraud 
be pleaded with particularity, but also the four 
traditional factors justifying a preliminary injunc-
tion must be considered. First, the probability that 
the plaintiff will eventually succeed on the merits, 
second the presence of irrepairable injury to the 
plaintiff, third, the injury to the defendant if the 
injunction is granted, and finally, the interest of 
the public or third parties. 
It is clear that the fraud exception is now 
firmly recognised by the coxirts. In spite of this 
recognition one senses on extreme reluctance by the 
coxxrts to apply it in practice for fear that irre-
paiirable damage would be done to the systemof payment 
that has grown up with the performance guarantee. 
The coxirts have strived to maintain confidence in 
the system of payment at the expense of a few indi-
viduals who have entered into inexpedient contracts 
and this is by no means a bad thing. 
:i / •; 
The letter of credit today is an extremely-
useful and viable financing device both in the tradi-
tional sale of goods transactions and in the more 
recent performance guarantee. In future the letter 
of credit will become increasingly important in both 
international and donestic consnercial and business 
transactions. As the letter of credit grows in popu-
larity, the principles of law applied to them must be 
more fuily elaborated if their efficacy is to be main-
tained. In case of letter of credit of international 
trade requires presentation of documents prepared inde-
pendently of the beneficiary. In the case of a bank 
guarantee the documents called for is usually the 
beneficiary's own certificate that the other party to 
the underlying contract is in default there under an 
open invitation to abuse by the unscrupulous beneficiary. 
In any event, instances of fraud involving bankguarantee 
appear to be much rarer than the theoretical fears could 
indicate. Loss of reputation in the international busi-
ness community is a severe and immediate sanction 
awaiting a dishonest beneficiary. 
By enunciating the general principle of non-
interference by the courts in respecta of guarantee and 
letter of credit, the courts anly intend that the 
,i^ . 
International trade and conunerce should function 
smoothly without interference from court. At the 
sametime, the courts expected that the merchants 
and traders In international trade and commerce will 
honour their respective commitments and the business 
honesty will be maintained. By the theory of non-
interference in cases of letters of credit and bank 
guarantees# certainly the courts did not intend that 
international trade and commerce should flourish and 
thereby adopting dishonesty unscrupulous practice. 
These trade practices and the commitments by the 
banks are treated on a different level by the courts 
and are allowed to function without interference 
from court only with the view that the trust in 
International commerce is not damaged in any way and 
not for encouraging malaflde activities of unscrupulous 
traders. If so^ fraud or the special equity arising 
out of the peculiar situation of the case could not 
have been made exceptions to the general principles 
of non-interference by coxirts. 
More recently the sta'idard bank guarantee forms 
are so cc«mprehenslvely worded that the surety is made 
to contract out almost all of his normal legal rights. 
It is the result of concentration of a particular 
kind of a business in relatively few hands. The 
terms have not been the subject of negotiations bet-
ween the pairties to it or approved by an organisation 
representing the interests of the weaker party. It 
is like take-it or leave-it situation. 
The question to be determined is as to the 
extent to which the law would or should assume that 
parties would enjoy freedom of economic decision when 
entering into contracts, particularly when more and 
more economic activity come under computerisation that 
the country is being ushered into the twenty first 
century of our dreams. 
Suggestions and Rectxnmendations 
The defects of the guarantees as security centre 
round (i) the legal complications of the guarantee 
forms and the rights of the guarantor and (ii) the 
guarantor's financial ability to honour his guarantee 
as and when called upon to do so. 
To meet the first point bank guarantee forms are 
drafted with the utmost care to protect the bank as 
much as possible and likewise to cut down the surety's 
:iHc. 
statutory rights ( of course the statute itself flaking 
the rights subject to a contract to the contrary ), A 
fully 
guarantee Is dependable when It Is/supported by other 
security, whether cash, land, stocks and shares, 
life policies and so on. But If Is partially supported, 
or as in perhaps a majority of cases, unsupported, 
then the absence of assets actually charged to the bank 
makes the guarantee a less dependable security than 
the other types of security. Of course, even at worst 
an in supported guarantee makes the bank on the secured 
creditor of two or more persons instead of one but if 
neither guarantor(s) nor custoner has any assets, 
nothing can be obtained, and there is often little 
point in obtaining judgment against then and even less 
in instituting bankruptcy proceedings. Banks try to 
avoid taking guarantees from men of straw , and usually 
make status enguiselns on guarantors at, say, six 
monthly intervals. Never the less,, the position of a 
guarantor apparently, sound when he entered into the 
guarantee^may change abruptly or gradually without the 
bank's knowledge. Giving a guarantee on behalf of 
someone who is indebted to his bank is a onerous 
obligation often blithely entered into by sureties who 
never expect that one day they may be called upon to 
pay up. 
' i *.• A '^ . 
The difficulty of keeping in touch with the 
financial position of the guarantor from time to 
time contrasts with the case which some other secu-
rities can t>e dally valued, e.g,* quoted stocks and 
shares and with stability in value of such securities 
as land and life policies, in the case of these 
other securities the bank has actual control over 
them, for it normally possesses the appropriate 
instrument of title, but it has no similar control 
over a guarantor. Quoted stocks and shares and life 
policies with a surrender value can be quickly con-
verted into cash, and land can be sold though it may 
take a little longer, but getting a guarantor to hand 
over cash is less certain and not always successful. 
Even wealthy guarantors are sometimes not keen to pay 
up, and though in case of need banks can and to insti-
tute proceedings against relevant guarantors, such 
legal action may occasionally prove abortive and in 
any event lead to bad feeling and ill-will between 
all concerned. 
The guarantor should be highly credit worthy. 
An ideal guarantor is one who can be considered good 
for clean advance to the extent of the guarantee. 
3S. 
The banker should approach any person to give 
a guarantee for an advance to a borrower. 
In the case of joint, or several 
guarantee? no advance should be made until the sig-
natures Qf all the proposed guarantors are obtained. 
Periodical confirmation of the guarantee should 
be obtained from the guarantors separately along with 
balance confirmation duly signed by the borrower to 
avoid the guarantee agreement becoming time-barred. 
No bank should lend to a customer solely relying 
on a guarantee. Even if, the contract of guarantee»is 
legally valid, it cannot ultimately produce cash from 
a guarantor who may be incapable of meeting his liability. 
When a banker proposes to accept a guarantee 
as security for a loan, he must first of all, by careful 
inquires, satisfy himself as far as is possible that 
guarantor will be able conveniently and without embarrass-
ment to carry out his promise to pay if the borrower 
fails to do so. For instance, the banker should not 
generally speaking regard persons with fixed incomes 
terminable at death, who have no other means, a fit 
person to guarantee a loan. 
:is. 
At the time of entering into a contract of 
guarantee the guarantor may be quite able and willing 
to perform all that he agrees to do, but his financial 
position, though no fault of his own, may change for 
the worse, while the guarantee remains operative, 
the banker should, therefore, renew periodically his 
original incjulres « He should make it deeur to the 
source of his information that the inquirey is a 
renewal, since otherwise the latter might think that 
the guarantor was undertaking an additional liability 
which he would not be in a position to meet. In parti-
cular, the banker should look out for any evidence 
that the guaurantor has settled or is about to settle, 
any substantial part of his property in trust for his 
dependents or that he is otherwise placing his property 
beyond the reach of his creditors. 
The guarantor is well advised to require docu-
mentation prepared independently of the beneficiary, 
and in a form capable of verification by the guarantor. 
Fraud will always be a problem in any transac-
tion and parties to an International venture must always 
evaluate the risk of its occurrence and prices the 
contract appropriately. Obviously factors such as the 
3 S 
relative bargaining strength of the parties and how 
desperately the business is wanted will influence the 
compromise point. Under standard forro contracts often 
the position is such that one party has to accept the 
terms put forward by the other party, but If possible 
the number of options should be considered* 
The terms of the performance bond or guarantee 
should provide that it is only payable on production 
of some independent evidence of default(e,g, an arbi-
tration award, an independent certificate), The bond 
should clearly set out when and how the banks should 
make or refuse payment. 
There should always be a term in the underlying 
contract that written notice must be given by the 
beneficiary of the bond to the other party before a 
demand is made that such demand can not be made within 
a specified period from the date of expiry of the 
guarantee. 
This would give the account party the oppor-
tunity to go to the court, and seek a remedy to prevent 
the beneficiary fran making an unlawful call when it 
was felt that this was likely. 
38/ 
Continuance o£ financial assistance depends 
on the extent of recovery of loans, duly and expe-
ditiously. If the Financial institutions are 
compelled to resort to recovery through the suits 
in civil courts, the process of recovery will be 
delayed. Therefore the financial institutions should 
have a expeditious ranedy of recovery. As it is 
clear from the answers to the questionnaire that 
the banks should have power for the speedy recovery 
of the loans. This purpose can be achieved if the 
Indian Arbitration Act and the Land Revenue Act are 
made applicable to all banks so for as settlement 
of disputes and recovery of loans are concerned res-
pectively. On the above lined Financial Corporations 
throughout the country have also been given special 
powers for the recovery of loans. It is desirable 
and high time 'that similar powers are also given to 
the banks also. 
In view of the massive credit facilities extended 
by the banks debts sometimes get time-barred under 
the law of limitation. Again short-term loans granted 
by the banks repeatedly being renewed or re-loaned 
at the expense of vastman power Just: ito save them 
from getting barred by the limitation Act, This 
38: 
process involves considerable delay and expense in 
most of the cases* 
Under Article ll2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, 
for filing any suit by or on behalf of the Central 
Government or any state Government, the period of 
limitation is prescribed as 30 years. Banks mainly 
deal with the money of a large number of depositors, 
besides that of the share-holders. Thus, if the 
advances made by the banks are barred by limitation, 
the loss falls on the public, that is on the conmunity 
in general, while the corresponding benefit, accrues 
to the private individuals who derive advantage by 
the lapse of time. Further, due to some inevitable 
factors, there will be some unavoidable delay in the 
functioning of the public institutions like banks in 
the matter of filing suits and pursuing their remedies, 
Viewed in this background, there is a rational basis 
for equating the public institutions like banks and 
other financial institutions, with the Government for 
the purt-oses of extending the benefit of the longer 
period of limitation proved under Article 112 of the 
Limitation Act, 
38: 
It Is, therefore, submitted that the Limitation 
Act, 1963 be amended to Incorporate the above view. 
If this concession is not immediately extended to 
them, they would in all probability lose their 
credit, on which the very foundations of banking 
business stand. 
The existing law embodied in the Indian Contract 
Act needs streamlining and suitable modifications 
the definition of continuing guarantee is ambiguous 
and the illustrations appended to the section as 
created confusion. It will be better to revise the 
definition so as to point out expressly as to what is 
a continuing guarantee. 
The Indian Contract Act relating to the contract 
of guarantee should be modified appropriately at rele-
vant places so that the rights of the surety are not 
taken away by powerful financial banks and government 
under the standard forro contract. In England, pur-
suant to the Law Commissions Report of 1975, the 
British Parliament had enacted the unfair Contract 
Terms Act, 1977, It is time that the Indian parliament 
followed suit in the interest of the weaker sections 
of the society at large. 
A distinction should be embodied between a 
contract of guarantee and an Irrevocable letter of 
credit as far as the problem of Injunction is 
concerned. Specific provision shall be made that 
the power to declare whet|ier the principal debtor 
has committed 'default* or not should not lie with 
the creditor or his nominee , This is a judicial 
function concerning the fortunes of both principal 
debtor and surety. This issue, therefore, be decided 
by a court of law or at the most by a set of arbi-
trators and an independent ximpire law on the subject 
should be made clear. 
The problem of freedan of contract and standard 
form contract is a burning problem and there should 
be a through revision of the whole chapter of con-
tract of guarantee and Indemnity on the subject and 
relevant provisions be made. 
There baa been a Judicial conflict on the follow-
ing two problems. When the agreement between the 
principal debtor and the surety is void and the 
liability of the surety has to be distinct. The 
Indian Contract Act is amended and expressly it is 
laid down, that the capacity defence is personal to 
the principal debtor and should not be pleaded by the 
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surety. If the surety did not know of the 
incapacity and the creditor knew of the fact and 
did not disclose it to the surety this may well 
be a defence based on the non-disclosure of a 
material fact. 
The words any variance in section 135 has 
divided the Supreme Ck)urt between majority and 
minority. The law may be amended to incorporate 
the majority view. 
An agreement between the creditor and the 
principal debtor should in no way be allowed to 
prejudice the surety's rights. The courts should 
refuse to give effect to the reservation clause 
in a discharge of the principal debtor. The law 
should be suitably amended. 
The Law Commission in its 13th Report, 1958 
did not suggest any sweeping changes on the subject. 
Three decades have passed since the report was given 
and second revision of the Indian Contract Act 
particularly on contract of guarantee is long over 
due, A number of new factual situations have come 
before the courts on account of the industrial 
development of the country. 
;i 9 J 
It would be in the fitness of things 
if the Law Commission of India takes up the 
matter of the revision of the Indian Contract 
Act and the provisions dealing with the con-
tracts of guarantee are revised in tY^e light 
of suggestions made in this study. This will 
benefit the trade and commerce and the people 
of India at large and will be in the interest 
of the country's development. 
APPENDIX No, I 
Provisions of Sectlona 124 to 147 of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 
124, "Contract of indemnity" defined - A contract 
by Which one party promises to save the other 
from loss caused to him by the conduct of the 
promisor himself, or by the conduct of any other 
person, is called a "contract of indemnity". 
Illustration 
A contracts to indonnify B against the consequences 
of any proceedings which C may take against B in 
respect of a certain sum of 200 rupees. This is 
a contract of indonnity, 
125, Rights of indemnity-holder when sued - The 
promisee in a contract of indemnity, acting within 
the scope of his authority, is entitled to recover 
fran the promisor -
(1) all damages which he may be compelled to pay 
in any suit in respect of any matter to which the 
promise to indemnify applies; 
(2) all costs which he may be ccxnpelled to pay 
in any such suit if, in bringing or defending it, 
he did not contravene the orders of the promisor, 
and acted as it would have been pxrudent for him 
to act in the absence of any contract of indeannlty. 
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or 1£ the promisor authorised him to bring or 
defend the suit; 
(3) all sums which he may have paid under the terms 
of any compromise of any such suit, if the compro-
mise was not contrary to the orders of the pro-
misor, and was one which it would have been prudent 
for the promisee to make in the cibsence of any 
contract of indemnity, or if the promisor autho-
rised him to compromise the suit. 
126, "Contract of guarantee**, "surety", "principal 
debtor" and "creditor" - A "contract of guarantee" 
is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge 
the liability, of a third person in case of his 
default. The person who gives the guarantee is 
called the "surety"; the person in respect of 
whose default the guarantee is given is called 
the "prAncipal debtor^" and the person to whom 
the gueUrantee is given is called the "creditor", 
A guaurantee may be either oral or written, 
127, Consideration for guarantee - Anything done, or 
any promise made, for the benefit of the principal 
debtor may, be a sufficient consideration to the 
surety for giving the guarantee. 
IIlustrations 
(a) B requests A to sell and deliver to him goods on 
credit, A agrees to do so, provided c will guarantee 
the payment of the price of the goods, C prc»nises to 
guarantee the payment in consideration of A's promise 
to deliver the goods. This is a sufficient consideration 
for C*8 promise, 
(b) A sells and delivers goods to B,C afterwards 
requests A to forbear to aue B for the debt for a year, 
and promises that, if he does so, C will pay for them 
in default of payment by B» A agrees to forbear as 
requested. This is a sufficient consideration for C's 
promise, 
(c) A sells and delivers goods to B, C afterwards, 
without consideration, agrees to pay for them in default 
of B, The agreement is void . 
128, Surety's liability - The liability of the surety is 
co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, 
unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. 
Illustration 
A guarantees to B the payment of a bill of exchange 
by C, the acceptor. The bill is dishonoured by C, A is 
liable not only for the amount of the bill but also for 
any interest and charges which may have become due on it. 
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129, "Continuing guarantee" - A guarantee which extends 
to a series of transactions is called a "continuing 
guarantee"* 
Illustrations 
(a) A« in consideration that B will employ C in 
collecting the rent of B*s zamindari, promises B 
to be responsible^ to the amount of 5«000 rupees, 
for the due collection and paymenfc by C of those 
rents. This is a continuing guarantee, 
(b) A guarantees payment to B, a tea dealer, to the 
amount of £100, for any tea he may from time to 
time supply to C, B supplies c with tea to the 
above value of £100, and C pays B for it. Afterwards 
B supplies C with tea to the value of £200. C fails 
to pay. The guarantee given by A was a continuing 
guarantee, and he is accordingly liable to B to the 
extent of £l00, 
(c) A guarantees payment to B of the price sacks 
of flour to be delivered by B to C and to be paid 
for in a month. B delivers five sacks to c, C pays 
for them. Afterwards B delivers foxxr sacks to C« 
which C does not pay for. The guarantee given by A 
was not a continuing guarantee, and accordingly he 
is not liable for the price of the four sacks. 
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130.Revoacation of continuing guarantee - A continuing 
guarantee may at any time be revoked by the surety* as 
to future transactions, by notice to the creditor. 
Illustrations 
(a) A, in consideration of B's discounting, at A*s 
bills of exchange for C, guarantees to B, for twelve 
months, the due payment of all such bills to the extent 
of 500 rupees, B discounts bills for C to the extent 
of 2,000 rupees. Afterwards, at the end of three months, 
A revokes the guarantee. This revocation discharges A 
from all liability to B for any subsequent discount. 
But A is liable to B for the 2,000 rupees, on default 
of C, 
(b)A guarantees to B, to the extent of 10,000 rupees, 
that c shall pay all the bills that B shall draw upon 
him, B draws upon C, C accepts the bill, A gives 
notice of revocation, C dishonours the bill at maturity, 
A is liable upon his guarantee. 
131,Revocation of continuing guarantee by surety's death-
The death of the siurety operates, in the absence of 
any contract to the contrary, as a revocation of a 
continuing guarantee, so for as regarx3s future 
transactions, 
- vi «. 
132» Liability of two persons primarily liable, not 
affected by arrangement between them that one shall 
be surety on other's default — Where two persons 
contract with a third person t4 undertake a certain 
1lability« and also contract with each other that 
one of them shall be liable only on the default of 
the other, the third person not being a party to sue 
contract, the liability of each of such two persons 
to the third person under the first contract is not 
affected by the existence of the second contract, 
although such third person may have been aware of its 
existence* 
Illustration 
A and B maXe a joint and several promissory note to C« 
A makes it, in fact as surety for B, and c, knows this 
at the time when the note is made. The fact that A, to the 
knowledge of C, made the note as sxirety for B, is no 
answer to a suit by C against A upon the note. 
133, Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract-
Any variance, made without the surety's consent, in 
the terms of the contract between the principal (debtor) 
and the creditor, discharges the surety as to tran-
sactions subsecjuent to the variance. 
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Illustrations 
(a) A becomes surety to C for B's conduct as a manager 
In C*s bank. Afterwards, B and C contract, without A's 
consent, that B*s salary shall be raised, and that he 
shall become liable for one-fourth of the losses on 
overdrafts* B allows a customer to overdraw, and the 
bank loses a sum of money. A Is Alscharged from his 
suretyship by the varlauice made without his consent, 
and Is not liable to make good this loss. 
(b) A guarantees C against the misconduct of B In an 
office to %rtilch B Is appointed by c, and of which the 
duties are defined by an Act of the Legislature. By a 
subsequent Act, the nature of the office Is materially 
altered. Afterwards,B inlsconducts himself. A Is dis-
charged by the change from future liability under his 
guarantee, thoflgh the misconduct of B Is In respect of 
a duty not affected by the latter Act, 
(c) C agrees to appoint B as his clerk to sell goods 
at a yearly salary, upon A's becoming surety to C for 
B's duly accounting for moneys received by him as such 
clerk. Afterwards, without A's knowledge or consent,C 
and B agree that B should be paid by a commission on 
the goods sold by him and not by aflxed salary, A Is 
not liable for subsequent misconduct of B. 
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(d) A gives to C a continuing guarantee to the extent 
o£ 3«000 rupees £or any oil supplied by C to B on credit. 
Afterwards B becomes embarrased and without the know-
ledge of A, B and C contract that C shall continue to 
supply B with oil for ready money, and that the payments 
shall be applied to the then existing debts between B 
and C. A is not liable on his guarantee for any goods 
supplied after this new arrangement. 
(e) C contracts to lend B 5«000 rupees on the first 
March, A guarantees repayment C pays the 5,000 rupees 
to B on the first January, A is discharged from his 
liability, as the contract has been varied inasmuch 
as c might sue B for the money before the first of 
March, 
134, Discharge of surety by release of discharge of 
principal debtor - The surety is discharged by 
any contract between the credit and the principal 
debtor, by which the principal debtor is released, 
or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal 
consequence of which is the discharge of the 
principal debtor. 
Illustrations 
(a) A gives a guarantee to C for goods to be supplied 
by c to B, C supplies goods to B, and afterwards B 
becomes embarrassed and contracts with his creditors 
(including C's to assign to them his property in eon* 
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sideration o£thelr relaliAAng him from their demands) • 
Here B is released frcxn his debt by the contract with 
C« and A is discharged from his suretyship* 
<b} A contracts with B to grow a crop of indigo on 
A*s land and to deliver it to B at a fixed rate^ and 
C guarantees A's performance of this contract. B 
diverts a stream of water which is necessary for irri-
gation of A's land and thereby prevents him from 
raising the indigo. C is no longer liable on his 
guarantee. 
(c) A contracts with B for a fixed price to build a 
house for B within a stipulated time, B supplying the 
necessary timber. C guarantees A's performance of the 
contract. B omits to supply the timber. C is discharged 
from his suretyship. 
135, Discharge of surety when creditor compounds with, 
gives time to, or agrees not to sue principal debtor -
A contract between the creditor and the principal 
debtor, by which the creditor makes a composition 
with, or promises to give time to, or not to sue 
the principal debtor, discharges the surety, unless 
the surety assents to such contract. 
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136• Surety not discharge when agreement made with 
third person to give time to principal debtor > 
Where a contract to give time to the principal 
debtor is made by the creditor with a third person* 
and not with the principal debtor* the surety is 
not discharged* 
Illustration 
C, the holder of an overdue bill of exchange drawn by 
A as sxirety or B, and accepted by B, contracts with M 
to give time to B. A is not discharged, 
137#Cz:editor*s forbearance to sue does not discharge 
surety - Mere forbearance on the part of the cre-
ditor to sue the principal debtor or to enforce any 
other remedy against him does not* in the absence of 
any provision in the guarantee to the contrary, 
discharge the surety. 
Illustration 
B owes to C a debt guaranteed by A. The debt 
becc»ies payable. C does not sue B for a year after the 
debt has become payable, A is not discharged from his 
suretyship, 
138. Release of one co-surety does not discharge others* 
Where there are co-sureties* a release by the 
creditor of one of them does not discharge the 
others; neither does it free the surety so released 
from his responsibility to the other sureties. 
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139. Discharge of surety by creditor's act or omission 
Impairing surety's eventual remedy « if the creditor 
does any act which la Inconsistent with the right 
of the surety, or omits to do any act which his 
duty to the surety requires him to do, and the 
eventual remedy of the surety himself against the 
principal debtor Is thexreby Impaired, the surety is 
discharged* 
Illustrations 
(a) B contracts to build a ship for C for a given sum, 
to be pedd by Instalments as the work reaches certain 
stages* A becomes surety to C for B*s due performance of 
the contract. C, without the knowledge of A, prepays to 
B the last two Instalments. A is discharged by this 
prepayment. 
(b) C lends money to B on the security of a joint and 
several promissory note made in C's favour by B, and A 
as surety, for B, together with a bill of sale of B's 
furniture, which gives power to C to sell the furniture, 
and apply the proceeds In discharge of the note. Subse-
quently, C sells the furniture, but, owing to his mis-
conduct and wilful negligence, only a small price is 
realized. A Is discharged from liability on the note. 
(c) A puts M as apprentice to B, and gives a guarantee to 
B for M's fidelity. B promises on his part that he will 
at least once a month, see M make up the cash. B. omits 
to see this done as pzt>ml8ed, and M embezacles. A Is not 
liable to B on his guarantee. 
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140, Rights of surety on payment or performance » where 
a guarantee debt has become due« or default of the 
principal debtor to perform a guaranteed duty has 
taken place, the surety, upon payment or performance 
of all that he Is liable for, isinvested with all the 
rights which the creditor had against the principal 
debtor« 
141, Surety's right to benefit of creditor's securities-
A surety is entitled to the benefit of every security 
which the creditor has against the principal debtor 
at the time when the contract of suretyship is 
entered into, whether the surety knows of the exis-
tence of such security or not; and, if the creditor 
loses, or, without the consent of the surety, parts, 
with such security, the surety is discharged to the 
extent of the value of the security. 
Illustrations 
(a) C advances to B; his tenant, 2,000 mpees on the 
guarantee of A» C has also a further security for the 
2,000 rupees by a mortgage of B's furniture, C cancels 
the mortage* B becones insolvent , and c sues A on his 
guarantee. A is discharged from liability to the amount 
of the value of the furniture. 
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(b) C, a creditor, whose advance to B is secvired by a 
decree, receives also a guarantee for that advance from A« 
C afterwards takes B*s goods in execution under the decree, 
and then, without the knowledge of A, withdraws the exe-
cution. A is discharged* 
(c) A, as surety for B, makes a bond Jointiby with B to C, 
to secvuce a loan from C to B, Afterwards, c obtains from 
B a further security for the same debt. Subsequently C 
gives up the further security. A is not discharged. 
142, Guarantee obtained by misrepresentation invalid - Any 
guarantee which has been obtained by means of mis-
representation made by the creditor, or with his 
knowledge and assent, concerning a material part 
of the transaction, is invalid. 
143. Guarantee obtained by concealment invalid •» Any 
guarantee which the creditor has obtained by means 
of keeping silence as to material circumstances is 
invalid. 
Illustrations 
(a) A engages B as clerk to collect money for him. B 
fails to account for some of his reipts, and A in con-
sequence calls upon him to furnish security for his duly 
accounting. C gives his guarantee for B's duly accounting, 
A does not acuaint C with B's previous conduct. B after-
wards makes default. The guarantee is invalid. 
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(b) A guarantees to C payment for Iron to be supplied 
by him to B to the amount of 2,000 tons, B and C have 
privately agreed that B should pay five rupees per ton 
beyond the market price, such excess to be applied In 
liquidation of an old debt. This agreement Is concealed 
from A* A Is not liable as a surety, 
144, Gurantee on contract that creditor shall not act 
on It until co-surety Joins - Where a person gives 
a guarantee upon a contract that creditor shall not 
act upon It until another person has Joined In It 
as cosurety, the guarantee Is not valid If that other 
person does not Join, 
145. Implied promise to Indemnify surety - In every con-
tract of guarantee thereis an implied promise by the 
principal debtor to indemnify the surety; and the 
surety is entitled to recover from the principal 
debtor whatever sum he has rightfully paid under 
the guarantee, but no sums which he has paid wrong-
fully. 
Illustrations 
(h) B is indebted to C, and A is sujcety for the debt, c 
demands payment from A, and on his refusal sues him for 
the ^ount, A defends the suit, having reasonable grounds 
for doing so,but is compelled to pay the amount of the Bill 
and costs,He can recover from B the amount of the bill,but 
not the s\irop paid for costs, as there was no real ground 
for defending the action. 
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(c) A guarantees to C, to the extent of 2,000 rxipees, 
payment for rice to be supplied by C to i^ C supplies 
to B rice to a less amount than 2,000 rupees, but obtains 
from A payment of the s\im of 2,000 irupees in respect of 
the rice supplied. A cannot recover from B more than the 
price of the rice actually supplied, 
146• Co-sureties liable to contribute equally - Where two 
or more persons are co-sureties for the same debt or duty , 
either jointly or severally, and whether under the same or 
different contracts, and vriiether with or without the 
knowledge of each other, the co-sureties, in the absence 
of any contract to the contrary, are liable, as between 
themselves, to pay each an equal share of the whole debt, 
or of that part of it which remains unpaid by the principal 
debtor. 
Illustrations 
(a) A, B and C are sureties to D for the sxim of 3,000 rupees 
lent to E, E makes default in payment. A, B and c are liable, 
as between themselves, to pay 1,000 rupees each, 
(b) A, B and C are sureties to D for the sum of 1,000 rupees 
lent to E, and there is a contract between A, B and c that 
A is to be responsible to the extent of one quarter, B to 
the extent of one quarter, and C to the extent of one half, 
E makes default in payment. As between the sureties, A is 
liable to pay 250 rupees, B 250 rupees and C 500 rupees. 
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147* Liability of co-sureties bound in different stuns - Co 
sureties who are bound in different sums are liable 
to pay equally as for as the limits of their respec-
tive obligations permit. 
Illustrations 
(a) A« B and c as sureties for D, enter into three several 
bonds, each in a different penalty^ namely^ A in the 
penalty of 10«000 rupees, B in that of 20,000 rupees,C 
in that of 40,000 rupees, conditioned for D*s duly accoun-
ting to E. D makes default to the extent of 30,000 mpees. 
A, B and C are liable to pay 10,000 rupees. 
(b) A, B and c, as surities for D, enter into three se^ezal 
bonds, each in a different penalty, namely, A in the penalty 
of 10,000 JTupees, B in that of 20,000 rupees, C in that of 
40,000 rupees conditioned for D*s duly accounting to E.D 
makes default to the extent of 40,000 rupees. A is liable 
to pay 10,000 rupees, and B and C 15,000 rupees each. 
(c) A, B and c, as sureties for D, enter into three 
several bonds, each in a different penalty, namely, A in 
the penalty of 10,000 rupees, B in that of 20,000 rupees, 
C in that of 40,000 rupees, conditioned for D's duly 
accounting to E. D makes default to the extent of 70,000 
rupees. A, B and C have to pay each the full penalty of 
his bond. 
APPENDIX - II 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND REPLIES RECEIVED 
1« Why do banks demand guarantee7 
2« Is it solely oni a third party guarantee or 
there are some other securities like pledge/ 
fixed deposit Acoount/Life Insurance Policies 
against which debt is granted? 
3, Why do banks give guarantee? 
4, Do banks arrange the guarcmtees? 
5, Do banks explain the nature of documents? 
6, Is the deed of guarantee signed before the 
Officer of the bank? 
7, Do principal debtor execute the surety bond? 
8, Do bank suggest the name of the guarantors? 
9, Do banks give informatibn to the guaramtor about 
the financial status of the custc»ner (principal 
debtor)? 
10vis guarantee a safe security for recovery of debt? 
11 .How for the guarantee is helpful for the business 
of banks? 
12, How for the debts/loans have affected social 
economic progress? 
13, Who are the beneficiaries of the loans? 
i ) Agriculture 
ii ) Industry 
iii } Urban Sector 
iv } Rural Sector 
V } Employed 
vi ) Unemployed 
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vll ) Educated 
vlll ) Uneducated 
14* How the recovery Is made? 
15, What Is the percentage of defaiilt? 
16, What are the causes of default? 
17• To what extent banks have been Involved In the 
litigation? 
18. What Is the reaction of the banks to the system 
of the guarantee? 
19. How for the present law Is satisfactory? 
20. Any other suggestioni 
Name of the haiik/ Corporation* 
Designation, 
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JAMMU & KASHMIR STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
SRINAGAR 
1, To ensxire that the borrower repays the instal-
ments of principal and interest to the Corporation 
on 4lue dates during the ctirrency of the loan. 
The guarantor is a third party of suitable means 
who enjoys influence on the borrower for meeting 
debt obligations to the financial Corporation* 
2, The Corporation insists on third party guarantee 
in every case where, however the borrower is not 
able to produce a guarantee of suitable means but 
is in a position to pledge his/her LIC policy/ 
fixed deposit account the same is accepted by the 
Corporation, 
3, The SPC gives guarantee as under t 
a. Guaranteeing, on such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed upont 
i. loans raised by industrial concern which 
are repayable within period not exceeding 
twenty years and are floated in the public 
market. 
ii, loans raised by Industrial concerns from 
schedule banks or state cooperative banks. 
b, guaranteeing on such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed 'upon deferred payments due 
from any industrial concern in connection 
with its purchase capital goods within India, 
4, The SFC, does not arrange the guarantee for the 
borrower except that recononendations may be made 
to any laanH/ financial institution for guaranteeing 
the arrangwnents of financial accommodation 
- Iv -
depending upon the merits of the case. 
5, Yes, the nature o£ the documents is explained 
to the executants be it the mortgagor or the 
guarantor, 
6, Yes every document is executed in pursuance 
of the concerned officer of the SFC. 
7, Yes 
8, No, except that it is suggested that the guarantor 
should be man of substantial means enjoying 
reputation in the market* 
9, Yes, but it is not the principal security for 
the reason that the guarantors meets as on effec-
tive agent between the landor and the borrower 
in the event of defaxxlt by the borrower. That 
being the position the guarantor is a suitable 
means if not a complete security for the recovery 
of debt, 
10, The guarantor has proved to be a quiten useful 
for the SPC on a majority of cases of default. 
The guarantors have been used as an effective 
tool for persuading the borrowers to meet the 
payment of dues forthwith. 
11, The loans are being granted by Corporation to 
enterpirenuers for setting up of industrial 
concerns engaged/to be engaged in various manu-
facturing activities. The financial assistance 
given by the Corporation under various schemes 
has definitely brought about a rapid industriali-
zation in the state, provided means of employment 
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opportunity to the paople and resulted a fantastic 
charges in the socio-economic pattern and living 
standard o£ the people* The weaker section of the 
population such as people below poverty lives living 
in far flung and rural areas have benefited from the 
schemes of the Corporation to a great extent. They 
have been provided loans upto Rs# 50,000/- per unit 
without margin and security for setting up of village 
and cottage industries. This scheme has brought living 
standard of the poor. 
12, ±2^ All the sectors have benefited a great deal as x 
Corporation has granted/is providing loans to entre-
prenures for setting up an industrial units/transport 
industry without discrimination of area/sector. However 
keeping in view the credit needs of different sectors, 
emphasis is laid on rural regional implances and employ-
ment. 
13. Recovery is effected by the following modes. 
a. personal pursuation with the borrowers through visits 
and inspections. 
11. pursuation with the help of guarantors. 
ill. Letters and notices of default sent to borrower/ 
guarantor, 
iv, action u/s 29/31 of SPC*s Act, 
a. Taking over the management of the unit, 
b. Transfer/sale of the limit, 
c. Institutions of a suit against the borrower/ 
guarantor In the Court of Law, 
taking help of the banks with whom borrowers have working 
capital account in the matter of receiving of recovery 
of dues* 
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14* As on 31st March 1988 the % age o£ default to the 
total outstanding loan was 31*5% 
li. The causes o£ default are oatariaed as under s 
!• Wilful defaulters i«e. the units are doing well 
but not paying the dues of the Corporation 
deliberately* 
ii« Non availability of raw material« lack of market, 
iii.Non availability of goods/inadequacy of working 
capital, 
iv, Non availability of power 
16, AS on 3l8t March 1988 57« units for recovery of 
dues were pending settlement in the court of law for 
an amount which forms 0,67% of the total balance 
outstanding loan is on 31,3,1988, 
17, SFC feels that obtension of guarantee of a third 
party is alright so as to make the guarantor who is 
a person of means proposed by the borrowers himself 
responsible for repayment of dues by the borrower 
to the SFC, It gives a psychological awening to 
the borrower that apart from the lending institution 
is being pursuaded by a third person (guarantor) 
to need the financial obligations. The guarantor 
becomes legally bound to make irepayment in the event 
of failure of the main borrower. 
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JAMMU AND KASHMIR BANK 
1« To secure their advances. In case of default the 
banks invoke guarantee, 
2, No . The Banks also accept other securities such 
as hypothication of stocks , Fixed depdsits/pledge^ 
Life Insurance Policies and mortgage of Immovable 
Properties, 
3, To facilitate their clients to execute their contracts 
with other parties* This assures the person* in 
whose favour guarantee is issued« that the other 
party will execute his part of the contract, 
4, Guarantors take pains usually to seciire repayment 
of loans, 
5, Yes 
6, Yes - always then to be signed by Judge or Notary. 
7, No - No separate bond is executed x±±± but he 
assures repayment in loan agreement itself and 
executes a demand prcsnisory note in favour of the 
Bank, 
8, No - But the guarantor should have sufficient 
means to cover the bank advance, 
9» Ho, But the Bank informs the guarantor the total 
amount of advances for which he has to give his 
guarantee• 
10. Not always 
11, It assures repayment from third person in case the 
principal debtor is unable to pay. 
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12» The Bank debt is the back bone of Indian Econcsny, 
Any plan made by the authorities is not implimented 
unless it is financed by banks. The loans have 
accelerated the growth of agriculture, expansion 
of Industries , self employment finally increased 
the percapita income of India. 
13, All 
14* 1, Normal recovery 
2, By sale of hypothicated good 
3« By sale of mortgage property 
in case of default 
15, 30 to 4056 
16, 1« Wilful default,2 Failure of crop due to natural 
calamities 3, Marketing problem in industrial 
products and 4. Under financing 
17. The banks usually avoid litigation but to avoid 
that the securities are expired Banks are involved 
in litigation. 
18 
• The guarantee helps the banks in recovery provided 
the guarantor is a third person and not a family 
member. 
18. The Present law is totally ineffective . The 
provision must be made to authorise banks to 
recover the dues themselves* 
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THB ANANTNAG CENTRAL COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. 
I. When credit facilities are given to an individual 
firin^  corporation , banksd^ uoutgl demand various 
dooiments•in some cases mortgage of property and 
in some cases guarantee of respectable person is 
accepted, A aim of the Bank is that in case of 
default amount will be recovered from Guarantors 
II, Not only on third party guarantee loans are being 
advanced but on mortgage of property hypothecation 
of goods or moveable property* Loansare being 
sanctioned against fixed deposit, other securities 
like pledge* However, no loan's being 9iven against 
insurance policies 
III* No 
Iv No 
5* Banks or any other financial Institutional explain 
the nature of docximents to a loanee as well as to him 
guarantor/ 
6. Yes, the deed of guarantee is being signed before 
the officers of the Bank* 
7. Yes 
8. No, but, guarantor should be well-known to Bank 
and having good reputation* 
9* Not in every case, but, same case were guarabtors 
all fail to repay the loan, one is referred to 
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Registrar or any other officer whom powers 
have been delegated* 
10, Guarantee is helpful for the business of the 
Banker SPC but, bank has to see other aspects 
also before sanction of loan. 
11, It is due to the Banks or other institutions that 
State has made progress in Agriculture, Industry 
and transport etc. Tourism has also made progress 
as house boat owners, hotel owners are being 
provided financial assistance* 
13* i } Agriculture 
ii ) Industry 
iii) Urban sector 
iv) Rural sector 
V ) Un-employed ( but not Employed ) 
vl ) Educated and 
(vii) uneducated 
14* Recovery is being made as per the agreement in 
Instalments ( monthly or yearly ) from the principal 
debtor. However, in case of default notice is issued 
to guarantors, 
15. It is abour 40% 
16. Some are wilful defaulters, some times default is 
due to crop failure , non-availability of marketing 
facilities. Some times due to mismanagement, 
17, An amount of about 20 lakhs is involved, 
18. The system <bf guarantee is invoage,however,hypdthe> 
cation or mortgage deed is more effective for safty of 
advance. 
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Elaquiai Oahati Bank, Srinagar 
I. To secure the repayment of advances» 
2» The advanced can be secxared by third party 
realisible • However where the security is 
realizlble, like Fixed Deposits, LZC Policies etc, 
the advances can be greeted without the guarantee, 
3, The guarantee is offered by Banks on better client 
relations, 
4, NO, 
5, Yes in detail also in regional language 
6, Yes. It is a must 
7, Yes 
8, No - Borrower has to suggest himself the guarantor 
and they should be acceptable to Bank, 
9, Yes - To educate guarantos all the details are , 
furnished in regional language 
10, Yes 
II. Helpful for recovery aspects 
12, To a maximum extent Bank have been successful in 
poverty Removal thereby the society has obtained 
social and economic progress., 
13, These are all eligible 
14, Recoveries are made from the surplus amount 
guaranteed by the Banker from a scheme project 
financed by the Bank, Modes of recovery include. 
personal contact with borrowers, camps organisa-
tions etc# 
15, About 40% 
16, Diversion of funds from the parrent scheme. Lack 
of job knowledge, wrong identification, wilful 
default , political intervention, natural calamities. 
17, 5% to 10% 
18, The guarantee system to a limit of ''^s, 10,000 has been 
waived of as suggested by Kelkar Canmittee, However 
personal contacts are being encouraged« This is 
called now social banks, 
19, Not quite satisfactory 
a) Prom borrowers point of vlew-
(i) the high costs are involved 
(II) Fran Bank's point of viewt 1, High casts 
(2) Delay in litigation (3) The Bg^r^k officers 
should be authorized upto a certain limit, 
to K^HK adjudicate the suits, 
20, Application of Arbitration Act and Land Revenue 
Act may be extended to all the Bankd, 
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KAMRAZ RURAL BANK 
1, To secure the advance 
2« There are some other securities 
3« Banks do not give guarantee 
4, No 
5, Yes 
6, Yes 
7, NO 
8, No 
9* To scxne extent 
10. If the principal debtor beccmes defaulter, we can 
preasurise him through guarantors. 
11• To a great extent 
13. All are eligible except employed on«« 
14. He persuade the borrower for the liquidation of debt. 
15. 60% 
16. Loan amount is not invested for the purpose granted. 
17. Very leas 
18. Not good 
19. Very lengthy 
APPENDIX - III 
13th,Report of Law Commisalon of India 
Contract Act< 1872(Relevant portion) 
g 126- ^^^* ^^ change is considered necessary in sectioaa 126 
^^^V to 129. 
Sec.130. 106. There is divergence of opinion between some High 
Courts as to the right of the sureties to revoke surety 
bonds given to Courts. In Bai 8<xni v, Chokshi, which 
was a case of security for the guardian of a minor's 
estate, it was held that section 130 was inapplicable 
and that such a surety could not be discharged, as the 
very object of requiring security was to gueurantee the 
minor's estate against the misconduct or mismanagement 
on the part of the guardian. In Raj Narain v. Ful Kumari« 
a case under the probate and Administration Act, the 
surety had made an application for his discharge on the 
ground that the Administrator had been guilty of waste 
which the surety could not prevent. It was held that it 
was open to the Court to grant the application. In 
Subroya Chetti v, Ragammall, an application by the surety 
for an administrator for his discharge, was dismissed on 
the ground that no such maladministration had been proved. 
Thereupon the surety instituted a suit praying that the 
Coxxrt should discharge the plaintiff from his guarantees 
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as a surety in regard to future transactions* The 
suit was dismissed upon the grounds that 
(1) The making of an order for discharge might defeat 
the object for which an Administrator is required 
to find sureties to his administration bonds; 
(2) Section 130 does not apply to a special contract 
of suretyship; and 
(3) If the section applies to an administration bond, 
the surety could, without any action or any legal 
proceeding put an end to his liability by giving 
notice to the Registrar or to the Court, 
^" Kandhya Lai v, Monki the view of the Madras High 
Court was followed and it was hold that where a person 
guarantees that an administrator will duly get in 
and administer the estate of a deceased person, there 
is a continuing guarantee within the meaning of 
sec* 129. 
In our opinion the law has been correctly stated by 
Sulaiman, A.C.J, in In goods of Dr. Abinash Chandra, 
It was held in that case that although it was true 
that the surety cannot claim as of right to be 
relieved of all liability by merely expressing his 
intention to do so either by notice or by a proper 
application to the Court and, although it is also true 
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that the case of a surety whose security has been accepted 
by a courts cannot be treated as one falling under 
sections 129 and 130 of the Contract Act so as to 
entitle him to put an end to the guarantee at his will, 
yet that is quite a different thing from saying that 
the High Court itself to which the guarantee isgglven 
has no power to exonerate the surety from all liability 
for future transactions. This view is in consonance 
with that of the Privy Council in Mahoroed All v^ Howeson 
Bros. We recommend that an Exception be added to the 
section providing that a guarantee given to the Court 
cannot be revoked without the peirmission of the Court. 
sees,131- 107, No change is considered necessary in sections 131 
133. 
to 133, 
Sec.134, 108, There was a conflict of authority upon the question 
whether a surety is discharged when a creditor allows 
his remedy against the principal-debtor to become 
barred by limitation* The Bombay, Calcutta and 
Madras High Courts took the view that the surety is 
not discharged; while the Allahabad High Court had 
taken a different view. In Mahanth Singh v, U Ba Yi, 
the view of the majority of the High Courts was 
preferred. It was held that not every unenforceable 
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I 
contract was declared void, but only those unenforceable 
law',and that those words meant not unenforceable by ±xx^ 
reason of some procedural regulation, but unenforceable 
by substantive law. A mere failure to sue within the 
time specified by the statute of limitation or an 
inability to sue by ree|8on of the provisions of one 
of the Oirders under Civil Procedure Code would not cause 
a contract to become void. It was observed that sections 
134 and 139 were merely declaratory of the law in England. 
We recommend that an Explanation be added to clarify 
this position and the view of the privy council be adopted, 
109* There has been a difference of opinion betvfeen the 
Madras and the Nagpur High Courts as t© the effect of 
Debt Relief Acts upon the liability of the surety. In 
cases where the creditor proves his debt but the debt Is 
scaled down by the Board, the Madras High Court has taken 
the view that the surety is liable only for the reduced 
amount, while the Magpur High Court has held that the 
surety remains liable for the whola of the original debt, 
in agreement with Pollock auid Mull a, we prefer the 
opinion of the Madras High Court, vrtiich appears to be 
more in consonance with justice. This conflict,however, 
does not necessitate any change in the language of the 
section* 
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Sees*135- 110* No change ia considered necessary in sections 135 
140. 
to 140• 
sec,141, 111* This section limits the surety's right to the 
securities held by the creditor at the date of his 
becoming surety* According to the current English law 
"a surety has on payment and not before, a right to 
the benefit of all the securities, %fhether known to 
him or not at the time when he became surety, which 
the creditor has received from the principal-debtor, 
before, contemporaneously with, or after, the creation 
of the suretyship, and whether or not they existed at 
the time when the guarantee was given. We think that 
the law upon this point should be brought in line with 
the English law. 
112, The section does not lay down at what point of time 
the surety is entitled to have the creditor's securities 
made over to him wholly or in part, whether at the time 
vfien the deb$: of the creditor is paid off or when the 
surety pays the amount of his guarantee* There is a 
difference between the Bombay and Madras H.gh Courts on 
this point. In Goveirdhandas v# The Bank of Bengal, a 
surety had guaranteed an allquotor a defined portion of 
past debt secured by mortgage. On payment by him of 
the portion of the debt guaranteed by him, he claimed 
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to be entitled to share in the mortgage in proportion 
to the amount of the debt which he had guaranteed 
and paid before the mortgagee had been paid the full 
amount of his mortgage debt* This claim was rejected. 
In Parvataneni Bhushayya v, Suryanarayana# the Madras 
High Court doubted the correctness of this view. That 
Court decided that the surety was entitled to a propor-
tionate share in a security held by the creditor at 
the time the surety discharged his liability even though 
the creditor was not fully paid* Pollock and Mulla 
opined that the view taken by the Madras High Court is 
inequitable and that the creditor's right to hoJbd 
securities until the whole debt has been paid is para-
mount to any claim of the surety whether based upon 
section 140 or section 141» We agree with the opinion 
of the learned Commentators and recommend that it 
should be made clear that the surety is entitled to have 
the creditor's securities made over to him only when 
the creditor is fully paid off* 
Sec. 142 113. We think that a comma should be inserted after 
the woxd 'misrepresentations and the existing comma 
after the word 'creditor' removed, in order clearly to 
bring out that the section deals with the case of a 
guarantee obtained by means of misrepresentation whether 
the same is brought by the creditor or by some one else, 
with his knowledge and assent. 
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sec*143 114, It has been held that this section provides 
for the case of a guarantee obtained by wilful 
silence as distinguished from mere non-disclosure. 
The language of the section should be brought Into 
conformity with the judicial opinion. 
Sec,144, 115, No change is necessary in section 144, 
Sec,145, 116, Pollock and Mulla auggeat that the words 'right-
fully' and 'wrongfully* are not felicitous and that 
they .-should be Substituted by the wor^s 'reasonably' 
and 'unreasonably*, We do not agree, 'Rightfully' was 
intended to convey that the suras paid were such as 
the creditor was legally entitled to recover and, 
therefore, the surety had the right to pay, and, 
likewise, the expression 'wrongfully' was Intended 
to convey that the sums paid were such as the creditor 
was legally not entitled to recover^ and, therefore, 
the surety was wrong in paying the same. We feel 
that the expressions used by the legislature more 
fuliy convey the Intended idea than the suggested 
Expression, 
117, Controversy has arisen on the question whether 
a surety paying a debt which is barred by limitation 
as against the debtor can be said to have paid it 
rightfully' within the meaning of this section. We 
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think the affizmatlve is the correct answer as 
the rights of the surety arise not from the lia-
bility of the debtor but from the discharge of 
his own liability* An Explanation should be added to 
the section to make this clear* 
lie* In appropriate cases the suz«ty is entitled 
to recover special damages beyond the sum he has 
actually been compelled to pay* It has been 
observed that his right is not merely a right to 
stand in the shoes of the creditor but is founded 
upon an independent ec[uity* 
An Explanation should be added to the section to 
clearly presexrve this right* 
Sees.146-7* 119* No change is recommended in sections 146 to 147. 
To section 130 of the Principal Act, the following 
Sec*130. Ex-eeption shall be added, namelyt 
"Exception- A continuing guarantee given 
to a court cannot be revoked by the surety 
as to future transactions, without the 
permission of the court"* 
Sec*134* In Section 134 of the Principal Act, the following 
Explanation shall be inserted at the end, namelyL 
"Explanation! For the purposes of this section, 
the following do not amount to acts or omissions 
• Ix -
the legal consequence of vrhi(ph Is discharge of 
the principal debtorlt-
(I) mere failure to sue the principal debtor 
within the time specified by euiy law relating to 
limitation for the time being In force; 
(II) Inability to sue the principal debtor, 
arising by reason of any provision contained In 
any of the Orders In the First Schedule of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"* 
For section 141 of the Principal Act, the following 
.section shall be substituted, neunelyt 
"141. Surety^s right to benefit of creditor's sacurlties. 
If the debt or liability owed by the principal 
debtor to the creditor has been paid or discharged 
in fuil, the surety is entitled to the benefit of 
every security which the creditor has against the 
principal debtor, whether such security was or was 
not in existence at the time when the contract of 
suretyship was entered into, and whether such 
security was received by the creditor before, con-
temporeuieously with or after the contract of surety-
ship was entered into, and whether the surety knows 
of the existence of such security or not; and if 
APPENDIX - IV 
SOME SPECIMENS OP GUARANTEE DEEDS 
Deed Of Guarantee 
State Bank of India 
Place 
Date 
In consideration of the State Bank of India 
{hereinafter referred to as "the Bank") having at my/our 
request granted/agreed to grant/continue to grant fran 
time to time to 
Shri/Smt« •••••••••••••••*••••••«• ••••••• 
Son of/wife of/daughter of 
Address ••••••• •*•••••••••••••••• • 
Smri/Smt •«••••••••••• • ••• 
Son of/wife of/daughter of 
Address •••••••••••* •• ••••• 
Shri/Smt, «•..••«••••«• *.•»«• •••• 
Son of/wife of/daughter of 
- ii -
Address •••••••• < 
Shri/Smt ^.•••••••*««**i 
son of/wife of/daughter of 
Address 
here enter name<s) of individual borrower/co-owner borrowers 
OR 
If the borrower is other than 
indivldual/co-owners, the 
norrower is to be described 
here in accordance with the 
constitution of the borrower 
as per the Administrative 
Instruction No, ••• 
who are carrying on the business of farming/rearing of 
cattle ^" flocH/fial^ i-fig sericulture (hereinafter 
referred to as "the borrower(s)") 
(1) Cash Credits at any one time upto 
the limit ofRs •... Rupees only 
(2) Overdraft at any one time to the 
extent of Rs, * •., •••• •• Rupees only 
(3) Demand Loans at any one time for Rs« ••.••••• 
• •••••••••••• •«••••••••«•• Rupees only 
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the creditor loses or, without the consent 
of the surety, parts with such security, the 
surety is discharged to the extent of the vajue 
of the security". 
Sec,142, In section 142 of the principal Act -
(a) a comma shall be inserted after the word 
"misrepresentation"; 
(b) the comma appearing after the word "creditor" 
shall be omitted. 
Sec,143, In section 143 of the principal Act, for the 
words "by means of keeping silence" the words 
"by wilful silence" shall be substituted. 
Sec,145, To section 145 of the principal Act, the 
following Explanations shall be added, namely; 
Explanation 1- The right of the surety to 
indemnity under tjiis section shall not be deemed 
to prejudice his right to recover damages in 
appropriate cases, 
Explantion 2 - Payment by a surety of a debt 
barred as against the principal debtor by limi-
tation, is a payment made "rightfully" within 
the meaning of this section". 
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(4} Term Loans a t any one time of Rs» • • • • • • • * • • • • • • * • (Rupees 
only) 
(hereinafter collectively and individually referred 
to as "the loans") 
l/we 
Son of/daughter of/wife of 
Address 
Son of/daughter of 
Address 
Son of/daughter of/wife of 
Address 
Son of/daughter of/ 
wife of 
Address 
hereby guarantee Repayment of all moneys payable 
by the Borrower(s) to the Bank in respect of the 
loans together with interest thereon and all costs 
and esqpenses and the performance by the borrower's) 
of the terms of the loans euid l/we also agree to pay 
and make good to the Bank on demand all losses^costs* 
demages and expenses occasioned to the Bank by reason 
of non-payment or the breach of any of the terms 
aforesaid subject to the terms and conditions herein-
after contained} 
• V -
compound or make any other arrangement with the 
borrower(8) without releasing or discheLrglng me/us 
and/or in any manner affecting my/our liability 
under the guarantee. In the event of any such 
variation or composition or agreement I/we shall be 
deemed to become liable hereunder in all respects 
including such variation composition or arrangement. 
That the guarantee hereby given is independent and 
distinct from any security that the Bank has stipulated 
to take or has taken or may take in any manner what-
soever shall nave been fully satisfied. And further 
that notwithstanding the provisions of sections 140 
and 141 of the Contract Act 1872, or any other pro-
visions of ammicttua. that Act or any other law, I/we 
will not claim to be discharged on account of the 
Bank's failure to take any security or for losing far 
any reason whatsoever including reasons attributable 
to Bank's default and negligence and to the operation 
of law any such security. 
That without prejudice to the effect in any manner 
whatsoever of the foregoing clause, the Bank's failure 
in requiring performance of any of the terms contained 
in any Agreement(s) or letter(s) and the default of 
the Bank in enforcing the performance of any of the 
terms shall not have the effect of releasing me/us from 
my/our liability. 
• vi -
6< That If the Borrower(s) shall become Insolvent, 
enter into liquidation (compulsory or voluntary) 
or make any arrangement or composition with creditors, 
the Bank (notwithstanding payment to the Bank by me/us 
or any other person of the whole or any part of the 
amount hereby secured/shall rank as creditor and 
prove against the estate of the Borrower(s) for the 
full amount of the Bank's claims against the(Borrower(s 
or agree toand accept any composition in respect 
thereof and the Bank may receive and retain the whole 
of the dividends, compensation or other payments 
thereof to the exclusion of all my/our rights as 
guarantor(s) in competition with the Bank until all 
the Bank's claims are fully satisfied and l/we will 
not by paying off the amount payable by me/us or any 
part thereof or otherwise prove or claim against the 
estate of the Borrowers until the whole of the Bank's 
claim against the Borrower(s), in respect of all the 
liabilities whatsoever, have been satisfied and the 
Bank may enforce and recover payment from me/us of 
the full amount payable by me/us notwithstanding any 
such proof or composition as aforesaid. 
- vll -
7, That in the case of Borrowers being at flrm(s) my/our 
guarantee and obligations hereunder shall not be 
affected by any change In the constitution of such 
flrm(s) whether consisting of or reduced to one 
Individual at any time and in the case of our being 
a firm, our firm and all members from time to time 
thereof shall be bound hereby notwithstanding any 
change in the constitution of our firm whether con-
sisting of or reduced to one individual at anytime 
and being more than one individual all of us shall 
be bound Jointly and severally. We further agree 
that in the event of our being more than one indivi-
dual unconnected in partnership notwithstanding 
anything hereinbefore contained we shalltbe Jointly 
and severally liable to the Bank for the entire 
outstanding in respect of the loans, 
®' That the Guarantor hereby gives his consent for the 
amount under this guarantee being zrecovered as a 
public demand/moneys in terms of any legislation 
relating to recoveries thereof, where such consent 
is required under such legislation* 
Here enter 
the name of 
language. 
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The contents of the Deed have been read over and 
translated into ••••••••.• •••••••.••••• and 
explained t4 the Guarantor(a) and he/they having 
understood the contents thereof subscribe(s) to 
these presents* 
Signed and delivered by the said 
Shri (Guarantor) 
Shri • ••**«. ( Guarantor) 
Shri • ••••••••• ( Guarantor ) 
Shri ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ( Guarantor ) 
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DEED OF GUARANTEE 
This deed of guarantee is executed this the ,.,,, 
day of «••••• •••• at Srinagar,between «->-«-%•••*•«••• 
Son of .*••»•••••••• *•• R/o •••••••••••••••«•«•• 
(hereinafter referred to as the guarantors) which 
expression shall be deemed to mean and Include their 
heirs« executors, administrators« representatives and 
noninees etc* in favour of the Jammu and Kashmir Bank 
Limited having its Registered Office at Residency Road 
Srlnagar and a branch office at Nallamar Road Srlnagar 
( hereinafter referred to as the Bank) which expression 
shall unless repugnant to the context thereof be deemed 
to include its assigns and nominees and successors in 
interest. 
Whereas the Bank has sanctioned an advance facility 
to the extent of Rs, /- (Rupees . 
in favour of •• ••••••••••••• S/o«.««, 
R/o, •,.. • •*••,••••*•••••••••• (hereinafter called 
the borrower) against the security of the hypothecation 
of stocks of allkinds of Klryana goods etc: 
Whereas the said advance facility granted in favour 
of the borrower is intended to be further secured by the 
personal guarantee of the above said guarantors and 
Whereas the said guarantors have in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the Bank's requirement agreed to 
execute this deed of guarantee in favour of the Bank as se-
curity for the credit facility allowed to the borrower. 
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NOW THIS DEED WITNESSETH AS UNDER 
1* That in eonsideratlon of the Bank having agreed 
to sanction loan to the extept of Rs» /(Rupees 
) in favour of the borrower the receipt 
whereof shall be acknowledged by the said borrower at 
the time of execution of the docioments and or withdrawal 
of money by him frcm the Bemk, the Guarantors hereby 
guarantee to the Bank the full repayment of all the 
moneys including the principal money, the interest 
thereon at the ruling rate andoother charges charged by 
the Bank on these accounts in the course ofits business 
as bankers which shall at any time be due to you from the 
said borrower towards the Bank on his respective account 
with the Bank or any other account, whatsoever when the 
same shall be owing and become payable by the said 
borrower to the Bank until the entire dues inkkthe borro-
wer's said respective account with the Bank within this 
branch at Nallamar Road,Srinagar is fully liquidated and 
the borrower discharged from any liability whatsoever to 
the Bank as such. 
2, That the guarantee shall be without any prejudice 
to any security/ies which the Bank may now or hereafter 
have from the borrower or from any one else in respect of 
any indebtedness or liabilities. 
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3, That the guarantee shall be continuing guarantee 
and shall not be considered as wholly or partially 
satisfied or exhausted by any payroents from time to 
tlme« The guarantee shall also continue to remain 
In force from time to time notwithstanding the 
discharge of the borrower by operations of law, 
4, That the Bank shall have the full dlscretlonery 
without any assent or knowledge of the guarantors to 
negotiate with the borrower and settle and or alter 
the terms and conditions of the loan to compromise, 
to grant time and Indulgence or to sue the borrower 
or compound or make any other arrangement with the 
borrower as the Bank may think fit and to hold over, 
revive, vary, exchange, or release In whole or part 
any security held by the Bank as security for or on 
account of the moneys or part thereof. The guarantor 
further agree that It shall not be discharged from 
liability by the Bank's releasing the borrower. It Is 
also agreed that the Guarantors shall not be entitled 
to any of the rights conferred as sureties by sec-
tions 133,134, 135 and 141 of the Contract Act, 
5, That the Bank may recover against the Guarantors 
notwithstanding that any securities given or to be 
given to the Bank may be void, defective or that the 
borrower has exceeded Its powers or that the 
arrangements of the borrower with the Bank are 
ultravires and without being bound to enforce 
Its claim, the Bank shall not be bound to enquire 
Into the powers of the borrower and all moneys 
due and liabilities incurred shall be deemed to 
form part of the present guarantee. 
6. That in case default shall be made in the payment 
of the borrower to the Bank or any lawful claim or 
demand held by Bank against the borrower, the 
guarantee hereby covenents, promises, and agrees to pay 
the same to the Bank, its successors ^pd assigns 
on demand, 
7. That the Guarantors further agree that with resi)ect 
to its liability hereunder, the Bank shall have a 
lien on all seouJCities belonging to the Guarantors 
now or hereafter standing belonging to the Guarantors 
now or hereafter standing to the credit with the Bank 
. on any account* 
8. That any account settled by or staxrted between 
the Bank and the borrower or admitted by the 
borrower »hall be concepted by the guarantors as 
conclusive evidence, A certificate in writing signed 
by an officer of the Bank standing the balance on 
any particular date payable under this deed of guaran-
tee shall be conclusive evidence against the Guarantoi 
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9, That notwithstanding any meaning or import or 
otherwise in any clause therefore this guarantee shall 
be full complete and perfect and continuing one shall 
remain in force and the said above named Guarantors 
till the loan secured under this guarantee is fully 
adjusted and alongwith the interest thereon and also 
the charges that are incurred by the Bank and the 
accounts of the borrower closed in the books of the 
Bank. 
10, That the Bank shall be free to invoke the guarantee 
and the Guarantors undertake to pay the amount to the 
Bank secured under this guarantee within seven days 
from the date of receipt of demand in writing from the 
Bank* 
11* That this guarantee shall be enforceable notwith-
standing any change in the name, of the Bajtik* It shall 
ensure for the benefit of any banking company with the 
Bank shall assign itself to* 
12. That if the borrower shall at any time be found not 
to be liable to the Bank under any law in force for the 
advance/s made or credit/a given by the Bank to the 
borrower by reasons of its incapacity to the borrower 
to contract tor for any other reasons, the Guarantors 
shall nevertheless be liable on the principal debutors 
pay to the Bank all sums that would have been recoverable 
by the Bank from the borrower and this guarantee shall 
be construed accordingly the consideration for the 
giving of which shall be the peeping of the composite 
fierm loan account in the name of the borrower and 
permitting such accounts to be over-drawn or the pen-
ding payments or advancements of moneys to for on on 
an account of or apparantly for the purpose of the 
debutor as the case may require, 
13, That the Guarantors declare that it has not received 
any security from the borjrower from giving this guarantee 
and agree that it shall not, so long as any money remain 
owing by the borrower to the Bank or any liability 
incurred by the Bank remain outstanding, take any secu-
rity in respect of its liabilities, hereunder without 
first obtaining the Bank's consent in writing* 
14, That a demand in writing shall be deemed to have 
been duly made to the Guarantors If sent by post under 
registered cover and shall be deemcKi to have been 
received by the said Guarantors six days after posting 
thereof and shall be sufficient if signed by an officer 
of the Bank and in proving that the letter containing 
the demand was properly addressed and send under regis-
tered cover* 
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In witness whereof the parties mentioned 
above have signed this deed of guarantee on the 
date and place first above written in presence oft 
Witnesses t 
1 • 
s/o • • 
R/O • *• 
2 
s/o ....••....••*.••••• 
R/o , • * • 
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DEED OF GUARANTEE 
This Indenture made the day of. 
One thousand nine hundred and eighty 
between 
hereinafter calj.ed "THE GUARAOTOR/S" ( which expression 
shall unless repugnant to the context or meaning thereof 
be deemed to include his/their respective heirs,successors« 
executors, and administrators) of the one part and the 
JAMMU AND KASHMIR BANK LIMITED ( a Joint stock company 
incorporated under the Jammu and Kashmir ccmpanies Act 
No. XI of 1977 and having its registered office at Srinagar 
hereinafter called "The Bank ( which expression shall 
unless repu9nant to the context or meaning thereof be 
deemed to include its assigns) of this other part* 
Whereas this deed is intended to be supplemental 
to the Deed of HypothecationAieiJ'einafter called "the 
deed of hypothecation" dated and made 
betwee n 
(hereinafter called "the Borrower") of the one part 
and the Bank of the other part being deed of hypothecation 
of the vehicle bearing Engine No. Chassis 
No. and Regiatratton No. 
referred to therein to secure repayment to the Bank of 
« xvii -
the principal sum of Rs, .___.____...___ with interest 
hereon at the rate therein mentioned; 
And whereas the Bank agreed to lend the said sum 
of Rs, to the borrower at their request and 
upon the terms that the guarantor/s should give to the 
Bank such guarantee as hereinafter appears. Now this 
Indenture Witnesseth and it is hereby convenanted as 
agreed (the guarantor/s contracting jointly and severally) 
as follows»-
1. If at any time default shall be made in the payment 
of the instalment of principal and/or interest and/ 
or any other money's for the time being due to the 
Bank upon the security of the hypothecation of the 
vehicle and guarantor/s vill pay the Bank the whole 
of such principal, interest and other moneys which 
shall then be due to the Bank as aforesaid and will 
Indemnify and keep indemnified the Bank against all 
loss of principal. Interest or the moneys secured 
by the hypothecation and all costs, charges and 
expenses whatever which the Bank may incur by reason 
of any default on the part of the borrower, its 
successors or on assigns* 
2, The Bank shall have the fulless liberty without 
affecting this guarantee to postpone for any tike or 
from time to time the exercise of the power of sale 
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or any other power or powers conferred by the 
Deed of Hypothecation and to exercise the satne at 
any time and in any manner and either to enforce 
or forbear to enforce covenants for payment of 
principal or interest or any other covenants con-
tained or implied in the Deed of Hypothecation or 
any other remedies or securities available to the 
Bank and the Guarantor/s shall not be released by 
any exercise by the Bank of its liability with 
reference to the matters aforesaid or any of them 
or by reason of time being given to the borrower, 
its successors or assigns of any other forbearance 
act, on onmission on the part of the Bank or any 
other indulgence by the Bank to the borrower or 
by any other matter or thing whatsoever which under 
the law Relating to sureties would but for this 
proviWon have the effect of so releasing the 
Guarantor/s• 
3« The Guarantor/s will obsexrve and perform all the 
terms, conditions and covenants contained in the 
Deed of Hypothecation in such manner in which the 
borrower is liable for the due observance and per-
formance of the said terms, conditions and covenants* 
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4. The guarantee herein contained shall be enfor-
ceable against the Guarantor/s notwithstanding 
the securities specified in the Deed of Hypothe-
cation or any of them at the time when proceedings 
are taken against the Guarantors hereunder be 
outstanding or realised* 
5. In order to give effect to the guarantee herein 
contained the Bank shall be entitled to act as if 
the Guarantor/s was/were the principal debtor/s to 
the Bank for all payments and covenants guaranteed 
by him/them as aforesaid to the Bank, 
6. The guarantee contained in this Deed is a con-
tinuing one for all amount advanced on hereafter 
to be advanced by the Bank to the borrower under 
the Deed of Hypothecation as also for all interest, 
costs and other moneys which may from time to time 
become due and remain unpaid to the Bank thereunder, 
?• The guarantee herein contained shall not be deter-
mined or affected by the death of any one or more 
of the Guarantors but shall in all respects and 
for all purposes be binding and operative until, 
repayment of all moneys due to the Bank as aforesaid. 
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8. Th« guarantee herein contained shall not be 
determined or in any way prejudiced by any 
absorption of or by the Bank or any amalgamation 
thereof or therewith but shall ensure and be 
available for and by the absorbing or amalgamated 
Bank or concern• 
In witness whereof the Guarantor/s have hereunto 
set his/their respective hands the day and year first 
eOitove written* 
Signed by the above named, 
Witness I 
2. 
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THE JAMMU AM) KASHMIR BANK LTD, 
Hypothecation of goods to secure a Demand 
Cash credit/Overdrafts, 
NO, 
Amount Rs» 
Name J 
The Jan«mu and Kashmir Bank Ltd,, ( hereinafter 
called "The Bank") having at the request of 
(hereinafter called the borrowers) opened or agreed to 
open in the books of the Bank at ________^ ,___ a cash 
credit/overdraft account to the extent o£ Rupees 
with the borrowers ta remain in lc>w force 
until closed by the Bank and to be secured by goods 
to be hypothecated with the Bank it is hereby agreed 
between the Bank and the borrowers ( the borrowers agreeing 
jointly and severally) as followsi 
1, The borrowers hereby hypothecate in favour of the 
Bank the goods described in general terms in the schedule 
(hereinafter referred to as the 'hypothecated goods') 
which expression shall include all products, goods and 
movable property of any kinf belonging to the borrowers 
which now or hereinafter from time to time during this 
security shall be brought in, stored or be in or about 
the borrowers' premises or godowns at 
or wherever else the same may be as security for the 
payment by the borrowers to the Bank of the balance 
due to the Bauik at any time or ultimately on the 
closing of the said cash credit/overdraft account and 
for the payment of all debts and liabilities mentioned 
in the 13th class hereof. The expression 'the balance 
due to the Bank* in this and the subsequent clauses of 
this Agreement shall be taken to include the principal 
moneys from time to time due on the said cash credit/ 
owerdrafit account and also all interest thereon calcu-
lated from day to day at the rate hereinafter mentioned 
and the amount of all charges and expenses which the 
Bank may have paid or Incurred in any way in connection 
with the hypothecated goods or the sale or disposal 
thereof in covering any type of insurance risk thereon 
including fire, burglary and riot and civil eotrotiotion 
risks, 
2« That the hypothecated goods and all sales, realiza-
tion and insurance proceeds thereof shall be held as the 
Bank's exclusive property specially appropriated to this 
security and the borrowers will not create any mortgage, 
charge or lien or encumbrance affecting the same or any 
part thereof nor do anything which would prejudice this 
security and the borrowers shall not part with the hypo-
thecated goods save by way by way of sale in the ordinary 
course of the borrowers business and as hereinafter 
provided nor shall any sale be made after prohibition 
« xxill -
In writing from the Bank against selling. 
3, That the borrowers shall with the previous consent 
of the Bank be at liberty from time to time to sell or 
dispose of in any manner the hypothecated goods or any 
part thereof provided the advanced value of such goods 
is paid into the said account or goods of a similar 
nature to those mentioned in the schedule hereto or 
any of the same and of at least equal value« are 
substituted for the goods so sold or disposed of after 
approval of the Bank obtained in writing, 
4, The borrowers shall permit the Bank, their agents 
and servants from time to time and at all times to enter 
upon any godown or premises wherein the hypothecated 
goods or any part thereof may for the time being be and 
to view, inspect and value the same and take inventories 
thereof and render to the Bank and their servants all 
facilities as may be required for any of the purposes 
aforesaid, 
5, The borrowers shall punctually pay all rents, 
rates and. taxes and other outgoings of the godowns and 
premises wherein the hypothecated goods shall be stored 
and keep the same free from distress. 
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6# That the hypothecated goods shall be insured 
against fire risk by the borrowers in some insurance 
office or offices approved by the Bank and in the name 
and for the sole benefit of the Bank fortheir full 
market value and the borrowers will on demand deliver 
to the Bank all policies for the receipts for permia 
paid on such insurance endorsed and assigned with 
the full benefit thereof in favour of the Bank, Should 
the borrowers fail to so insure or fail to deliver the 
policies or receipts for premia duly endorsed as afore* 
said three days after demand the Bank shall be at 
liberty though not bound to effect such insurance at 
the expense of the borrowers. The borrowers further 
agree that the Bank shall be at liberty at any time at 
its discretion ( without being bond to do so ) to insure 
the securities for their full market value against riot 
and civil commotion risk or any other type of insurance 
risk at the expenses of the borrowers with any insurance 
company* 
7» That all sums received under any such insurances 
as aforesaid shall be applied in or towards the liquida-
tion of the balance due to the Bank for the time being 
and in the event of their being a surplus the same shall 
be applied as provided by the 13th clause hereof. 
- XXV «• 
8. That the borrowers shall make and furnish to 
the Bank all statements and returns of the cost and 
market value of the hypothecated goods and a full 
description thereof and produce such evidence in 
support thereof as the Bank may from time to time 
require and shall maintain in favour of the Bank a 
margin of percent between the maurket value from 
time to time of the hypothecated goods and the balance 
due to the Bank for the time being. Such margin shall 
be calculated on the open market value of the hypothe-
cated goods as fixed by the Bank from time to time 
and shall be m2d.ntained by the borrowers either by the 
hypothecation of further goods to be approved by the 
Bank in writing or by cash payment by the borrowers 
immediately on the market value for the time being of 
the hypothecated goods becoming less than the aggregate 
of the balance due to the Bank plus the amount of the 
margin as calculated above* 
9 That interest at the rate of percent above 
Reserve Bank of India rate subject to a minimum rate 
®^ — — — — percent per annum with monthly rests shall 
be calculated and charged on the daily balance in the 
Bank's favour due upon the said cash credit/overdraft 
account untii the same is fully liquidated and shall be 
paid by the borrowers as and when demanded by the Bank, 
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10* That on demand by the Bank the borrowers shall 
pay to the Bank the balance them due to the Bank on 
the said cash credit/overdraft account together with 
all further interest at the rate above mentioned and 
the amount of all f\irther charges and expenses (if any) 
to the date of paymiJnt provided that nothing herein 
this clause contained shall be deemed to prevent the 
Bank from demanding payment of the interest for the 
time being due at the above mentioned rate without at 
thM same time demanding payment of the balance due to 
the Bank exclusive of such interest, 
11, In default of payment by the borrowers in terms 
of these presents or in the event of the borrowers 
committing a breach of any of the terms and conditions 
of these presents^ the Bank and their officers and agents 
shall be entitled without notice to the borrowers but 
at the borrower's risk and expenses and if so required 
as attorneys for and in the name of the borrowers to 
enter and remain at any place where the hypothecated 
shall be and to take possessions of« recover and receive 
the same and/or appoint any officer of the Bank as 
receiver or receivers of the hypothecated goods and/or 
sell by public auction or by private contract or otherwise 
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dispose o£ or deal with all or any part of the hypo-
thecated goods and to enforce, realise, settle,com-
promise and deal with any of the rights aforesaid with-
out being bound to exercise and of these powers or being 
liable for and less in the exercise thereof and without 
prejudice to the Bank's right and remedies of suit 
against the borrowers amd to apply the net proceeds 
of such sale in or towards liquidation of the balance 
due to the Bank and the borrowers hereby agree to acdept 
the Bank's account sales of realisation and to pay any 
sort fall or deficiency shown therein, 
12, That if the net sum realised by such sale be in-
sufficient to cover the balance then due to the Bank, 
the Bank shall be at liberty to apply any other money 
or moneys in the hands of the Bank standing to the credit 
of or belonging totthe borrowers or any one or more of 
thma in or towards payment of the balance for the time 
being due to the Bank and in the event of their not 
being any such money or moneys as aforesaid in the hands 
of the Bank or in the event of such money or moneys 
being still insufficient for the discharge in full of 
such balance the borrowers promise and agree forthwith 
on production to them of an account to be prepared and 
signed as in the 14th clause hereinafter provided to pay 
further balance which may appear to be due by the 
borrowers thereon • PROVIDED ALWAYS that nothing herein 
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contained shall be deemed to begative, qualify or 
otherwise prejudicially effect the right of the Bank 
(which it is hereby expressly agreed the Bank shall 
have) to recover from the borrowers the balance for 
the time being remaining due from the borrowers to 
the Bank upon the said cash credit/overdraft account 
notwitstanding that all or any of the said hypothecated 
goods may not have been realized* 
13• That in the event of there being a surplus 
available of the net proceeds of such sale after pay-
ment in full of the balance due to the Bank it shall 
be lawful for the Bank to retain and apply the said 
surplus together with any other money or moneys belong-
ing to the borrowers or any one or more of them for 
the time being in the hands of the Bank in or under 
whatever account as for as the same shall extend against, 
in or towards payment* or liquidation of any and all 
other moneys which shall be or may become due from the 
borrowers or any one or more of them whether solely 
or jointly with any other person or persons, firm or 
company to the Bank by way of loans, discounted bills, 
letters of credit, Guaramtees, chaurges or of any other 
debt or liability including Bills, Notes , credits and 
other obligations current though not then due or payable 
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or iny other demands legal or equitable which the 
Bank may have against the borrowers or any one or 
more of them or which the faw of setoff of mutual 
credit would in any case admit and whether the 
borrowers or any one or more of them shall become 
or be adjudicated^ bankrupt or insolvent or be in 
liquidation or otherwise and interest hereon from 
the date on which any and all advance or advances 
in respect thereof shall have been made at the rate 
of respective rates at which the same shall have 
been so advanced, 
14• The borrowers agree to accept as conclusive proof 
of the correctness of any sum claimed to be due from 
them to the Bank under this agreement a statement of 
account made our from the books of the Bank and signed 
by the Accountant or other duly authorised officer 
of the Bank without the productiion of any other voucher, 
document or paper* 
15, Th^t this agreement is to operate as security for 
the balance from time to time due to the Bank and 
also for the ultimate balance to become due on the 
said cash/overdraft account and the said account is 
not to be considered to be closed for the purpose of 
this security and the security of hypothecated goods 
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is not to be considered exhausted by reason of the 
said cash oredit/overdraft account being brought to 
credit at any tike or from time to time or of its 
being drawn upon to the full extent of the said siun 
of Rs, ._..._..,___«. if afterwards reopened by a payment 
to credit, 
16, The borrowers hereby declare that all the 
hypothecated goods are the absolute property of the 
borrowers at the sole disposal of the borrowers and 
free from any prior (^ arge or encumbrance and that 
all future goods and property hereunder shall be 
likewise their unencumbered, undisposed property and 
that the borrowers have not done or knowingly suffered 
or been party or privy to anything whereby they are 
in anywise prevented from hypothecating the hypothe-
cated goods in manner ^foresaid and that the borrowers 
will do and execute at their costs all such acts 
and things for further and more particularly assuring 
the hypothecated goods are any part thereof to the 
Bank as shall be required by the Bank and for giving 
better effect to these presents the borrowers authorise 
and irrevocably appoint the Bank and/or their officers 
as attooneys and attorney for and in the name of the 
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borrowers to act on behalf of the borrowers and 
to execute and do any act« assurance and things 
which the borxx»wers ought to execute and do under 
these presents are generally to use the name of the 
borrowers In the exercise of the powers hereby 
conferred* 
17, Provided always that this agreement is not to 
prejudice the rights or remedies of the Bank against 
the borrowers irrespective and independent of this 
agre«nent in respect of any other advances made or 
to be made by the Bank to the borrowers, 
18« In case the borrowers shall be a fiim or members 
of a firm no change whatsoever in the constitution of 
such firm,during the continuance of this agreement, 
shall impair or discharge the liability of the borro-
wers or any one or more of them thereunder, 
19* The borrowers hereby agree and undertake to 
comply with all the provisions of the various control 
orders already promulgated or that may be promulgated 
hereafter by the Govertsnent and shall see that the 
Bank*8 interest are not in any way affected or pireju-
diced by infringing the provisions thereof. The 
borrowers hereby agree to liquidate the stocks in 
terms of Control orders or any other orders or . 
instructions from Government, 
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20* The borrowers shall suhmit the declaration 
in respect o£ stocks held by them as and 
when required and the form and manner 
prescribed by the Government in the various 
Control orders and will hand over the decla-
ration as regards the stocks so hypothecated. 
In witness whereof the borrowers have hereunto 
set their hands this day of 
one thousand nine hundred and 
Place 
Date 
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LETTER OF GUARANTEE 
Place, 
Date , 
The Manager^ 
THE JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK LTD, 
,,..BRANCH 
Dear Sir, 
In consideration of your bank at my/our request 
allowing an accommodation by way of demand loan 
to __ ______,...,_ at branch, I/We Jointly 
and severally guarantee to you the repayment on demand 
in writing of all moneys Interest and other charges 
which may at any time be due to you from the said,,,,., 
2« This guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee 
and will remain operative and in full effect in my/our 
liability as guarantor is satisfied, 
a) You may grant time and other indulgence and/or 
enter into any settlement or compromise with the 
said • ••,. This guarantee will not be 
cleared insolvent, 
b) My/our liability as guarantor will remain unaffected 
even if the said •..,,••,.• may enter into any 
composition with his creditors or even if he may 
declared insolvent, 
c) This guarantee shall not be affected by my death/ 
by the death of any of us but shall remain in force 
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until the amount to due tho bank ia repaid in full, 
d) You may accept any security or part with the 
same or sell the same without notice to me/us/ 
my/our liability as guarantor shall remain un^ 
affected in any such event, 
4, Any account settled by and between you and the 
said #•,••..••or admitted by him, will be conclusive 
evidence of the amount outstanding in his account 
against me/us• The said•«•••,••••••,«•• is authorised 
to acknowledge my/our liability as guarantor at any 
time during the currency of the account, 
5, That the bank shall be entitled to proceed 
against me/us for the recovery of its dues outstanding 
against the said ••,,••••. without proceeding against 
him or exhausting any of the securities that may at 
any time be held by the bank in the account. 
Yours faithfully. 
Signature,• 
Full name ( 
Address,,,,. 
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THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR BANK LIMITED 
Residency Road« Srinagar 
PERSOHAL STATEMENT OF THE GUARANTOR 
!• Namei 
2* Father's namet 
3« Casti 
i« HOW long I 
7« Whether Married t 
9* Permanent Private Addresst 
10« Business Addressi 
11, Post officeI 
11• Description of house 
property ownedi 
4« Occupations 
6, Age: 
8, Monthly Incomes 
12, Telegraph Offices 
14* Situation of propertys 
15• Landed property owneds 
16, Its Locations 
17« State if encumberedI 
18, Moveable property owned} 
19, Business investments 
20« Your title to the aboves 
21« Market value of the propertys 
a) House value of the propertys 
^} Other assetss b) Landed propertys 
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22, H«ve yOM any vehicle on hire 
systwn of guaranteed anyt 
23, Are you willing to stand a 
guarantor oft 
24* Motive underlying guarantees 
25, Relationship with the borrower* 
26. Have you understood yoiir res-
ponsibility as a guarantor 
in this caset 
27* Give two respectable references 
with their Addresst 
1, 2. 
Z hereby deolare that the above statements are true 
and they will form the basis of my contract with you 
and if they turn to be false I hold myself criminally 
liable. 
Dated,••«•«•••«••• Signatxire of the Guarantor 
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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON THE GUARANTOR 
IN THE CASE OF DURABLE CONSUMER LOAN 
1» Name 
2» AddressI 
a) Official 
b) Residential 
3« Occupations 
a) Service 
Indicate the name of the 
institution where employed, 
Temporary/Pearmanent, 
b) Business 
Nature and location of business 
4* Monthly income i Rs, 
'^  the case of an emp3qree 
(attach pay certificate of 
the institution) In the 
case of person engaged in 
business state market repu-
tation and monthly income 
from his business* 
5* Age 
$• Details of assets of the 
guarantor by way of movable/ 
immovable propertyt 
7. Other assets^ if any 
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8* vrhttther the guairantor is 
a delator to th« Bank at 
i t s any branch< 
9» Type o£ deposit with 
the branch and date 
since when dealing with 
the branch! 
10* Estimated worth of the 
gueurantor 
11• Whether the person is 
fit to be a guarantors 
Yes/No. 
Savi ng/Pixed/Current 
Rs« 
Yes/No, 
Manager 
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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON THE GUARANTOR 
IN THE CASE OP DURABLE CONSUMER LOAN 
!• Name 
2« AddressI 
a} Official 
b) Residential 
3* OccupationI 
a) Service 
Indicate the name of the 
Institution where employed, 
Temporary/Permanent 
b) «ll«iMC« 
nature and loc9tidn of 
businent 
4, Mozttlfay 4n«so^et Ss* 
In the ease of an employee 
(attach pay certificate 
of the institution) 
XQ tim oaie of person 
engaged in business state 
narteet reputation and 
monthly inoome from his 
business* 
5. Age 
6« Details of assets of the 
guarantor by way of 
movable / immovable 
nroTiertvt 
- xxxx -
7* Othor assets. If any 
8* Whathar the guarantor Is 
a debtor to the Bank at 
its any branch t 
• Type of deposit with 
the branch and date 
since when dealing with 
the branch} 
2.0 • Sstimated worth of 
the guarantor 
11• Whether the person is 
fit to be a guarantor 
Yes/NO 
Saving•s/Pixed/Current 
Rs» 
Yes/No• 
Manager 
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Mado on between _,._._,,......_.,.,_^  S/o 
R/o ___.,«_.._,._«....«. herein after called as the 
employee of J«& K, State Industrial Development 
corporation Ltd, Srlnagar. Herein after called SIDCO 
Whereas the employee has applied for the post of 
In the scale of ....,,_.._.._._^« Now this agreement witnesses 
as under: 
!• That the anployee shall not give up the service 
at any time during the period of 5 years during which 
period the employee shall not seek employee outside the 
Corporation, 
2, That the employee shall not give up the service 
at any time during the period of 5 years and In case of 
breach of this condition the employees shall repay to SIDO 
all expenses incurred on the employee in connection with 
training, if any, tour and Impairting technical knowledge 
if any, and in addition a penalty upto 5000/- at the 
discretion of the SIDCO. 
3, That the employee shall not give up half way 
training if any, for which , the employee may be deputed 
during thit periodt 
4, That the employee shall beyond to serve SiDCO on 
completion of any braining during the period, 
5, That <unployee will faithfully, obldently discharge 
the duties Imposed upon him during the course of his 
employment and shall not be guilty of any misconduct. 
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6, That In case of SMy each of abdtve conditions 
the employee will be liable to be dismissed and the 
^nployee shall be bound to compensate the SXDCO for 
^ny loss caused to the later on account of the said 
brreaeh and early termination of this agreement, 
7« That the employee will not hold the SZDCO for 
Injury caused to him on account of an accident or 
misoheap arising out of negligence act for omission 
of any hi oo<»«nployee« 
a. The employee will have no objection in case the 
f^actory is put in the private sector or Joint sector 
and under such circumstances the employee will continue 
to work in the factory for a minimvmi period as per the 
Stipulation of the agreement« 
9, That the onployee shall be entitled to one months 
notice in case his work is not found satisfactory if 
he is discharged wrongly he shall be entitled to one 
month pay in lieu of the notice period. 
In witness were of the parties aforementioned 
have signed this deed in token of acceptance thereof. 
Witness t 
2, 
EMPLOYEE, 
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DEED OF GUARANTEE 
This indenture made the day o£ one thousand 
nine hundred and eigl^ty six between 
hereinafter called the Guarantors ( which expression 
shall unless repugnant to the context or meaning 
thereof be deemed to include their respective heirs« 
executors and administrators of the one peurt and 
the Jammu and Kashmir state Financial Corporation* a 
Corporation established by the State Financial Coxrpo-
rations Aot» 1951« and having its head office in 
Srinagar/ Jammu hereinafter called the Corporation 
(which expression shall unless repugnant to the con-
text or meaning thereof be deemed to include its 
successors and assigns) of the other part. 
Whereas this deed is intended to be supplemental 
to a mortgage/hypothecation ( hereinafter called the 
hypothecation/ mortgage bearing even date herewith and 
made between M/s _,.__.____^ 
hereinafter called the concern/firm/company of the 
one part and the Corporation of the other part being 
a mortgage/hypothecation of the lease hold rights in 
land hereditaments and premises and the machinery 
plant and fixtures referred to therein to secure the 
repayment to the Corporation of the Principal sum of 
Bs* (rupees ..,«...______^ )» 
•» xxxxlv « 
with interest at the rate therein mentioned and 
whereas the Corporation agreed to lend the said axua 
of Rs, (rupees 
to the concern/£irnt/company at the request o£ the 
guarantors and upon the terras that the guarantors 
should give to the Corporation such guaranicee as 
hereinafter appears* Mow this indenture witnesseth 
and it is hereby eovenated and agreed (the guarantors 
contracting jointly and severally } as followst 
!• If at any time default shall be made in the 
repayment of principal inteirest or any other moneys 
the time being due to the Corporation upon the security 
of the hypothecation/mortgage and guarantors will pay 
to the Corporation the whole of such principal interest 
and other moneys which shall then be due to the Corpo-
ration against all loss of principal interest or other 
moneys secured by the hypothecation/mortgage and all 
costs charges and expenses whatsoever which the Cor-
poration may incur by reason of any default on the part 
of the conceriv/firm/oompany its successors or assigns* 
2« The corporation shallhave the fullest liberty 
without affecting this guarantee to postpone for any 
time or from ti|)te to time the exercise of the power of 
sale or any other power or powers conferred by the 
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hypothecatloo/mortgage and to exorcise the same at 
any tlma and in any manner and either to enforce 
or forbear to enforce the covenants for payment of 
principal or interest or any other covenants con-
tained or implied in the hypothecatioxv^mortgage or 
any other remedies or securities available to the 
Corporation and the guarantors shall not, be released 
by the exercise by the Corporation of its liability with 
reference to the matters aforesaid or any of them or by 
reason of time being given to the concern/firm/company 
its successors or assigns or any other forbearance 
act or oiomission on the part of the Corporation or 
any other indulgence by the corporation to the concern/ 
firm/company or by any other matter or thing whatsoever 
which under the law relating to sureties would but for 
this provision have the effect of so releasing the 
guarantors* 
3* The guarantors will observe and perform all the 
terms and conditions and covenants contained in the 
mortgage/hypothecation in such kanner in which the 
ooncern/firn\/c!ompany is liable for the due observance 
and performances of the said terms and conditions 
and covenants, 
4, The guarantee herein contained shall be enforceabli 
against the guarantors notwithstanding the securities 
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specified In the hypothecatloiV'°>ortgage or any of them 
Shall at the time vhen proceedings are taken against 
the guarantors hereunder be outstanding or unrealised. 
S« In order to give effect to the guarantee herein 
contained the Corporation shall be entitled to act as 
If the guarantors were the principal debtors to the Cor-
poration for all payments and covenants guaranteed by 
them as aforesaid to the corporation* 
6« The guarantee contained in this deed is a conti-
nuing one for all amounts advanced or to be hereafter 
advanced by the Corporation to the f irm/concern/ccnnpany 
under the mortgage hypothecation deed as also for all 
Interest costs and other moneys which may from time to 
time be due and remain unpaid to the Corporation here-
under* 
7« The guarantee herein contained shall not be deter-
mined or effecting by the death of any one or more of 
the guarantors but shall in all respects and for all 
purposes be binding and operative until repayment of all 
moneys due to the Corporation aforesaid, 
8» The guarantee herein contained shall not be deter-
mined or effected by any absorption of or by the Cirpo-ra-
tlon amalgamation thereof or therewith bu€ shall ensure 
and be available for sjid by the absorbing or amalgamated 
corporation or concern* 
witnessess Signed by the above named 
1» 
2. 
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SURETY BOND 
•I'm i n I " I 
Whereas a loan of Rs« 
has been granted to Shrl S/o« 
» 
R/o working at present as ^___ 
by the University o£ Kashmir on the condition that 
the borrower shall enter into an agreement with the 
Registrar, University of Kashmir and further that the 
borrower shall furnish a surety* 
Whereas the said Borrower has entered into an 
agreement with the Registrar,University of Kashmir, I 
stand surety for the said Borrower and bind myself, 
successor, in interest as \indert 
That in case of the Borarower making default in 
payment of the said loan or any interest thereon as 
agreed upon by him or in fulfilling any of the condi-
tions on which the loan has been granted to him, I 
shall be liable for the repa3^ent of the full amount 
with intexrest due frcMn the Borrower to the university 
of Kashmir* 
Date Day of 
witness 
1* 
2 
• Signature of Surety 
Designation 
Adress 
